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From its independence from the Soviet Union 22 years ago, Kyrgyzstan has engaged in 
profound governance changes. The word ‘governance’ implies the rules that govern the public 
arena. In the Kyrgyz setting, this translates to administrative-political institutions at local, 
district, provincial and central levels, organising and governing the public arena and public 
resources. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan lost Moscow as its political-
administrative centre. Kyrgyzstan was cut off from not only economical support, but also 
knowledge and social and technical skills on how to govern their society. Kyrgyzstan started 
out as a relatively open system being the only Central Asian state opting for parliamentary 
democracy. The republic quickly turned to international donors, especially the World Bank, 
and aid agencies. Donors and aid agencies have pushed decentralisation of political decision-
making and participative measures in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government, with support 
from donors and aid agencies, has created mechanisms for local self-governments and 
people’s participation in these.  
This thesis will analyse how decentralisation and participatory development have enfolded in 
Kyrgyzstan, as these agendas have been criticised for not taking account of power structures 
in the society at the local level, and between local societies and powerful policy-makers and 
aid agencies. As the Kyrgyz government has implemented traditional and informal elements 
in modern, democratic governance structures, this sets the stage for a range of institutional 
sites to use or abuse to gain political power. Water governance has become particularly 
precarious in Kyrgyzstan, as operation, governance and maintenance disintegrated after 
Soviet collapse. This has created conflicts and poverty both locally and regionally. 
Decentralisation and participative efforts have to a large part been implemented by aid 
agencies and the Kyrgyz government in water governance as well. Local water associations, 
governance by local governments and collective volunteer work for digging canals are some 
of these measures. This thesis will study a village case where an irrigation project is supported 
by the Aga Khan Foundation with a focus to improve local participation and governance in 
water irrigation, develop agriculture and create possibilities for youth. This thesis will, 
through a ‘politics of scale’ and ‘institutional bricolage’ analysis, explore the possibilities and 
obstacles for different actors to move and use the reformed institutions of water governance. 
In particular, it seeks to answer how different villagers participate in the governance system, 
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AKDN: Aga Khan Development Network 
AKF: Aga Khan Foundation 
AO: Ayil Okhmotu  
CBO: Community-based organisation 
ICG: International Crisis Group 
INGO: International non-governmental organisation 
MSDSP: Mountain Societies Development Support Programme 
NAMSU: National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic on Local-Self-Governance Affairs 
NGO: Non-governmental organisation 
PRA: Participatory Rural Appraisal 





Glossary, organised thematically 
Ayil Okhmotu: a) Group of villages or loose settlements subsumed under one administrative 
jurisdiction. 
b) The executive administration committee of this juridical-administrative unification of 
villages. Functions like a government versus the parliament at the local level.  
Ayil Kenesh: Representative council of the a) Ayil Okhmotu at the local level. Functions like 
a local parliament in the two-tier village administrative jurisdiction. Performs checks and 
balances on the administration b) Ayil Okhmotu. 
Kenesh: Elected council bodies that are the administration bodies’ checks and balances at all 
levels- Oblast, Raion and Okrug/ Ayil Okhmotu. 
 
 
Oblast: Province/ region. First layer of sub-national territorial-administrative units below the 
central level. 
Raion: District. Layer of sub-national territorial-administrative units below oblast level. 
Okrug: Overlapping with the meaning of a) of Ayil Okhmotu. Territorial-administrative level 
below Raion layer. 
 
Akim: Head of state administration at raion level.  
Governor: Head of state administration at oblast level. 
Head of Ayil  
Okhmotu: Head of both Ayil Okhmotu and Ayil Kenesh. 
Aksakal: Elder, male member of the community. Enjoys respect and holds a specific position 
in Kyrgyz society. Can also denote knowledgeable and skilful, which includes middle-aged 
men as well. 
IX 
 
Ashar: Collective voluntary work. 
Tooganchilik: The norm of traditional village or community solidarity, the basis for the 
performance of ashar and patronage network support stystems. 
Kurultai: Village/people’s assembly or congress. Kurultais can be arranged by villagers, 
village leaders and aksakals, but also by national leaders. Used for encouraging collective 
decisions on local, regional or national matters, depending on the Kurultai is held at local, 
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1  Introduction 
Donor driven efforts for democratic development have profoundly changed the relationship 
between the people and the state. From the late 1980s, donors and aid agencies have pushed 
policies of good governance and decentralisation in receiving countries to create effective 
government institutions and boost democratisation. Governance can broadly be defined as the 
formal and informal rules that govern society or the public realm (Batterbury and Fernando 
2006). So, when one talks of good or democratic governance reforms, this entails changes at 
different levels and organs of government ensuring accountability, efficiency, transparency 
and democratic and participative decision-making (Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Sehring 
2009). Good governance and decentralisation reform policies have entailed a diffusion of 
decision-making power to different state, market and civil society actors at local, regional, 
state and global levels. Much decentralisation efforts involve pushing decision-making power 
to lower levels of government and local institutions at the cost of central state power. This has 
created changes in the way central government, regional authorities, local powers and citizens 
relate to each other (Doornbos 2001; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Grindle 2011). I will 
come back to the definition and different relevant aspects of governance in the chapter on 
theoretical departures.  
In Kyrgyzstan, decentralisation and participation by the people in decision-making is now 
central policies in most governance spheres and institutions. When the Soviet Union collapsed 
in 1991, Kyrgyzstan was cut off from its earlier central decision-making level; Moscow. 
Kyrgyzstan inherited a strongly centralised political-administrative system, wretched with 
inefficiencies and corruption. Much knowledge on how to govern society was lost, as policies, 
technical plans and knowledge were created or situated in Moscow. Experts fled from the 
newly independent state to the Russian capital, and Kyrgyzstan experienced a severe 
economic crisis as subsidies from Moscow were cut. The economical crisis escalated as the 
whole economic-political system of the Soviet states disintegrated (Adamson 2002; Sehring 
2009; Baimyrzaeva 2012). Kyrgyzstan quickly turned to international donors, particularly the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, institutions which instigated privatisation 
and economical liberalisation of many state institutions. When entering the late nineties, 
donor discourse changed, also for Kyrgyzstan. Now, the focus was on democratic governance, 
institution building and people’s participation. People’s participation at local levels, in local 
development projects and local governments, has become part of the good governance 
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agenda, as local populations should participate in governance to enhance democracy and 
development (White 1996; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Baimyrzaeva 2012).  
In this respect, I wanted to look at Kyrgyzstan in the light of its overlapping decentralisation 
process and participative development process. While there are examples from developing 
countries where local voices have been heard (Florisbelo and Guijt 2004; Waddington and 
Mohan 2004; Kulipossa 2004), these good governance reforms have just as often lead to the 
further neglect of local excluded voices by strong local or other political elites or wider global 
political-economic processes (Doornbos 2001; Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Grindle 2011). 
As these processes have been challenging in many parts of the world, how are they enfolding 
in Kyrgyzstan? 
In many development projects run by international aid agencies in Kyrgyzstan, local self-
government and people’s participation are meant to ensure sustainable public services and 
sustainable governance of common resources. Decentralisation and participation, pushed by 
donors, aid agencies as well as other state and non-state actors, are to ensure that institutions 
governing common resources ‘work properly’ (Earle 2005; Adamson 2002). Much 
development support of this kind has been given to institutions governing the agricultural 
sector in Kyrgyzstan, such as the management of forests, water and irrigation infrastructure. 
Agriculture accounts for 27% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but 60% of employment 
in Kyrgyzstan, and plays a leading role in the economy
2
. 
Agricultural institutions waned after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Within water 
management for agriculture, energy and household use, the unified Central Asian water-
energy system collapsed. Operation and maintenance of infrastructure, already crumbling in 
late Soviet times, disintegrated further due to the mentioned cut-off from and brain drain to 
Moscow. The economic crisis led to a decline in financial allotment to the country’s water 
sector  to less than 15% of that of the late 1980s (Iskender Dzholdoshjaliev, head of Water 
Resources Management Department under the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources 
Management and Processing Industry, 10.06.11; Sehring 2009; Kouplevatskaya-Buttoud 
2009; Baimyrzaeva 2012). Today, the need for canal and irrigation infrastructure 
rehabilitation in the countryside is severe. Many villages lack water for subsistence farming 
and sanitation. High mountain glaciers in Kyrgyzstan contain considerably important water 
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sources for the whole Central Asian region. Climate changes are affecting and continue to 
affect common natural resources in a severe way, which also affects its neighbouring 
countries lacking mountainous water-holdings (Jansky and Pachova 2006; Granit et al. 2012). 
This adds to the difficulties in and importance of resource governance. There are also security 
considerations to the governance reforms, as water and other resource conflicts across and 
within land-borders in Central Asia are a challenge (Olsson et al. 2010). 
Donors’ and the government’s good governance and participation efforts entailed governance 
changes within the agricultural sector institutions. But these efforts also entailed changes in 
the vertical political-administrative system – that is, the national, provincial and local 
decision-making institutions’ role relative to one another. When reforms are made for 
stronger local governance, the relationship between higher levels of government and local 
government often change. More decision-making power is being placed at the local 
government. Participation reforms are in addition created to make the local government 
represent the people at the local level and create a ‘democratic chain’ from the people to the 
state (Sehring 2009). In Kyrgyzstan, these changes have created a complex political-
institutional field, a mix of old and new, formal and informal institutions. Within this 
institutional field, international NGOs and aid agencies are implementing their projects. In 
this thesis, I want to explore this political-institutional field and how it affects the 
development efforts of an aid agency or INGO. I want to analyse which actors are involved in 
a development project, and what role and position of power these actors have – from the 
national to the local level - in the implementation of a development project. I also want to 
look at how villagers are involved and participate in these development projects, which are 
designed to have an effect on the participation of the people in their own development. I want 
to shed light on what kind of ‘participation’ is actually taking place, and if excluded groups 
such as women and young people are taking part in participatory measures. What is, in 
practice, meant by good governance, decentralisation and participation by the people in 
development efforts in the Kyrgyz context?  
1.1 Research questions 
Governance reforms means that a range of different actors and institutions, from different 
levels of government to villagers and their local leaders, are involved in decision-making to 
different degrees. In addition, aid agencies or INGOs are often included in the process, giving 
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them a role within the Kyrgyz governance system. So, the first bulk of my research questions 
is as follows,  
1a) how have institutional decentralisation and participation influenced different actors’ and 
institutions’ roles in governance processes? To support this main question, a second question 
is, 1b) How has this affected development in Kyrgyzstan?  
My second bulk of research questions is as follows,  
2a) what is the role of an International Non-Governmental Organisation and other different 
actors involved in a participative project at the local level? The supportive question here, 
helping to elaborate and deepen the main question is 2b) How do different villagers 
participate in village development projects where issues of governance and participation are 
involved? This question seeks to shed light on how villagers participate in governance 
structures and their own development, and to what extent more excluded individuals and 
groups, such as youth and in particular women, gain in decision-making power through 
representation in their local government. 
As mentioned, reforms in water and irrigation governance have been particularly in focus in 
development projects in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, in my thesis I have chosen to analyse an 
integrated irrigation project in a Kyrgyz village, Kun Elek, and the governance and 
participative elements in this project. The project has many goals that cross different sectors - 
agricultural development, job creation, villagers’ participation, youth development and halting 
out-migration
3
. I have divided the analysis into two chapters, representing the two bulks of 
research questions. In the first analytical chapter I analyse how Kyrgyz good governance and 
decentralisation reforms have affected different government levels. These reforms entail a 
mixing of traditional and new institutional traits, which affects participation and governance 
mechanisms in function at the local village level. I also analyse the role of donors and INGOs 
role in this governance system. In the next analysis chapter I then analyse an INGO project in 
the South Kyrgyz village mentioned, Kun Elek, and the participation and governance process 
in this village as a single-case study. The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and its sister 
organisation Mountain Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP) are the leading 
implementing forces in the project. The thesis will examine AKF’s/MSDSP’s role in the 
village, and whether the project is creating participation by or empowerment for villagers. I 
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particularly look at women in village participation, as they constitute a vulnerable group in 
the Kyrgyz society. The thesis will look at villagers’ role in decision-making in development 
issues, and how villagers are connected to decision-making organs, institutions and actors, 
both formal and informal. Non-structural interviews of villagers are an important component 
of the case-study. 
1.2 Relevance of the research questions 
Mosse (2005), ethnographer and a practitioner in rural participative projects for decades, 
argues that reform policy models, like a project’s pledge to engage in ‘participation of 
villagers’, function well to legitimise a project and mobilise political support, among state 
actors, villagers and other donors or agencies involved in the project. However, policies ‘do 
not provide a good guide to action, nor can they easily be turned in to practice, ‘(Mosse 2005, 
16). As development projects involve different actors with completely different agendas and 
power statuses, and who lead power-struggles with other actors over limited resources, the 
policy and reforms agreed upon when deciding on implementing a programme will most 
likely not be turned into practice. Practice and outcomes are completely different from, 
although hiding behind, policies (Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2005). The policy of reforms such as 
participatory governance will be upheld also after the project is finished, as this continues a 
support for a policy behind which lies the best intentions, but also a range of practices and 
outcomes that might even go against the idea of ‘participation’. As Mosse (2005) explains, 
“Ideas have to be understood in terms of the institutions and social relationships through which they are 
articulated, and (..) relationships have to be understood in terms of ideas.” (Mosse 2005,11).  
The development agenda has been pushing decentralisation and participation for many 
decades, whilst continuously learning about its shortcomings and failures (Apthorpe 
18.09.2012, seminar, Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, Oslo). It is therefore I find my topic 
highly relevant and urgent. As aid agencies and governments are implementing 
decentralisation and participatory reforms, I argue like Mosse that there needs to be more 
focus on ‘the institutions and social relationships through which they are articulated,’. As 
reform policies directed to implement decentralisation and participation are connected to 
formal institutions and still built on Western models of government, their should be more 
analysis of how these formal institutions, both INGOs and forms of government, meet 
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underlying informal institutions and practices in different ways. I agree with Mosse (2005), 
following his argumentation that it is not the objectives and policies per se, the written 
statements and motivations for decentralisation and participation that are important for 
outcomes of development projects. It is the actors involved and what they actually do with the 
stated idea of decentralisation and participatory reforms - through a myriad of different 
institutions - that ought to be the starting point of analysis. This will illuminate complex, 
surprising and perhaps unexpected and confusing outcomes, both positive and negative ones, 
of participatory development (Institute of Development Studies 2010). This is why I believe 
my topic of institutions and actors in village participatory projects are important. I believe this 
method of analysis is important, because analysing projects based only or mainly on 
motivations and stated and written polices, project proposals and reports from development 
agencies will narrow the complexity of your answers, not to mention exclude many complex 
answers on what participatory projects really do in a community. 
I was very inspired by the report “An upside down view of governance” (Institute of 
Development Studies 2010), which encourages everyone that is working within the 
development field to forget the mental models on governance and development that are rooted 
in OECD experience. “Instead of prioritising reform of formal institutions, they should look at 
the structures, relationships, interests and incentives that underpin them”, (Institute of 
Development Studies 2010). One the one hand, these researchers acknowledge a positive 
trend where more aid agencies and donors, included the World Bank, are now more focused 
on the need to understand country context, the interests of actors and the factors shaping 
these. But on the other hand, 
“The core objective of the analysis is usually to improve the effectiveness of aid operations. The aim is 
to find practical solutions – often to development problems identified by donors. There is a tendency to attach 
labels to problems, and to see political patronage, rent seeking, and vested interests as ‘pathologies’ to be 
addressed through reforms that promote accountability, transparency and rules-based behaviour (World Bank 
2008c). This risks oversimplifying a very complex reality, and can induce unwarranted optimism about the 
ability of donors to facilitate and support reform coalitions.” (IDS 2010, 6). 
I believe my research questions to be highly relevant, as they seek to analyse and understand 
the informal institutions through which actors operate in Kyrgyzstan. I will explore the 
meeting of both development institutions and practices and formal and informal Kyrgyz 
institutions and practices and how they work together, without labelling any of them 
automatically negative or positive. 
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 Some research has already been done on decentralisation, participation and governance of 
water and other resources in Kyrgyzstan. Baimyrzaeva (2012) explains how donors focused 
on formal national-level institutional changes, but had little extensive knowledge of the 
context in which they were implementing the changes. In Kyrgyzstan, formal reforms were 
not followed as informal ties secure resources and employment for many. Outcomes were 
further corruption, strengthening of elites, economical deterioration and the creation and 
further sustaining of ill-functioning institutions. Sehring (2009) claims that conflicts and 
competition for power and resources between and within different institutions, both formal 
and informal, created problems for functioning water governance in four institutional spheres; 
the decision-making process, the agricultural sector, the local governance institutions and the 
internal water-institutional linkages. In addition, Mosello (2011) identifies financial 
constraints as one of the main obstacles for water governance cooperation. He adds three 
other obstacles – political volatility, corruption and excessive presence of external donors. 
Mosello believes that donors still maintain primary initiative and control over projects. This 
hampers Kyrgyz actors to device their own sustainable strategies. Jailobaeva (2011) argue in 
contrast that when aid agencies started to move away from supporting NGOs directly from the 
mid-2000s, they enabled mutual cooperation and support between the state and the Kyrgyz 
NGOs.  
Nonetheless, Earle, Bichsel, Sehring and Baimyrzaeva also argue that the excessive presence 
of external donors is a problem. They assert that useful informal institutions of society are 
being misunderstood and thus rendered dysfunctional, by INGOs (Earle 2005; Bichsel 
2009;Sehring 2009;Baimyrzaeva 2012). Babajanian (2011) mentions how participative 
measures in World Bank-supported irrigation projects in Kyrgyzstan did not always generate 
participation from the most vulnerable. Many of the more underprivileged villagers, 
especially in the poor North, disagreed with the payment methods that were forced upon them 
by village elites, project managers and project policies. Basing projects on village traditional 
norms, although mobilising needed local resources, reinforced top-down control mechanisms.  
Messerli (2008) and Ibraimova (2009) contend that participation from all levels of decision-
making is unrealistic, as participative measures threaten the hierarchical methods of state 
structures in Kyrgyzstan. The executive branches of government have too much power, 
knowledge and influence in comparison to the representative branches. Also, the conditions 
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required to secure public interests are not present, as decentralisation was initiated from the 
top in a pro forma way.  
I actively use these contributions in my thesis, but wish to use them as background material 
for the analysis of the roles of different actors in the governance system and how they 
influence participation in my single-case study. I include an analysis of politics, power, 
knowledge and coping mechanisms at all governance levels and how these structures have an 
effect on each other. My contribution is that I analyse these aspects from the viewpoint of a 
‘politics of scale’. As an analytical framework, this suggests that scales of politics, from the 
local to the global, have an effect on each other, though often in a non-hierarchical and 
complex way (Görg 2007). I look at how politics at different governance levels together have 
an effect on my single-case participative project. Another contribution is that I also draw the 
analysis of decentralisation and participation much closer to the theoretical framework of 
space claiming or potential for space claiming, citizenship claiming and institutional 
bricolage. Some scholars (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Gaventa 2004) believe that creating a 
transformative, political space based on your rights and duties as a citizen will be the only 
way to create empowerment for excluded groups through participative measures. Empty 
spaces or invited spaces are still controlled by elites. What is needed for an empowering form 
of participation are spaces that are entirely formed or claimed by excluded groups. At the 
same time, Henry (2004) asserts that informal local coping mechanisms, highly important to 
secure resources for small and excluded communities, are often based on strict social control 
of some by local elites. It is naïve to try and implement space claiming and empowerment of 
the excluded in these settings. Cleaver’s (2012) theory on ‘institutional bricolage’ is relevant 
here (ibid.). She thinks that people continuously recombine elements of different institutional 
logics and by this change their meaning. They use the different institutional traits there are. 
She argues that both new and old institutions are institutional tools which can be used by 
actors to gain empowerment, but that actors have very different opportunities to take 
advantage of them.  I will elaborate on ‘institutional bricolage’ and analyse how the processes 
of politics of scale and institutional bricolage are sometimes intertwined, which gives a scaled 




In Kyrgyzstan, clans and corruption are also important informal aspects in Kyrgyz politics 
and for development. I have chosen to focus on informal institutions rather than corruption 
per se, as I think this is beside the scope of this thesis. Clan ties and corruption are 
interconnected, but the word ‘clan’ in the Kyrgyz context is, some argue (Gulette 2010; 
Radnitz 2005), quite exhausted. For this reason, I analyse different forms of informal social 
organisations and relationships. In addition, formal parties in Kyrgyzstan are also based on 
informal mechanisms and networks. I do not include them to a large degree in my analysis as 
this too is beside the scope of this thesis, although they will be mentioned when relevant. 
My case study is an ethnically Kyrgyz village, which has implications for societal norms and 
village participation. Babajanian (2011) believes that ethnically pure Kyrgyz cities have a 
stronger sense of village solidarity. This makes the thesis less generalisable for Kyrgyzstan, 
but still adds empirical evidence to theory and other research on ethnically pure villages. 
1.4 Clarifications 
I use the terms ‘INGO’ and ‘aid agencies’ interchangeably. These words bear the same 
meaning in the context of this thesis, and if they at some point do not the differences will be 
explained. In addition, I use the term ‘institution’ regarding many informal mechanisms that 
some might refer to as traditions. Nonetheless, these mechanisms function as important 
informal institutions in Kyrgyzstan today, as these informal traits are ‘important patterns of 
recurrent transactions’ and behaviour over time, and have social consequences (Kuehnast and 
Dudwick 2002). 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
This introductory chapter will be followed by a chapter on my theoretical framework. Chapter 
3 will be focused on methodology. In the next chapter, chapter 4, I present some essential 
background knowledge about Kyrgyzstan and historical-political dividing lines. In addition, I 
set the stage for the analysis chapters by contextualising important concepts of the thesis. I 
focus on institutional changes and the challenges and developments in the economical, 
political, cultural and social spheres from Kyrgyz dependency in 1991 up until today. This 
will be a framework to understand Kyrgyzstan today, as well as the following analytical 
chapters. In chapter 5 I present Kyrgyz good governance and decentralisation reforms. I 
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present the Kyrgyz administrative-political governance system as different layers from the 
national to the local. I analyse the result of these reforms, and how these reforms have shaped 
the different layers of government. I also analyse how Western agencies and policies are part 
of Kyrgyz governance reforms, and what role they have.  In the next analytical chapter, 
chapter 6, I analyse an aid agency/INGO’s role locally as a strong governance actor. In this 
case, it is the AKF/MSDSP’s role in decision-making and participation at village level. I 
analyse local participation in view of local power relations, other governance levels’ politics 
and other wider structural processes. I look at how and to what extent different villagers are 
participating in their own development and governance organs. In chapter 7, I conclude and 
return to the research questions. 
1.6 The case study. An integrated irrigation 
project in Kun Elek.  
As mentioned, my case is an integrated irrigation project in the village of Kun Elek in the Alai 
valley in the Osh province in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The project was planned by the Aga Khan 
Foundation’s main office in Bishkek, and was operated and managed by its local sister 
organisation in Osh, the Mountain Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP). It 
was financially supported by the Norwegian government, the Sustainable Land Management 
in the High Pamir and Pamir-Alai programme under United Nations Development 
Programme and the local government under which Kun Elek villagers are constituents. Also, 
villagers and private contributors donated 55 841USD. The whole cost was 93 897 USD
4
. 
This irrigation project is integrated as the MSDSP’s approach is to always include the 
involvement of the population and vulnerable groups in governance and development 
questions. In addition, they promote the creation of sustainable and market oriented 
agriculture in the village. This again will create opportunities for the youth of the village, and 
halt the massive migration tendencies of the village. Migration is a challenge for Kyrgyzstan 
as a whole
5
 (Saparova 15.11.11; Saparova (email), 07.02.2013).  
The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) is a wide and diverse group of development 
and business agencies. They Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) is their development branch. AKF 
focuses on a small number of specific development problems – education, health, rural 
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development, the environment and the strengthening of civil society
6
. AKF has a larger 
programme in the Kyrgyz republic called Promoting Stability and Economic Opportunity in 
Kyrgyzstan. This is not one project, but in fact AKFs overall goal for their projects in 
Kyrgyzstan. AKF wants to promote stability and economic opportunity by focusing on the 
poorest province
7
, Naryn, and the Southern province, Osh. In this way, the AKF implements 
projects in both the South and the North. Ethnic tensions are exacerbated by harsh living 
conditions and land scarcity in Osh oblast (Kipping 2008, 311).  The Alai valley areas in Osh 
oblast have poor water and land conditions, scarce and arid mountaineous landscapes. The 
valley and its mountainous areas has a larger amount of emigrating and unemployed youth 
than the rest of Osh oblast, but the whole Southern part of Kyrgyzstan has larger amounts of 
emigrating or internally migrating populations (Olimov and Omlimova, 2007; Nasritidinov et 
al. 2010) . Because of these conditions, and arguably especially because of a volatile security 
situation being a neighbouring country to Afghanistan
8
, many development agencies and 
donors focus on South Kyrgyzstan.
9
 
AKF and its partner University of Central Asia, also an agency under AKDN, aim to promote 
economic opportunities and stability by training civil servants to improve governance at 
regional and local level, train and employ youth, support entrepreneurship and rehabilitate or 
build infrastructure.  Emigration, youth employment, development of sustainable agriculture, 
land and water security, governance issues, market developments and ethnic conflicts are 
tightly interconnected challenges and processes in Osh province. Nearly 40% of employed 
youth are working within the agricultural sector, which is charachterised by seasonal work 
and low salaries (around 48 USD a month). Rural economic development is restrained by 
dilapidated infrastructure, weak agricultural markets and a constraining policy environment. 
As a consequence, the people are outmigrating in an unprecedented fashion. Nearly 20% of 
the country’s population is living abroad, mostly younger men, although the number of 
women are also on the rise. Many others have fled to urban areas
10
. 
Kyrgyzstan has a young population. Demographic data from 2008 show that 39% of the 5,2 
million that constitutes the population are between the ages of 14 and 34. Two thirds of all 
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young people live in rural areas and 43% of the residents in Osh City are youths.The anti- 
government protests leading to president Bakiev’s ousting in 2010, and the ethnic violence in 
the aftermath of the ousting, is to a certain extent consequences of the rural deprivation 
experienced by the unemployed youth.Therefore, the overall programme, Promoting Stability 
and Economic Opportunity in Kyrgyzstan, has an integrated approach. With this approach, 
irrigation projects are followed up by integrating local governance organs and villagers in 




The project was instigated by local actors, not the AKF. ‘Niva’, who is the head of the Ayil 
Okhmotu, the local self-governance administrative unit of several villages to which Kun Elek 
belongs, together with other leading figures of the village, proposed the irrigation 
development plan to the MSDSP. The proposal shared some of the same goals as the AKF 
overall program for Kyrgyzstan mentioned above - Promoting Stability and Economic 
Opportunity. The project proposed by the village to AKF is about halting the youth 
emigration process and bringing development to the village by building a canal for irrigation 
of non-populated land in the village. It has been decided by the librarian, Niva and the 
villagers at a village community meeting that the new, irrigated land would be given to young 
families. The canal will also irrigate the lower part og the village, as there is no water in this 
part of Kun Elek. As mentioned, there is an extreme lack of jobs all over Kyrgyzstan and 
especially in Osh oblast. It is also considered to be vital for the country to improve its food 
security situation
1213
. According to the head of AO, the village suffers because of its lack of 
water (Niva, 29.11.11). If young people were able to grow crops to sell on the market and 
feed their animals, the hope uttered from village leading figures and villagers is that young 
people would to a larger extent stay and not go to Russia or Kazakhstan. At the same time 
they would develop their own country, create better economic opportunities and thereby halt 
ethnic tensions. This is also to halt emigration and develop land for agriculture (Baatyrbek, 
Manager of Infrastructure Department MSDSP, 16.11.11; Suleimanova, Manager of Natural 
Resource Management MSDSP, 16.11.11; Niva, 30.11.11; Dardarin the librarian and his 
group of workers, 17.11.11).  
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In this chapter, I will present methodological approaches, the qualitative methods of a single 
case-study based on interview techniques and gathering of other materials. I will explain how, 
when and why I approached my case the way I did. I will elaborate on the researcher’s 
positionality and the stages of the research processes. I will also outline the challenges with 
the case and the methodological approaches. 
2.1 Qualitative methods  
Qualitative approaches are concerned with interpreting the social world or social phenomena 
to be able to understand how these are experienced, constituted or produced (Mason 2002, 3; 
Thagaard 2009). Qualitative methods are relevant if the aim is to understand the processes, 
actors, networks and power relations underpinning development issues, governance and 
decision-making in Kyrgyzstan. They are relevant as they show social phenomena’s 
contextual meanings and complexities that do not surface through strict use of quantitative 
approaches; they give a hermeneutic perspective (Thagaard 2009). Politics and governance 
issues are complex social phenomena that need to be analysed and interpreted in a way that 
seeks explanations for and meaning behind social action (Mason 2002).  
2.2 Case-study as method.  
Yin (2003) describes and defines the case study method as an empirical inquiry for capturing 
a complex process that is explicitly bound, even blurring with, its context. In addition, the 
case study “benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis,” (Yin 2003, 18). A case study seemed very relevant for my thesis as it 
provides the opportunity to explore and analyse how villagers and especially vulnerable 
groups and individuals are affected by their context when it comes to citizenship rights and 
participating in political spaces. As mentioned by Emmel and Hughes (2009, 322), the case 
study is particularly prevalent in the rich descriptions of methods to access hard-to-reach 
groups or excluded individuals.  
Ragin and Becker (1992) describe cases as complex systems that are influenced by, as well as 
part of, a large number of processes and systems involved. This blurs the case with its 
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context.  I found that my case was really not possible to separate from its context of other 
types of participation within the village, local politics and different structures of governance 
at different scales, from the local to the global. I look at how actors are working at and across 
various scales and how they influence each other (Lebel et al. 2005). The politics of scale 
approach is introduced in my theory chapter and followed up in the analysis chapter where I 
try to illuminate different meanings and practices at the different scales. This has 
methodological implications. I have tried to interview different actors at different political 
scales, juxtaposing their opinions.  
The case study method has been criticised for providing little basis for scientific 
generalization. However, in the case study, the goal will be to expand and generalise theories 
(Yin 2003; Thagaard 2009). In this way, my case is not meant to be generalisable to 
Kyrgyzstan or developing countries, but to the theories elaborated on in my theory chapter. I 
try to expand some theories in my thesis. I argue, like Yin (2003) and Thagaard (2009),that 
doing a single case study in contrast to a comparative case study gives a unique and deep 
understanding of contextually bounded processes. I argue that my case – people’s 
participation in a development agency’s development/ irrigation project in Kun Elek – is such 
a complex system, or process, as described above. This project is interconnected with its 
context at different local, national and global scales.  An analytic single-case study will give a 
deeper understanding of the case and the relevant contextual framings. 
2.3 Stages of the research process 
 Considering that the heavy responsibility of finding the variables, or relevant influential 
factors, of the study at hand rests on the researcher, I did a lot of research in the beginning. In 
addition, in preparations for, and during my field stay I read up on methods on how to 
conduct research in development settings. The theories I use derive from development studies 
and human geography, and I found participatory development theories and newer institutional 
theories particularly important for my thesis. Typically, when using qualitative methods, the 
different phases of the research process are flexible. There is a mutual influence between the 
formulation of the research questions, the collection of data, analysis and interpretation 
(Thagaard 2009). New information from reading materials or interviews continuously 
adjusted the interview plan, the research question and the focus of the thesis, making the 
different phases of the research hard to separate.  
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2.4 Data-gathering: Interviews as method 
Because of the complex intertwined processes at many levels of society that was the context, 
and part of, my case, I believed that there were diverse people involved having diverse 
positions, and therefore diverse opinions and insights on governance, decentralisation and 
participation. As mentioned by Willis (2006) on research in development settings, the 
meaning with qualitative interviews is not to get statistically significant results, but to hear a 
‘diverse range of people who might have different opinions and perceptions based on their 
own experiences and context.’ (p. 146). Their different opinions and perceptions might 
express the power differences and interests in the society, which was an integrated part of my 
research questions. To capture this variation, I interviewed people operating at different 
political scales - from the local to the global. I interviewed both state representatives and AKF 
staff at national, regional and local levels. As it turned out, my interviews with AKF staff at 
the local level were of less importance, as the regional office was more involved in Kun Elek 
than the local office in Gulche.
14
 
 I also did many depth interviews with villagers. The interviews took place during a period of 
14 whole days in the village, with interviews ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours. I tried to 
interview as large a variation of people in the village as I could, as there are often power 
differences in terms of class, gender and other social characteristics within a village (Mosse 
2001, 19; Mohanty 2011; Mosse 2008; Cleaver 2001). I conducted interviews with people 
from different geographical places in the village. Often, those who live closer to water sources 
are better off, and sometimes those who live more excluded and far from water resources 
might be worse off. This turned out to have some significance, although some significance 
had been erased because of the building boom in Kun Elek. 
I posed follow-up questions if something that seemed relevant came up and needed further 
elaboration. A lot of the time I was interested in information like the respondent’s opinion, 
meaning or understanding of a process or an issue. A problem with informants interviews is 
that what they say is often a mix of ‘facts’ about a process or an issue, and their opinion on 
this process or issue. I therefore tried to check the facts coming up in these interviews with a 
range of different sources. An interview schedule was developed, but was not strictly 
followed. My interviews with villagers were a blur of semi- and non-structured interviews. 
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Sometimes, moving towards more open conversations was useful as it opened for topics that I 
had not necessarily thought about on forehand. Also, information came up that I had not 
earlier assessed as relevant. When I was visiting the village, there were many spontaneous 
interview-situations occurring with different groups or individuals. Here, non-structural 
interviews were the main method because the setting was quite ad hoc. However, I learnt to 
always have some questions or issues ready for different groups of people, to have as a guide, 
and posed follow-up questions where I felt it was necessary. I also made a village diary where 
I made notes on important things that had happened during the day or important things to 
remember. I adjusted my questions for new information gathered that would influence the 
validity of planned questions, or give rise to new questions.  
2.5 Doing interviews. Where, when and how 
It is important to conduct the interviews in a way that is comfortable for both the respondent 
and the interviewer (Willis 2006, 148). I found it to be appropriate to use a recorder when I 
interviewed NGO staff, state representatives and experts, under the consent from the 
respondents. When I was in the village, I chose not to use a recorder. In these ad-hoc or more 
private interview situations, I did not feel it was appropriate or helpful using a recorder. I 
rather used some five to ten minutes after the interview to plot down the interview in my 
notebook, discussing what had been said with my interpreter. I was inspired by the methods 
of Willis (2006), who used a similar method during some of her research.  
I wanted to conduct the interviews where people felt comfortable, and at a suitable time. I 
visited the villagers’ homes during the day, when many villagers do not have much to do as 
chores are done in the morning. As unemployment is looming, many of those who are not 
working in Russia or Kazakhstan are at home. Especially women are at home a lot during the 
day if they do not have chores in the city or are attending events outside the village. As I was 
walking around the village, I also met those who were herding their animals or working in 
their garden during the day. Mostly, I chose to meet people in their homes as this seemed like 
a natural place. Villagers are used to greet guests to their home, and seemed comfortable with 
this arrangement. For women, they have no other natural place to meet in the village. In 
addition, we often found informants in the taxi going from the raion city/village centre to the 
village almost every day. We shared taxi with men, women, old, young and poor; however, 
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the very poor were perhaps not likely to take taxis very often. This was also a more 
randomized, although not optimally random, way to find respondents. 
Sometimes it was hard to talk to women alone. Husbands and grown up male children came 
in and out of the room as we carried out interviews. I did not want to ask the women the most 
sensitive questions in the presence of their husbands, like issues of male domination in the 
village. I thought it might create disharmony in the home, or that it would not be answered 
truthfully. As the men went outside again, I turned or returned to these issues.  
I also found there to be both negative and positive aspects with group interviews. They are 
useful because respondents get to discuss the topics among themselves, illuminate different 
sides and perspectives, go more in depth and give useful comments to the conversation topics 
(Thagaard 2009). At the same time, group interviews can give the powerful a strong voice on 
the expense of the weak. I therefore did both single and group interviews, sometimes with the 
same respondents doing both types of interviews.  
Having an interpreter involved advantages and disadvantages. My interpreter functioned as a 
cultural gate-keeper, introducing me to and acquainting me with socio-cultural practices and 
explaining accepted behaviour. There is a risk that something was lost in translation when we 
did interviews in Kyrgyz in the village. At the same time, most villagers new some Russian 
and I could in this way ask follow-up questions in Russian that they were able to answer or 
confirm. Also, we had continuous discussion about the meaning of different terms, how to ask 
questions, and cleared up ambiguities before, during and after interviews. In Kyrgyzstan, 
relatives are often obliged to help more vulnerable relatives get jobs (Kuehnast and Dudwick 
2002). This affected the way I obtained a interpreter, as it became clear that she got the job 
through the Gulche AKF/MSDSP office because she was the niece of the director of the 
office. She was an English student, but frankly, she was not that good at translating. From 
where I was located, in remote rural Kyrgyzstan, it was difficult to get a new interpreter. 
Fortunately, I could do all interviews with state and organisation employees in Russian, 
without translation, but with us discussing some terms that came up as the interpreter was 
present. Some of these interviews were also done in English, or in Russian but explaining 
more complex parts in English. I read up on relevant vocabulary beforehand, as I am used to 
studying different terminologies and technical language from translation courses. What is 
more, the villagers’ vocabulary was easier to translate for the interpreter. Villagers could in 
addition explain me in Russian if there was a need for this.  
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In addition, what I believe to be important is that villagers in Kun Elek are vulnerable in the 
interview setting, as there are power differences between me and the interviewee, and in the 
village setting and, often, in general. I tried to have this in mind when I had to handle 
spontaneous challenges in the field. As a researcher one has the ethical responsibility to be 
careful in the research situation, as any action from my side is to impose myself and my ideas 
in the village (Harrison 2006). My presence there might change something in the dynamics of 
the village. For example, if an informant is believed to have uttered negative meanings about 
leaders or the project or said something besides what is the norm, they might experience 
repercussions.  When I encountered norms that were against my own, I tried to be careful not 
to judge them from my own cultural stand before I had a thorough knowledge about them. 
This is especially related to gender norms and the different types of bride kidnapping stories I 
encountered.  
It is important that researchers “engage in in-depth reflection and acknowledgement of their 
own biases” (Mayoux 2006, 123). As my interest are within a more radical or critical 
development thinking, also from organisational work. I would say that I am biased towards 
these ways of thinking. This has probably affected my research, but at the same time my 
academic studies do give a buffer against such biases. Many times over my prior thoughts on 
a subject were met with evidence of something different, and I often reflected on my stands 
during field work and analysis work. 
2.6 Positionality and gate-keeping 
The researcher is always positioned in the research field. This positionality (in terms of race, 
gender, nationality, age, economic status or sexuality) may influence the data gathered (Willis 
2006). In the village, the possible dependence on AKF staff or elite member of communities 
to collect interview objects proved a challenge. Such actors are often referred to as 
gatekeepers in development research. Being associated with elite individuals or powerful 
actors might give the wrong impression about your role and intentions. Because of their 
position, it is in one way useful to follow their advice regarding whom to talk to. On the other 
hand, they will guide you, not always intentionally, to some individuals, leaving out other 
segments of the community (Willis 2006). If villagers think you are associated with village 
leaders, they might avoid any negative comments about these leaders or their situation in the 
village in fear of reprisals from the leadership.  
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In my case, it was certainly an issue that the villagers thought I represented either AKF or a 
Norwegian donor. Therefore, I always took time to explain that I was independent of any 
organisation, and that I was only doing research as a student. To get a voluntary consent or 
approval, I introduced myself and my research as honestly as I could and asked if they would 
care to do an interview. In the village I assured them that the interview would occur under full 
anonymity. I also asked if they had any questions about me or the research, or if there was 
anything they wanted to discuss that did not come up during our conversation. There is a 
chance that some villagers still believed I could connect them to more donor resources, and 
answered my questions accordingly. There is a probability that both villagers and AKF staff 
sometimes told me what they thought I wanted to hear. Fortunately, I did not visit the village 
with any representative from the AKF, but AKF put me in connection with leading figures in 
the village. After a while, my interpreter and I started walking around the village ourselves, 
then people would come over to us, or we would walk over to someone if we saw them in the 
street. Once the authority figures had connected me with a few people, I explained to them as 
politely and thoroughly as possible how I needed to find my respondent myself. When we got 
acquainted with someone, it was easy to get introduced to others. Thus, we gradually moved 
from gate-keepers to the Snow-ball method. This method is also challenging because of its 
lack of representativeness, as people might lead you to other people according to somewhat 
patterned mechanisms (Thorsen 1993). But on the other hand, talking to the villagers was the 
only way to get information about the other villagers, and to be introduced to them. As other 
villagers often knew who was poor and who was not, or other particularities about other 
villagers’ social status, this was a good way to meet a variety of people so as to include a wide 
variation of characteristics.  
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3 Theoretical departures 
Good governance, decentralisation and participation are largely interconnected processes and 
they are sometimes grouped under the term ‘good governance agenda’ or ‘good governance 
reforms’. These agendas have come from different political camps to create a better 
functioning democracy, in developed as well as developing states (Heller 2001). In this 
chapter, I will define good governance and elaborate on the context in which this concept has 
developed. The context has implications for how good governance reforms take place at 
national, regional and local levels in development countries. I will explain how community or 
village participation was co-opted by the good governance agenda, and elaborate on different 
theories and types of village participation. Arguably, good governance, decentralisation and 
participation have become buzzwords that hide different agendas, much because of the 
historical-political and institutional contexts within which they have developed (Cornwall and 
Brock 2006; Cornwall and Eade 2010; Leal 2007; Doornbos 2001). Further, I will explain a 
more radical view on participation, where participation is to create political space for 
excluded individuals and groups. These more radical theories also maintain that villagers 
should be able to claim their rights as citizens and therefore participate in decision-making 
regarding their own development (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Gaventa 2004; Cornwall 2004).  
As participatory development projects led by an aid agency involve a meeting of new, 
external institutions and existing local institutions, I will use the theory of ‘institutional 
bricolage’. As new institutions always mix with other institutions in society, one should focus 
on how, not which, institutions work, according to Cleaver (2012). I will elaborate on Henry’s 
(2004) thinking, which is based on how institutional bricolage are part of local coping 
mechanisms. These can sometimes be hierarchical yet necessary for survival in a poor village. 
Henry (2004) argues that many good governance theorists are too naïve when they push for 
citizenship rights and political space for excluded individuals or groups. With the theories of 
participation, institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2012) and local coping mechanisms (Henry 
2004) I lay the basis for the next chapters, on how the complex institutional processes in 
Kyrgyzstan, and power structures and knowledge transfer within these, influence village 
participation and the possibility for villagers’ empowerment. 




Governance refers to the ‘formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that 
regulate the public realm, the arena in which the state as well as economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions’ (Hyden, Court & Mease, quoted in Batterbury and Fernando 2006, 
1853). As with other buzzwords of development discourse, good governance spread fast as 
the term enclosed different meanings to different actors. The term’s open nature made it 
attractive, as it enabled a focus on a wide range of issues concerning public policy-making 
and authority issues at a time of restructuring in these spheres in many countries. It attracted 
policy makers, analysts, governments and aid agencies (Doornbos 2001, 94; Batterbury, 
Fernando 2006, 1854). The good governance agenda has been criticised for having pushed 
forward a neo-liberal agenda. The concept rose as the cold war ended, and originated from 
donor organisations’ circles, particularly the World Bank. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Western powers no longer had to support the authoritarian or corrupted politics of some anti- 
communist countries that the Western powers cooperated with and supported during the cold 
war (Doornbos 2001, 97). Donors from the west were now setting political conditionalities on 
structuring and operation of receiving countries’ institutions (Doornbos 2001). For donors, 
countries or organisations, good governance was about introducing state structures that would 
enhance accountability and effective laws. These things were to prepare countries for external 
policy intrusion, making them ready or even disciplining them to be receptive for the guide 
lines of global institutions (Doornbos 2001, 96, 97). To ensure that demands would be 
fulfilled, it was more efficient for donors to follow the World Bank’s guide lines for 
governance, which focused on ”creation of state-market mechanisms in developing country 
contexts that have been characteristic for Western liberal-capitalist systems,” (Doornbos 
2001, 96). 
 Good governance reforms frequently involve changing the scale at which institutions operate. 
The term describes a shift in political power from the central state to a range of other actors – 
to local levels, transnational organisations, civil society and private actors (Pierre and Peters 
2000).  Good governance is a package of reforms in the public sector that involves changes in 
policy, institutions and power relations between global, international, national, regional and 




Decentralisation emerged as states experienced that the Western institutionalised form of 
welfare democracies from the 19
th
 century and onwards could no longer ensure an efficient 
state democracy in the context of the 21
st
 century (Fung and Wright 2001). Decentralisation is 
the ‘devolution of resources, tasks and decision-making power to democratically elected 
lower-level authorities that are largely or wholly independent of central government’ (Bossuyt 
and Gold 2000, 1). The need to reform democracy in this way was a project taken on both by 
the political left and right in the Western world. Leftist ordinary people’s initiatives wanted to 
deepen democracy and make democratic state institutions respond to the people by 
implementing new and creative ways of ensuring popular democracy. Disappointed by the 
central government’s inability to secure basic services, they wanted an ‘affirmative 
democratic state’ — ‘the state that plays a creative and active role in solving problems in 
response to popular demands’ (Fung and Wright 2001, 5,6). The right, on the other hand, saw 
the costs of an affirmative state as too large. Their answer was to drastically reduce the role of 
politics. Their recipe was to deregulate, privatise and reduce social services (Heller 2001, 5). 
There are many ways of decentralising government, and for this reason one cannot generalise 
from one country to another. Decentralisation is grounded in diverging political traditions, 
takes place in different policy environments and is to reform very different administrative 
systems. There are different forms of decentralisation. Two important ways of performing 
decentralisation are decentralisation as devolution and decentralisation as administrative de-
concentration. In Bossuyt and Gold’s research on Ethiopia, Guinea and Mozambique they 
find that in cases of administrative de-concentration, civil service positions and budgetary 
funds are allocated to lower political levels. Simultaneously, decision making most often 
remains centrally. Local staff tends to answer to superiors located centrally.  Decentralisation 
as de-concentration has often created less flexible and less people-responsive government 
(Bossuyt and Gold 2000, 1, 2). In contrast, where there was decentralisation as devolution, 
authority is devolved from central to lower levels. Decisions about resources are made 
locally, and local staff tends to answer to local leadership. In addition, most definitions of 
decentralisation as devolution also involve that recipients of the democratic devolution are 
locally elected bodies (Schneider 2003, 39). This makes for real devolution of power and 
more flexible and people-responsive government (Bossuyt and Gold 2000, 1, 2). Outcomes of 
decentralisation processes can be very different if decentralisation is taking place ‘by design’ - 
where central government wants to improve its development performance, in comparison to 
decentralisation ‘by default’ -when the government lacks fiscal capacity to deliver basic 
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services to its citizens and wants to devolve spending to lower levels. In the last case, the state 
decentralises the burdens but not the power of resources (Bossuyt and Gold 2001). 
Expected positive effects of decentralisation are that lower level decision makers are likely to 
have better access to information, and that increases in efficiency will create lower transaction 
costs and stronger ability to compete (Agrawal, Ostrom 2001; De Vries 2000; Andersson, 
Gibson 2004). In addition, decentralisation is often defended as policy because it creates 
greater equity and imposes higher responsiveness from government to its citizens (Agrawal, 
Gupta 2005, 1101; Grindle 2011). Decentralisation holds great potential for deeper 
democracy and development.  
“Decentralised government can provide space for people to participate in local development. It can 
ensure a more efficient allocation of resources (including development aid), enhance local resource mobilisation 
and improve local governance.” (Bossuyt and Gould 2000,1).  
Decentralisation presumably spreads power, and moving government institutionally and 
spatially closer to the people will enhance democracy by increasing accountability and 
participation (Heller 2001, 132). It will improve decision making and responsiveness to the 
poor as the local level has deeper knowledge and care for ‘its’ population (Crook 2003, 77). 
Heller (2001) emphasises that the decentralisation project has turned out to be difficult. In 
reality, people often have much less power of decision making or choice. Central power has 
often been de facto sustained (Bossuyt and Gold 2000). Private companies, becoming part of 
the governance system for example by delivering services previously delivered by the state, 
have negatively affected livelihoods because of lack of checks and balances. Local elites have 
frequently captured power (Crook 2003), or non-embedded policies have been unsuccessfully 
enforced by states, NGOs and development agencies (Bossuyt and Gold 2000). In addition, as 
good governance has been pushed by many institutions that accord with neoliberal policies, 
lack of checks and balances and a failure to take account of power relations and politics from 
the local to the global have to a large degree affected outcomes (Heller 2001).  
3.2.1 Governance and politics of scale  
Governance reforms like decentralisation involve a rescaling of decision-making powers. The 
term ‘politics of scale’ is defined as how politics happen at different scales, or levels in 
society, and that these political-economic levels are in an influential relationship with each 
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other (Görg 2007; Herod and Wright 2002). Scale is socially constructed – ‘a produced 
societal metric that differentiates space’ (Marston and Smith 2001, 615). The scales most 
commonly referred to when talking about politics of scale are the local, regional, national and 
global scales (Jones et al. 2004, 174). Today, much governance is global, or having a global 
influence. Decision-making powers have been rescaled from the state to the global level. 
Much of the earlier debates regarding politics of scale were focused on how global companies 
and the power and governance of international capitalism where now truly globalised, and 
how the nation-state had lost much of its earlier decision-making powers in this new 
globalised world. Politics of scale were defined as politics happening at different levels at a 
naturally given and static scale, where the global was powerful and influencing the powerless 
local (Herod 2011, xii). But later scale analysis has gained more importance as it reveals the 
‘asymmetries, conflicts and confrontation of the globalised world’, (Paasi 2004, 536). Global 
policies, human rights, business or other social processes have connected with actors or 
institutions at the local or the regional level, sometimes passing the state, in an unprecedented 
if not new way. But now, the emphasis in the term ‘politics of scale’ is on how actors, politics 
and power move across scale, and that local and global political processes, and those in 
between at central and regional levels, are deeply intertwined, informing and being informed 
by one other (Herod and Wright 2002, 1-4). Furthermore, ‘socio-spatial scales are 
continuously reconfigured through social struggles,’ (Bolin et al. 2008, 1497). 
 For example, development agencies’ policies are made at a global level, and are global in 
scope. Nevertheless, these policies and decisions are reconfigured and contested at national, 
regional and local levels within the countries implementing these policies, by both non-state 
and state actors.  
As Masaki (2007) explains, policy interventions from global aid agencies are reworked and 
renegotiated by actors at local levels. In this way, the politics of scale affects the relationship 
between the state and its people (Mohan, Stokke 2000, 249–250, 258- 261). The different 
levels of decision-making from the local to the global are overlapping through both formal 
and informal mechanisms, and not clearly separated. Therefore, the success of governance 
processes at one level will be dependent upon its relationship to other levels (Görg 2007, 
957). In addition, actors move across and within different scales in political or social 
processes to achieve their diverse goals (Swyngedouw 1997; Bolin et al. 2008). For example, 
if a local environmental group has strong ties to powerful actors globally, they could stop 
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decision-making at state or regional levels. Or, if state level decision-makers are very 
powerful, or have powerful allies at other levels of governance, they can reconfigure or 
contest decision-making at local or global levels to which they are not devoted. Because of 
this interconnectedness of governance as decision-making, I will look at how different actors 
at different scales are interconnected in decision-making in Kyrgyzstan in my thesis. This will 
be reviewed in my analysis chapters.  
3.2.2 Participation as democratic decentralisation and good 
governance.  
As decentralisation efforts were meant to move decision-making closer to the people, these 
merged with another agenda of participation by the people in their own development during 
the 1980s and 90s. This agenda had its roots in more radical development thinking from the 
1970s. Disappointed with electoral participation as a traditional way of broadening 
democracy, it was argued that more direct forms of participations in decentralised governance 
would ensure democratic developments.  
“Participation is seen as critical to increasing the overall capabilities of citizens, strengthening fragile 
democracies, improving the quality of governance, and countering the influence of organized and powerful 
dominant groups.” (Heller et al. 2007, 627). 
Participation has been invented and reinvented again as part of development policy and 
discourse since the 1940s. Informal participation was the alleged saviour for groups and 
individuals that were excluded from broader development processes through post-colonial 
times and times of state failure. The alternative development approaches had their heydays in 
the 1970s.  These approaches rejected grand explanations and embraced belief in cultural 
pluralism and participatory development, and were linked to Post-Marxist thinking seeing 
participation as group mobilisation against both market and the state (Hickey and Mohan 
2004). They rejected class as the only locus for fighting for one’s rights, acknowledging other 
identities and relations. The alternative development agenda adhered to post-structuralism and 
claimed that Western and male biased grand truths were to be dismantled, the emphasis was 
on local knowledge revealed through more radicalised ethnography (Stokke and Mohan 2000, 
248; Hickey and Mohan 20004, 60). One of the most widespread methods in development 
work in the field became known through Robert Chamber’s Participative Rural Appraisal 
(PRA). He was influenced by Freire, who believed that people in developing countries should 
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be enabled to gain a consciousness over their own situation to be able to improve it 
(Chambers 1994). PRA was based on methods in which both experts and villagers joined, 
sometimes reversing roles, in inclusive discussion groups, consciousness building and 
participation in village tasks and knowledge-building, and in which they were to obtain 
knowledge from those who was earlier claimed to be without it (Chambers 1994, 26). Plans 
were to be made for, and by, villagers themselves.  
In the 1980s, community participation was mainstreamed into the major development 
agencies. It was a measure to exchange top- down, technocratic, blueprint planning of state- 
led modernization with bottom-up, people-centred, process-oriented and alternative 
approaches to modernisation (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 4). Participatory approaches were 
scaled up into national and international policy-making. Earlier, the participation agenda had 
been separated from the processes of institutional changes and good governance, being part of 
a more radical and grass-root or community development movement. Now, participation 
entered the government arena and governance institutions. Policy makers saw that 
participation could only be made effective if it was encompassed by institutional changes at 
all levels. Participation and changes in governance institutions became one mutual agenda; 
both processes were dependent on the other to make effective changes. This linked 
participation with much broader processes like democratisation and decentralisation (Hickey 
and Mohan 2004, 4, 27).  
As project-based participatory methodologies were mainstreamed and spread from non- 
government organisations to major development agencies, participation was criticised for 
becoming a part of neoliberal policy under the same agenda as good governance and 
decentralisation. There were still two camps pushing participation, the political left and the 
neoliberals. However, both camps push forms of decentralisation that do not try to alter 
politics and power relations. The neoliberals’ view on participation was technocratic, fulfilled 
through Western expert knowledge, institution building and public administration and 
planning. It did not include a political agenda of transferring power. The leftist vision had a 
tendency to reject other forms of representation for these groups, like parties and unions, and 
believes in the agency and participation of local actors themselves (Heller 2001, 132,139-
140).In this way, the leftist camp has been swallowed by the neoliberal agenda, and both 
camps disregard political and structural realities in which participatory measures are placed. 
(Bossuyt and Gold 2000; Heller 2001; Stokke and Mohan 2000, 251-254).  
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3.3 Participation – the new tyranny?  
Participation has become a contested issue within development. While Cooke and Kothari 
(2001) describe participation as the ‘new tyranny’, Hickey and Mohan (2004) brings a more 
optimistic view where participation could play a critical role in transformation. Cooke and 
Kothari express that the meaning of their own critique is to finally convey that participatory 
development as discourse might be the real problem, not that the methods or the foundations 
of it needs reconfiguration (2001, 5-7). As participation was mainstreamed into international 
policies, pushed by powerful international development agencies, the participation discourse 
is now criticised for hiding different meanings and discourses behind a nice buzzword. The 
participative efforts originating from the left discussed above had influenced people’s masses 
in authoritarian regimes in Africa and South America to oppose their regimes (Leal 2011, 72-
73; Hammond 1998). As participative thinking became part of the Worlds Banks programs, it 
lost much of its political and liberating elements. As the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes were put into action in the 1980s, consisting of harsh privatisation, the bank 
simultaneously developed programmes that focused on institution building and civil-society 
organisations so as to ‘soften the blow’ from state cut-backs and put a human face on 
development for the countries. These programmes were to ensure peoples’ participation in 
designing and implementing development programs (Leal 2011, 70- 74; World Bank 1989, 
61).  The Bank used words such as ‘empowerment’, ‘self-reliance’ and ‘participation’, and 
declared a deep governance crisis in the developing countries. The meaning of these words 
now changed from the meaning inherent in them when used by the radical people’s 
movements and those that influenced these. The radical leftist scholars had pushed 
empowerment of people to overturn authoritarian state control through increased political 
participation. The World Bank advocated the removal of that state from the economy, 
substituting it with the market. This was in fact quite similar to its Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, and arguably does not ensure development with a human face in any larger 
degree than these (Leal 2011; Cornwall and Brock 2005).  
Cooke and Kothari believe that the discourse of participation thus downplays political 
realities and power relations, both locally and between the local and the World Bank and 
other global structures (Cooke, Kothari 2001, 14). They claim that participatory facilitators 
overthrow existing and legitimate forms of decision-making. Cleaver (2001) reflects on the 
way development agencies and implementers focus on creating and building local institutions 
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for villagers to participate in; community organisations, associations and committees. These 
mirror Western bureaucratic patterns of governance, which is paradoxical when the reason 
they are implementing them is to ensure development freed from the state bureaucracy’s 
shortcomings. Thus, water user associations established by external experts have been prone 
to undermine existing governance activities that have been established through locally 
adapted channels. These local methods are not necessarily any better than externally imposed 
institutions, as they might uphold exclusion and vulnerability. But externally imposed 
institutions also have a tendency not to remedy these conditions, as they leave untouched the 
wider structural factors that shape exclusion and vulnerability (Cleaver 2001, 40, 42, 44). 
These experiences are highly relevant for the set-up of water committees in my own case, and 
how the INGO in my case later moved away from this policy of setting up committees.  
Many professional experts dominate decision making and manipulate, instead of facilitate, 
development processes (Botes and Rensburg 2000, 43). Mosse’s (2001) focus on how local 
knowledge, those times when participatory development measures claim to be based on this, 
is actually often shaped by the knowledge of the participation facilitators. Thus, the villagers’ 
wishes for development, becoming clear after they have participated in discussion meetings, 
is dependent on what they know or believe the development agencies can help them with. 
Development goals are based on external knowledge and practices, not local knowledge and 
needs. In this way, Mosse (2001) criticises participative methods for not taking into account 
power and knowledge relations. As power and knowledge stay with development agencies 
and their facilitators, participation sometimes does not lead to empowerment, or to the 
expression of real local needs. In these instances, participation functions as legitimisation for 
what developing agencies have planned to do (ibid; Botes and Rensburg 2000, 43). 
3.3.1 The tyranny of the group, the local and wider power 
relations 
Participative development has often been criticised for ignoring hidden power relations and 
exclusionary traits in communities. As Heller states 
“(..) to govern is to exercise power, and there are no a priori reasons why more localized forms of 
governance are more democratic.” (Heller 2001, 132) 
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The group dynamics that take place in participation efforts might make the already powerful 
more powerful at the expense of the weaker. Local participation is shaped by local practices 
and relations of power, authority and gender (Botes, Rensburg 2000, 45; Mosse 2001, 19). 
One challenge is elite cooptation, where local leaders or power elites might monopolize 
decision making and information channels. This again means that participation in the village 
setting takes the form of excluding women or other vulnerable groups and including those 
with power (Cleaver 2001, 53). Thus, participation is not always beneficial to those groups 
who have previously been excluded (Kothari 2001). Often, women’s participation is limited 
to participation in practical implementation, influenced by essentialist views on women’s 
traditional roles and naïve thoughts about “the local” or “ the community”(Cornwall 2011, 
203). Agrawal (1997) points out some problems for women’s participation in decision making 
that keep getting repeated. There is little comprehension of the time constraints women 
experience due to the responsibilities and work that are traditionally assigned to women; there 
is official male bias; there are social constraints about women’s capabilities and roles and 
there is an absence of a critical ‘mass’ of women and lack of public speaking experience. 
Another example is village participation in water governance that sometimes exclude 
marginal populations living on the fringes of or outside the village, but who nonetheless are 
users of the water source (Cleaver 2001, 52). These challenges and other pitfalls are also 
evident in research on water resource participation, which I will return to in my analyses. 
 Also, there are great power differences within different groups. For example, there are 
differences between women when it comes to age or status that are leading to the excluding of 
some women and inclusion of others in decision-making. Sometimes, the women themselves 
do make some women with higher status the vocal representatives for them as a group, 
because they are more eloquent and knowledgeable and retain a higher status in the 
community. In this way, they are respected and will be listened to in village meetings. Hence, 
groups and communities might have their own ways of handling these kinds of representation 
problems (Cleaver 2001, 44). At the same time, it is not given that particular women can be 
representative for women in general. Women with high status or power might secure only 
their own family’s resources (Cleaver 2001, 49; Cornwall 2011, 207). These are processes of 
inclusion and exclusion, and power differences, happening along various social relations 
within a society – class, gender and ethnicity (Cleaver 2001; Cornwall 2011; Mohanty 2011).  
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Wider power relations, not only within communities or groups, are also problematic for 
participative efforts. Cooke and Kothari (2001) elaborate on wider structural factors, like the 
power of the development agencies and how participation have contributed to the preservation 
of powerful structures and agencies. Hickey and Mohan (2004) agrees that much of the earlier 
alternative participation approaches that allegedly created the aforementioned bottom-up 
benefits did not create them in a sustainable way. PRA, the project-led alternative approach 
where in particular Robert Chambers was hugely influential, was not politicised enough and 
its focus was too local. Even Chambers himself realised this when he accepted to work for the 
World Bank on participative approaches in 1999. He argued for a critical chapter on the 
power of the powerful, included the World Bank, when he contributed to the World Bank 
Development Report 2000-2001. The World Bank ignored his arguments. After this he started 
looking at how powerlessness of the poor is sustained by the power of the powerful, he gained 
a more structural view where the personal power of the professionals, the “uppers”, was 
deeply linked to the institutional (Gaventa 2011b). Alas, alternative development and 
neoliberal positions tend to ‘underplay both local inequalities and power relations as well as 
national and transnational economic and political forces’ (Mohan and Stokke 2000, 247).  
3.3.2 The tyranny of the method  
Related to this, another critique of participation is that these methods take focus away from 
other methods better suited to create real political changes on a higher level than the village, 
connecting the state and the people. Power relations are at status quo in exchange for 
participative development assistance. The very act of including excluded groups in 
development projects might lead to disempowerment, as it inhibits them from challenging 
prevailing hierarchies and inequalities in societies (Kothari 2001, 143). On the other hand, 
inclusion of these groups can be empowering if participation is explicitly connected with a 
political agenda and not only with the implementation of projects by development agencies. 
Uniting excluded groups and creating linkages from excluded individuals or groups to higher 
political levels have proved more successful for creating long-term empowerment (Mitlin 
2004; Florisbelo and Guijt 2004). Mitlin (2004, 176) shows that studies of federating 
community groups, linked together by shared economic, political and cultural interests, have 
been remarkably successful in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Zimbabwe. This can be done 
through NGOs or popular resistant movements, and through alliances and partnerships with 
international agencies, international popular movements, unions, political parties and other 
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formal political-administrative structures (Mitlin 2004). Florisbelo and Guijt (2004) 
exemplify this with Zona da Mata, a meso-region of the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil. Here,  
poor rural smallholders have gained more political power in formal public administration 
through sophisticated political alliances (Florisbelo and Guijt 2004, 191- 198).  
These agendas were able to connect activities at various scales - local, regional, state and 
global, linking local activism to global political advocacy work. This is a good example of 
‘politics of scale’, where politics happen at different scales and also affects different scales in 
a non-hierarchical way (Görg 2007). In this way, they were able to connect villagers with 
state structures and thus create real political changes. Much local-global empowerment action 
bypass national governments in favour of applying direct pressure to global institutions. 
Although connecting the local with the global scale of decision-making has helped these 
societies, one shall not over-emphasise the importance of this connection. It is also important 
to connect poor people with their respective state. In fact, most participative development 
efforts need to connect with both state and non-state actors to have an empowering effect on 
citizens. Most poor movements still mobilise around issues with reference to the state 
responsible for delivering their rights (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 165; Mitlin, Hickey and 
Bebbington 2007). In addition, most people in poor countries do not have the means to attain 
a position to use these types of local-global linkages that are mentioned above (Gaventa 2010, 
262). In this way, we see that different scales of governance are not synced or sufficiently 
linked to each other, and most importantly they are not necessarily linked to the people. 
3.3.3 What kind of participation? 
To connect the people with the state, Hickey and Mohan argue for using people’s citizenship 
as a base for rights and participation to create power transfers that have potential for real 
change (Hickey, Mohan 2004, 3-5; Gaventa 2004, 37).If participation shall be empowering 
for communities and individuals, White argues it must be in the shape of representative or 
transformative participation (White 1996). In representative participation, the people who are 
the targeted group of a project have a voice in shaping the character of a development project. 
This way, being active in their own meetings and in discussions with the NGO, the people 
ensure leverage to influence the project. When participation is truly transformative, 
participation leads to real empowerment of the population involved. All involved parts, 
especially the local population, gain a greater consciousness about what makes and keeps 
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people poor. The local population gains a “greater confidence in their ability to make a 
difference”, and is able to influence government and power-structures (White 1996, 60). This 
kind of participation must involve action from below, but it is often through experience with 
external NGOs that transformation and empowerment is gained. White’s example is a village 
cooperative created by hillside families in the Philippines, encouraged by a community 
organiser. After learning about their own situation and poverty through their own discussions 
in this cooperative, the villagers started to organise political actions towards a repressive 
government. In this way, the villagers had gained consciousness about the reasons for their 
poverty. Also, they were now conscious about the rights they could fight for in opposition to 
the government in the belief that they could transform their own lives and ensure well-being 
for their families (White 1996). 
Much participation is instrumental, that is, people participate with their labour or their 
resources. Here, often, participation has no higher goal and include repressive mechanisms, as 
some groups might be exploited to do the work. It is often at a cost to the population, as they 
take time off from other chores, paid employment or leisure (White 1996). If the state has 
abandoned its responsibilities for its citizens or has low capacity to take the responsibility to 
deliver social services, self-help in this way is seen as a good option and gets support from the 
state and INGOs. The last instance then becomes a substitute for development policy rather 
than the missing ingredient needed for development (Stiefel and Wolfe 2011, 23; Masaki 
2004, 129). A Leal (2007) contends, it becomes compatible with neo-liberal agendas of 
withdrawing the state leaving service delivery to the market and civil society.  
3.4 Participation as citizenship; a political 
project 
Within a frame they call critical modernism, Hickey and Mohan (2004) hold that everyone 
involved in participative development must start to think about participation in a different 
way. Policy makers, practitioners and scholars need to think of participation as a political 
project. To them, modernism is simply material well-being. They argue for a radical 
democracy with direct popular control over all resources and institutions. The consequences 
of an unjust capitalist society can be contested and transformed by using one’s rights as a 




“ Citizenship can be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economical or cultural) which 
define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to 
persons and social groups” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 2).  
By denoting practises, Turner focuses on the informal realities that form a person’s status in a 
society. Citizenship is no longer linked to formal rights as members of a territorially defined 
state. As governance today includes actors and processes beyond the central state, citizens can 
claim their rights on the basis of local or global identities. They can work across different 
scales to claim these rights (Mohan and Hickey 2004, 62-65; Gaventa 2009). 
Gaventa (2004, 27-28) points to the misconception of focusing only on local participation. 
The focus should be on pulling the state and its citizens closer together and create 
mechanisms for people at the local level to influence politics at higher state levels concerning 
them. He agrees with Fung and Wright (2001) that the state’s inability to create welfare for its 
citizens and the decline in legitimacy of public institutions should not be used as an excuse by 
the right to dismantle the state (Gaventa 2004, 27). Local authorities have oftentimes gained 
responsibility that they have no capabilities to perform, and in addition they have not gained 
power. Political elites at higher levels often informally keep control, as they do not wish to 
give up their power positions. Alternatively, decentralisation has occurred, but without 
ensuring democratic mechanisms at the local level and so local elites have co-opted power 
and resources (Bossuyot and Gold 2000). The answer is to deepen democracy by creating a 
strong participating civil society and an accountable state that meets civil society with 
institutional change and structures for good governance (Gaventa 2004; Mohan and Hickey 
2004). Citizenship, as emphasised by Turner, contains practises. This is to enable people 
themselves to actively struggle for expanding and claiming their rights. Rights are seldom 
given, but must be claimed (Mohan and Hickey 2004, 67). Gaventa points to the fact that 
participation works best if these conditions are met; strong central state capacity, well 
developed civil society and an organized political force (Gaventa 2011a, 260; Gaventa 2004). 
These conditions are in many countries, like Kyrgyzstan, not present. So, citizenship cannot 
be successfully claimed everywhere. Here, it is imperative to create or develop spaces where 
excluded groups and individuals might obtain knowledge, seek strength and solidarity 
(Hickey and Mohan 2004). 
3.4.1 Spaces for citizenship claiming 
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Cornwall (2004) situates citizenship and rights-struggle spatially, arguing that these processes 
they take place in a certain space in contrast to other possible spaces. A general, yet usable, 
definition of space by human geographers is where ‘place is located’. Place is ‘lived space’ 
(Agnew and Livingstone 2011, 318) – place is usually filled with social meaning, conventions 
or cultural understanding, but framed by, or located in, space. So, the spatial frame or location 
affects social processes (Agnew and Livingstone 2011).  
The practical display of citizenship struggles and widening democracy takes place in new, or 
reformed, spaces. But some political spaces where differentiated people come together have 
not been sufficiently adapted to engage excluded individuals or groups. As an example, 
Mohanty (2011, 265) mentions local governance institutions and sectoral institutions for 
watershed development in Northern India. These institutions have been created at the village 
level by the Indian state to invite and enhance the participation of low-caste, poor, tribal 
groups and women. Although women constitute two thirds of these institutions, these spaces 
only reinforce stereotyped identities of women. Many women do not speak in public, and 
those that do are not heard and discriminated against in these spaces. Women’s participation 
in village meetings is against village code of conduct. Women’s inability to raise their voice 
in one space might also be a result of their status in other spaces, like gendered differences or 
discriminatory practices in the home. Or, it might be caused by their lack of knowledge 
(Cornwall 2004, 78; Cleaver 2001, 51; Cleaver 2012). These spaces are then largely empty 
spaces, where real participation and empowerment do not take place (Mohanty 2011).   
So, the good governance agenda and decentralisation have opened up many spaces previously 
closed for people at the local level. Yet, only spaces that are claimed, fashioned and chosen by 
marginalised people might lead to radical change (Cornwall 2004; Gaventa 2004). Spaces that 
invite marginal people, but let power and status differentiations be played out in the given 
space, will rather keep the status quo. Gaventa (2004) separates between closed spaces, 
invited spaces, empty spaces and claimed/created spaces (Gaventa 2004,35, 36). In closed 
spaces, decisions are still only made by a certain set of actors behind closed doors. In the 
invited spaces, efforts have been made to include people in decision making by governments, 
NGOs or supranational agencies. These might still be controlled by their instigators, and are 
often empty spaces if no transformation of power differences occurs. Claimed or created 
spaces are created more autonomously by the less powerful, or these groups of people are 
claiming spaces from or against power holders. These different types of spaces are not 
35 
 
autonomous but relational to one other, and actors will move between them. As mentioned 
above, status in the home space might affect status in other spaces negatively. Or, closed 
spaces might become invited spaces as the state needs to legitimise its policies. Invited spaces 
might become claimed spaces from the other end, as popular movements can take over the 
space for engagement with the state. Also, knowledge and power gained in one space can be 
used to enter and affect other spaces. For example, if we go back to Mohanty’s study, (2011, 
274-276), the women in the Akolpura village participate in healthcare and mother-centres. 
These are accepted women spheres, and therefore women can participate freely here. The 
space is not threatening for village cultural codes, which does not lead to political changes. 
Nonetheless, this space has given the women knowledge and education that have improved 
their capabilities. Mohanty claims that in villages where external NGOs create spaces next to 
the state-created spaces is where this effect really becomes prevalent. Here, NGO created 
institutions have given women a space to gain self-confidence and skills that can lay the 
ground for permeating other state-created spaces later. Thus, spaces constantly engage and 
affect each other (Mohanty 2011). Spaces are always ‘infused with existing power relations’, 
but they are also non-determinable and cannot be fully controlled. There are always 
possibilities to change these power relationships as long as a space is there; “they are always 
sites of resistance,” (Cornwall 2004, 81). Although, in Mohanty’s case above (2011), there is 
a danger that the spaces mentioned in Akolpura might also just stay empty. 
Henry (2004, 147- 152) points to the fact that in many communities, spaces are too difficult to 
claim and participation as citizenship claiming upon the state are very far from real attainable 
goals. Here he contrasts to rights-based citizenship and space theories. He broadens the study 
of participative development as he acknowledges how social control and obligation to your 
village is the underpinning pillars of membership of a community. In villages of the Gurage, 
an indigenous group in Ethiopia, the villagers participate in an organisation for development 
by giving labour and money for development projects implemented by the communities 
themselves. The founders of the organisation are the urban elite in the capital Addis Ababa, 
by request of rural respected elders in the villages. The success of the project has been 
attained by rural-urban migration linkages. Networks and clan ties to the capital, held up by 
traditional ceremonial institutions or events and the leaders’ and elders’ network knowledge, 
makes the rural Gurage mobilise urban resources, as well as their own participation and 
contribution. Villagers participate due to strong social control and village norms of solidarity. 
Leaders carry out strong control and sanctions, but they are also trusted to have the abilities to 
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lead based on a strong sense of community citizenship and duties. Henry shows that strong 
and sometimes exclusive social control by leadership is necessary. Scholars should not be 
naïve and presume that participation by weak groups is always necessary (Henry 2004). 
3.5 Institutional bricolage.   
Henry’s (2004) way of thinking has close resemblance to Cleaver’s (2012) theory of 
‘institutional bricolage’, where institutions are seen as always a mix of old and new, formal 
and informal. Cleaver explains how necessary improvisation, everyday norms and struggles 
over meaning and resources are mediated through institutions by all the people that use them. 
Institutions are in this way shaped by people as institutional engineers, or bricoleurs as 
Cleaver calls them. The bricoleurs are external development agents, state or local powers and 
villagers or citizens that are both using and shaping the formal and informal institutions from 
their experiences in their every-day lives. The different bricoleurs have very different 
capacities to shape the institutions, giving them different opportunities for deciding which 
norms are becoming institutionalised and which are not. For example, the power and capacity 
of a villager is often low in comparison to the state’s or a powerful development agency’s 
capacity to steer institutions. Cleaver contends that social theorist still have not explained well 
enough the relationship between structures and agency when it comes to the relationship 
between institutions and development. She argues that social theorists and some of the 
participation advocates do not elaborate on the dominating force of power on agents to a 
satisfying degree. In this way, she agrees with Mohan and Stokke (2000, 257) and Gaventa 
(2011b, 71, 72), and argue that the power of the powerful locally, and powerful external 
structures, are often keepers, not sharers, of power. The powerful may halt empowerment of 
the individuals in development projects.   
Her work contrasts with the good governance agenda. Cleaver argues that one shall not ask 
which institutions are best, as governance institutions change dependent on which actors and 
what politics and institutions that are already existing. She wants to understand how 
institutions work in practice and in a given context, and consequently why the outcomes 
benefit some people and exclude others (Cleaver 2012, 1). This is especially because of the 
‘wickedness’ of complex environmental problems; they are tightly connected to issues of 
values, equity and social justice in a way that will not create agreement on solutions. The 
problems cannot be solved only by science (Cleaver 2012). 
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Cleaver holds that meaning from one institution, like traditional community meetings or 
village solidarity norms, can leak to the newer institution of community development 
committees initiated by an external organisation. Meaning leaks as the institution builders can 
connect and draw on these earlier institutions and the value embedded in these so people can 
see the meaning inherent in the new institutions. In this way, institution building creates not 
entirely new and not entirely traditional institutions. Ad hoc and unplanned events make 
institutional processes filled with unintended outcomes. In addition, institution building mixes 
formal and informal elements, and unbalanced power relations are sometimes upheld. Formal 
good governance policies like decentralisation and participation might contrast with, and 
sometimes disable, important traits of bricolage (Cleaver 2012, 3, 4). 
New institutions, externally imposed or indigenous ones, are never built from scratch by 
externals. Institutional bricoleurs draw on whatever they have of traditions and on ways of 
doing things (Cleaver 2012, 39, 43-45). Migration, village ceremonies and village norms of 
control, solidarity and sanctions all mix with newer institutions for resource governance. 
When using traditional governance institutions, villagers and village leaders often learn new 
and better participative and organisational methods from international development norms 
and methods. They can use these methods and norms as ‘institutional resources’ in their 
development scheme. Many development scholars point to a Foucauldian power ‘circulating 
within societies’, where power and knowledge from aid agencies and powerful leaders is both 
enabling and disciplining at the same time, circulating between the different actors in a 
society (Masaki 2007, 3- 17; Henry 2004; Cleaver 2012).  Institutional bricolage is a way to 
see how villagers have different abilities to draw on external institutional traits that take 
different forms at different political scales. In formal good governance efforts and informal 
village practices, hierarchy and power is present, being both enabling and disciplining.  
As developments in Kyrgyzstan match the theory of institutional bricolage, I will analyse how 
institutional bricolage have enfolded in the Kyrgyz context of governance reforms, and what 
outcomes there have been for development in Kyrgyzstan. These reforms are also scaled, 
where politics at the local, regional, state and global level affect each other. I will show how 
politics of scale and institutional bricolage together influence which actors that have decision-
making power in the decentralised political system in Kyrgyzstan, and how the participative 




4 Political dividing lines and informal 
mechanisms 
In this chapter, I will outline the different historical dividing lines in Kyrgyzstan and how they 
merge with post-Soviet problems of economical, social and political nature. I will explain 
how these conflicts and dividing lines have created ethnic tension and violence, and I will 
outline the most important political events in Kyrgyzstan’s 22 years as an independent state. I 
will examine in some depth how informal politics and power structures, based on regional 
clan divisions and clan structures, are mixing in with new political and institutional reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan. This political and institutional field creates room for a strong merging of formal 
and informal practices, a mix of more or less external and indigenous institutional practices.  
4.1 Dynamics of conflict, power structures and 
political dividing lines 
When Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union, a new, so-called ‘liberal-democratic’ 
elite also arose in Kyrgyzstan, opposing the old Soviet ‘Nomenklatura’. There is also an 
underlying historic conflict between North and South in the country, upon which the new 
elites and the opposing ‘Nomenklatura’ was based. The North was russified earlier under the 
Russian tsar from the 1860s, it became secularized and urbanised. The North grew to be the 
political administrative centre. The South is predominantly rural, it is a part of the multi-
cultural green Fergana Valley and historically also a part of the Uzbek civilisation. This part 
is more traditional and Islam has a stronger position. In Soviet times, the North remained 
political-administrative centre and the South became the productive agricultural region. 
During Soviet times, the elites of the two different regions argued for resources, and further 
entrenched the division lines between the North and the South. Today, these division lines 
still count (Khanin 2004; Roberts 2010; Roy 2000). 
North and South is further separated by the overlapping dividing lines of ethnicity and 
traditionally nomadic versus sedentary lifestyles. Ethnic Kyrgyz to a large part make up the 
population in the North together with the Slavic population. The latter has been severely 
reduced since the Soviet breakup. Uzbeks are concentrated in the South, in the Fergana valley 
and the borderlands to Uzbekistan (Khanin 2004, 216; Roberts 2010, 8; Roy 2000, 115). 
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There is a historical continuum of nomadic versus sedentary differences between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks. As Kyrgyz in the South have been sedentary longer than the Kyrgyz of the North, the 
nomadic/sedentary divide still constitutes a difference in how Kyrgyz and Uzbeks live. High 
population density and scarce land is one of the most severe social, economical and 
environmental problems of the South, and is mostly taking place in the Fergana Valley 
(Sehring and Giese 2011). Although one should be careful not to over-generalise the social 
meaning of this divide today, the divergent attitudes towards property have aggravated 
conflicts between the groups (Roberts 2010, 3, 4). 
The ousting of the first two presidents was, among other interconnected reasons, connected 
with the exploitation and balancing of the powerbases of North and South (Ryabkov 2008, 
301- 303; Collins 2006; Crisis Group International 2010). After the second president Bakiev 
was ousted, the following ethnic riots in Osh stand as the most violent episode in independent 
Kyrgyz history. The riots, or as the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that I have talked to on the streets call 
it; the  ‘events’ or ‘war’, of summer 2010, killed approximately 400 people, mostly Uzbeks, 
and destroyed over 2000 buildings in Osh City
15
. As an economical and energy crisis 
happened at the same time as there was a power vacuum from the ousting of the Southern 
based president, fear spread and escalated into violent riots. Rumours and networks spread 
fear and violence that escalated because of the insecure vacuum of power, and gave the riots 
an ethnic framing (Hanks 2011, 179; International Crisis Group 2010). This reminded the 
population of the ethnic riots in June 1990, almost twenty years before the Osh events 
occurred.  
4.2 Informal politics, institutions and structures 
of power 
Kyrgyzstan was a clan based society
16
 prior to Soviet Rule
17
. Clan members in Kyrgyzstan 
are connected to a village or a region, no matter whether the members live there or not 




Most recent detailed and chronological report on the violent happenings from the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee, Memorial Human Rights Centre and Freedom House, 
http://www.nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Rapporter/2012/Rapport_2_12_ENG_nett.pdf 
16
 Clans are patrilinear units, congregated in larger tribes, whose members all descended from a common known 
ancestor (Hvoslef 1997, 99). 
17
 Although the Russians began colonising the region in the late 1860s, the Russians did not interfere with clan 
identities or customs in any formidable way (Luong 2000). 
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(Hvoslef 1997, 99). Although in some ways lying latent during Soviet times, clans survived 
through synthesis with the Soviet party system, and have according to Khanin (2004) shown 
themselves to be flexible in the post-Soviet period as well. The clans integrated the new 
‘democratic’ elites surfacing in the perestroika years. These democrats mostly became 
partners of the urbanised and russified Northern political clans. The Northerners claimed they 
were liberal democrats and used this wave to oust the Southerners, who had high positions in 
the Soviet government. This is how the Northerner Akayev became president. Alas, the 
political shift was not really one from communists to democrats, but clan leaders taking 
advantage of change in government, ‘a redistribution of power within and between neo-
traditional informal political institutions’ (Khanin 2004, 217- 221).  
In post- Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the state and government elites control commercialised property 
and resources, and the most important source of conflict has been about acquisition of 
political power on national, regional and local level to attain resources (Khanin 2004). 
Vladimir Khanin, explains that 
“ (..) informal structures of power, or ‘ political clans’, are among the most important institutional actors 
in the struggle for the control and distribution of resources in many Asian and African countries, including 
Kyrgyzstan. The political clans are neo-traditional institutions of power, an institutionalised form of patron-client 
relations, which play a dominant role in the majority of non-Western social systems,” (Khanin 2004, 217).  
Political clan ties became the main mechanism to usurp power and resources. These clans 
were not longer only linked to kinship, but ‘consolidated through a system of personal 
relations – people from the same region, on the one hand, and business, professional, property 
and administrative connections on the other,’ (Khanin 2004, 217; Collins 2006). Hence, the 
new market and administrative opportunities created new and reconfigured informal 
mechanisms (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). The political clan elites are often a narrow group 
on national or regional level. In his decentralisation efforts starting already in 1994 the first 
president Akayev’ he basically gave much power to the regional governors, the Akims, to 
build a good relationship with the regional elites. The Akims’ growing influence meant that 
they became the leading political clan patrons. They obtained mechanisms to control regional, 
political, bureaucratic and business establishment. The use of both formal mechanisms – 
electoral machinery and local government organs – and informal mechanisms – mobilising 
ethnic and tribal support – ‘is the key element in the influence of tribal-regional political 
groups’ (Khanin 2004, 224). Khanin explains how this evolvement of decentralisation is 
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really what democratisation processes has been about in Kyrgyzstan, and how decentralisation 
of power structures intersects with  
‘(…) the multi-structurality of local ‘pseudo- modern’ society, which adopts modern Western- style 
democratic institutions and enrich them with local, neo-traditional content,’ (Khanin 2004, 228).  
At the local level, in the ail s- communal villages and small urban centres, Khanin argues that 
these conflict lines emerge ‘in the political competition of the leaders of extended family and 
lineage groups’ (Khanin 2004, 217.). At all levels, the informal relations were based on giving 
resources and services for support to their clan members in a patron-client relationship. 
Khanin (2004, 217- 221) argues that clan and tribal political networking connects elite level 
of politics with the village clan network, creating a broad-reaching mutual system of support 
and resources from the local to the national level. I will argue below that this view hides 
important differences between the excluded and the included in society. Today, informal 
mechanisms and patron-client relationships are shaped by power and economic differences in 
a post-Soviet reality (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). 
4.3 ‘Clan’ as an exhausted term? 
The social importance of clan in Kyrgyzstan and similar societies, and the meaning of the 
term itself, are today of much discussion (Radnitz 2005; Collins 2006; Sjöberg 2009; Gulette 
2010; Momunova 2012). Collins by and large agrees with Khanin, saying that ‘clan pacts’ are 
the foundational organising principle of Kyrgyz society, and she defines clan as  
“(…) an informal organisation comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities. (..) 
“Fictive kinship” ties go beyond blood ties and incorporate individuals into the network through marriage, 
family alliances, school ties, localism (mestnichestvo), and neighbourhood (mahalla) and village (qishloq),” 
(Collins 2006, 17).  
In this respect, Radnitz (2007) argues that Collins creates false binary positions of informal 
and formal institutions, when culture and politics in Central Asia is far more complex, where 
formality and informality is blurred. Including such wide variety of relations, the term is 
exhausted and hides people’s diverse actions, interests and possibilities. As elites use a 
projection of clan unity and identity for political gains, clans have a different function within 
a village (Radnitz 2007). David Gullette (2010) argues that tribal and regional associations are 
to such a large degree constructed and claimed by political elites in struggles for economical 
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and political power that they are unfit as analytical categories. Today’s Western 
understanding of these terms are formed by Russian colonial- and Soviet ethnographic 
discourses, which are built on evolutionary concepts of tribes and clans as pre-modern 
organisational forms, and ‘not understood from the context in which they are embedded 
today,’ (Gullette 2010, 37-49).  
At the village level, Gullette’s fieldwork showed that ties between friends and families, based 
not only on support but on traditions of obligation, was important to meet their needs and 
overcome overwhelming financial burdens (2010,103). Radnitz (2007) agrees, as he too 
claims that many accounts of clan systems are over-generalising and do not explain how clan 
systems are overlapping with other formal and informal organisations and institutions. Clans 
are tightly bound to a whole range of other mechanisms, identities, organisations and 
institutions. In Radnitz’s research on how people were politically mobilised in the Aksy 
event
18
, he explains how clan mobilisations is confused with localism, that is, other local 
relationships. For villages, highly personified mechanisms and local support systems of 
families and friends can be more important if the village is excluded from richer clan 
networks or state elites and their resources. This overlaps with Bichsel’s (2009) case study of 
and indigenous village associations in Kyrgyzstan created to erect water irrigation 
infrastructure. She explains how villagers first relied on promises from political candidates to 
the parliament, then sought support from the state, but gained no support from either. They 
eventually gathered money themselves and received resources from foreign donors.  
This consists with Kuehnast and Dudwick’s (2002) research. They argue that the networks of 
poor and non poor have separated in a ‘process that parallels the sharp socio-economic 
stratification that has taken place since national independence,’ (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002, 
51). In addition, the separated networks have changed their character. They argue that 
 “These social networks are important to understand as they bridge the policy gap between macro-level 
economic strategies and micro-level intervention. These networks provide an essential framework to 
understanding how informal institutions interact with formal institutions in the postsocialist Kyrgyzs republic.” 
(Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002, 53). 
                                                 
18
 The Aksy event happened between January and November 2002, when an Aksy city member of parliament 
(MP) was arrested for accusing the sitting president for corruption and treason. This resulted in a wide spread 
national mobilisation of ordinary citizens for many months, where people mobilised to free the MP. Up to about 
8 000 gathered at some protests. These events resulted in the release of their MP, but also had tragic results as 6 
died and 12 were wounded at a gathering where the police fired at the crowds. The event stands out as a violent 
episode of state injustice against its people (Radnitz 2005). 
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The non-poor are moving on to more modern, interest-based networks which they exploit 
successfully for resources. The poor do not have access to these modern networks. In 
addition, more traditional networks are becoming smaller and accumulate fewer resources 
necessary in the modern society – that is, money. The poor are more and more linked together 
in flat networks that consist of people from more or less the same social strata. This is because 
these people are too poor to be connected to the non-poor networks where people are obliged 
to contribute resources. If the crisis is big enough, though, poor connect with non-poor, but in 
a patron-client relationship where the poor gets indebted. This has disrupted the earlier 
supportive nature of kinship ties between rural poor and urban, better off relatives. 
Neighbours are today taking over some of the support functions. As the flat networks are very 
short on modern resources- money- these networks cannot support very many and keep 
shrinking (Kuehnast and Dudwick). Hence, the poor loose much contact with friends and 
relatives, have smaller networks and fewer possibilities (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). 
The non-poor networks have become wider. They are spanning whole regions, and non-poor 
can obtain important information quickly. Through connections with people with formal or 
informal power and access to information, they find employment, obtain loans, start 
enterprises and gain access to elite institutions of education. They still use indigenous 
institutions - arranging lavish traditional parties to diversify their informal connections and 
joining traditional savings clubs or mutual aid obligations. It is now obliged to have money to 
access these institutions. So, the poor are further excluded from both social networks of 
friends and relatives, and ways to socially mobilize. The non-poor use money to mobilize 
upwards in the social hierarchy, and the poor use the little they have to survive (Kuehnast and 
Dudwick 2002).  
Now, out-migration is creating more money flowing in to the country. However, the money is 
flowing into more lavish parties – tois – and new houses for those with relatives in Russia or 
Kazakhstan. The money does to a large degree not accumulate to wider developments for the 
country. This has created a gap between those who migrate and those who do not, hence 
increased the differences between poor and rich (Reeves 2012). 
4.4 Political participation in Kyrgyzstan 
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Youth and in particular women are vulnerable groups in Kyrgyzstan today, and they are also 
to a lesser extent participating and engaging in politics and decision-making (Kuehnast 2002; 
Simpson 2006; USAID Youth Assessment, 2010; USAID/ CAR Gender Assesment 2010; 
Gullette 2010). I will therefore focus on these groups’, particularly women’s, participation in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Historically, the Kyrgyz nomadic culture is said to set them apart from their neighbouring 
countries concerning liberal attitudes towards women. Today, Kyrgyz women are said to be 
entering public space more and more, especially in comparison to Kyrgyzstan’s more 
repressive neighbours (Simpson 2006, 18, 19). Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the Central 
Asian region to have a parliamentarian democratic system, where there are relatively free 
elections, multiple parties, relatively free media and press and freedom for civil society. These 
political freedoms are marked by severe corruption, but they still stand out in its regional 
context as democratic and liberal. In this context, many women are involved in politics in 
Bishkek. Even the former president, taking over after the ousting of Bakyiev, Rosa 
Otunbayeva, is a woman (Simpson 2006) Nonetheless, women still bear the brunt of 
transition from Soviet society and economic hardships, from decreasing economic 
opportunities to increasing domestic violence and bride kidnappings
19
 (Thieme 2008;Thieme 
and Siegmann 2010). In fact, even though women are involved in politics at national level, 
USAID’s gender assessment for Kyrgyzstan reflects a more negative position for women, in 
politics and at home; 
“The crumbling social safety net, the small number of women in top political positions and the 
pervasive gender stereotypes have contributed to women’s sense of disempowerment since independence.” 
(USAID/ CAR Gender Assesment 2010, 26).  
Ilkhamov (quoted in Earle 2001) notes the growing patriarchal values of rural poor areas of 
Central Asia in general. Kandiyoti (1999) notes how the growth of subsistence agriculture as 
an effect of the continued poverty in Central Asia and the region’s misfit with global 
economic trade has pushed women back into the sphere of the household. In addition, there 
are geographical differences on women in public. The Southern regions, with historically less 
nomadic lifestyles and more culturally mixed, are perceived as more traditional and women 
here are to a lesser degree in public (Ibid; Simpson 2006, 18,19).  
                                                 
19
 Although, bride kidnappings refer to a range of different practises, from forced kidnappings to run-away 
weddings where the bride has given her consent. The latter is often practices if the groom lack resources to get 
married, or if parents are unhappy about their children’s choice of partner (Gullette 2010) 
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Narusbaeva, state secretary of the National Agency for Local Self-Government (NAMSU), 
thinks that women definitely participate in the Kyrgyz society, although there are some 
geographical differences. Women are better represented in Northern Kyrgyzstan. Women are 
also represented at obshestvennie nablyudatelnie sovyeti, a civil society observing councils. 
“There are actually 30% women at Ayil Okhmotos, in local self-government. And, women, and youth, 
are very involved in NGO’s. They are active, they have big influence on the authority of the government, on 
local level and central level. Last year, the president initiated obshestvennij nabljudatelnij sovet. Members (of 
this council) are youth and representatives of NGOs. All ministries and (state) agencies on central level have 
such councils. Now they are also on local level, it has started to form, also on AO. (It is an) aditional instrument 
for contact and collaboration with civil soc.” (Narusbaeva, 9.11.11).  
At the same time, there are ongoing disagreements among different Kyrgyz power structures 
whether the civil-society councils are rather overlapping with local self-governance organs, 
and have no role as a real critique of state or local self-government organs (Doishebaeva 
2013). On the other hand, women might be involved in NGOs and working for AO. 
Young people also do not participate in decision making to a large degree. Some youth, 
especially in cities, are active in organisations (Youth Assessment /USAID 2010). But they 
are not represented in village local self-governments. Local self-governments are not arranged 
so as to include youth in an effective way. Many youth are apathetic, and can be drawn to 
other more extreme directions in society today if they are not more incorporated in the state or 
gain a stronger faith in the state and the future of the country (Youth Assessment /USAID 
2010). Some INGO projects have turned out to be positive for young people, but in an entirely 
different way that they were meant to be. Although often failing their goals, these projects 
have created space for youth in society. They have also provided young people with 
opportunities for entrepreneurship, for leisure pursuits and for experimenting with their 
dreams and fantasies (Kirmse 2009, 289). 
Hence, pre- and Soviet conflict dividing lines have been continued and reconfigured in a post-
Soviet context. Informal mechanisms are still highly important for resources, but in 
reconfigured and different ways. Informal networks are incorporating modern ways, and are 
changed by modern context through, as Cleaver (2012) argues, institutional bricolage. This 
process has included and excluded different people. Although some space has been created in 
society for particularly vulnerable groups, social stratification and post- Soviet changes has 
also affected these groups in a negative way. 
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5 Good governance reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan 
In this chapter I will discuss how good governance efforts have been pursued by the Kyrgyz 
government, and how they have been supported and pushed by Western donors and large 
financial and aid agencies. I will describe how these efforts have been in the shape of 
decentralisation policies that push the retreat of the central state and more responsibility and 
powers to lower decision-making levels. I will further elaborate on how these 
decentralisations efforts have shaped power relations between the administrative levels of 
political-administrative governance. These are critical examples of politics of scale, as 
politics, power and actors at different scales (global, state, regional and local) are deeply 
intertwined and informed by each other. I will analyse processes of politics of scale, that is, 
how politics, power and actors are intertwined and the complexities of actors moving across 
scales to affect politics and power. Good governance reforms have also incorporated 
traditional practices and institutions. I will discuss what outcomes in practice this meeting of 
modern governance reforms, pushed by the Kyrgyz government and international aid 
agencies, and traditional practices has led to. Here, I will discuss both politics of scale and 
processes of institutional bricolage, that is, the melting together of new and old institutions 
that makes up new institutional tools. 
5.1 Good governance and decentralisation 
reforms 
The governance structures are the locus of political authority, and the social coordination of 
policy making (Krahmann 2003, 323). As mentioned in my theoretical chapter, these 
structures are in change, consisting of a wide range of institutions and actors at different 
scales with changing power and roles in governance issues. These institutions and 
organisations are located at different political-administrative levels, and they are the 
institutional framing of social, political and economical policies, including land, agriculture 
and water reforms (Sehring 2009, 72, 73).  From its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has 
engaged in political decentralisation processes, and these are still going on today. It was 
among the first post-Soviet states to establish a semi-parliamentary democracy, and was a 
frontrunner in the movement toward an open market economy (Sehring 2009; Gleason 2003, 
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69, 74). Decentralisation efforts in Kyrgyzstan were strongly supported by United Nations 
Development Programme and other large aid agencies (Bichsel et al. 2010, 258). Institutional 
and good governance reforms were in fact largely pushed by Western donors, especially the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and their neo-liberal discourse. This discourse 
promoted decentralisation, market-reforms, local participation and development of NGO 
participation in decision-making and shaping of institutions; hence, an erosion of the state in 
governance institutional development (Sehring 2009; Baimyrzaeva 2012,149). 
One of the first legal documents of the republic was the “Law on Local Government in the 
Kyrgyz Republic” (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001, 526; Grävingholt et al. 2006, 44). The 
document made it clear that the influence of the centre should be reduced and responsibilities 
were to be delegated to local levels (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 44). As many other post-Soviet 
states, Kyrgyzstan has inherited the formal political-administrative system from its Soviet 
past. These geographical-administrative layers are structures from Soviet administration 
structures that were highly centralised. At sub-national level, the administrative units in 
descending order are oblasts (regions), raions (districts) and okrugs (administrative-territorial 
group/congregation of villages or towns). There are 7 oblasts and 45 raions. Today, at oblast 
and raion levels, there are 10 oblast-subordinate cities and 10 raion-subordinate towns. The 
most local level, the last layer of geographical-administrative units, is the okrugs. In 1996, 
Kyrgyzstan implemented the most profound political-administrative reforms at okrug level to 
ensure better local governance. The country now implemented the Ayil Okhmotu, the 
executive organ of the village administrations, and their counterpart Ayil Kenesh, the elected 
representatives’ councils. Now the okrug levesl are most often called Ayil Okhmotus. There 
are 495 Okrugs/Ayil Okhmotus in the country, and there can be up to 17 villages under each 
of these village administrations. Like the okrug level and their local governance system of 
village administrations, all layers of government have an executive state administration body. 
They also have elected council bodies, Keneshs, that serve as the administration bodies’ 
checks and balances. Thus, the existing Soviet-inherited political-administrative governance 
institutions were reconfigured and decentralised (Jailobaeva 2011; Grävingholt et al. 2006, 6, 
47, 52, 54). 
At the oblast and raion administrative levels, the head of the executive organ is appointed by 
the president, and the organ is thus accountable to him or her. The local self-governance 
administrations for clusters of villages, the Ayil Okhmotus, are independent from central 
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government when it comes to decision making concerning local issues and management of 
local social issues. They are legally independent from the central level, as they are directly 
accountable to the Keneshs at the same level, and the people (Grävingholt 2006). In this way, 
the Ayil Okhmotu level is the real level of local self-government. The Ayil Okhmotu has to 
draft budget and development plans, manage municipal property and property gained from a 
central level redistribution fund and maintain infrastructure and facilities. AO collects taxes 
and duties (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 58), and is obliged to implement decisions made by Ayil 
Kenesh on local issues, and they organise meetings between the Ayil Kenesh and its 
constituents (Ibraimova 2009, 63). The head of the Ayil Okhmotu is also head of the Kenesh 
at this level, and elected by the population of all the villages that make up the Ayil Okhmotu 
every four years.  He or she addresses the population of each village at annual village 
assemblies. Here, the villagers can voice opinions, and sometimes these opinions become the 
basis of an act to be carried out by the Ayil Okhmotu. Also, as the Kenesh meets quarterly, 
deputies sometimes seek public opinion by going to the villages. Later, they present villagers’ 
opinion to the head of Ayil Okhmotu at these quarterly meetings. If the Ayil Okhmotu’s 
performance is dissatisfactory, for example on budget spending, the head of the Ayil 
Okhmotu may be dismissed if two thirds of Ayil Kenesh wish so (Ibraimova 2009, 81,82).  
Although the AO is supposed to be independent from other state structures to a large degree, 
most tax collected locally goes to the central level and the Ayil Okhmotu has in practice no 
economic autonomy (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 47, 54; Sybygalieva 2011). The AO is 
economically dependent on the central level as will be described further in the next paragraph. 
Also, although resource allocations go directly from the central to the local level, it is still the 
oblast level that distributes the earmarked grants. There is a risk that resources might get lost 
in informal rent-seeking or corruption here. In addition, the local level approve and control 
the implementation of social and economic development plans that have been developed at 
the respective raion and oblast levels (Grävingholt 2006). This is an example of politics of 
scale, as the local level is economically and politically dependent on formal policies from, and 
formal and informal actions happening at, higher levels. They are not autonomous, although 
they are meant to be to a large extent. 
5.1.1 The political-administrative levels of governance and 
their interconnectedness  
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Formally, at oblast and raion levels, state administrations need the Kenesh’s approval for its 
planned budget, and the Keneshs have the right to confirm the appointed governors and 
Akims. In reality, this council is largely under the power of the state administration - the 
executive power. The Kenesh approves the budget, but do not have the necessary oversight or 
resources to engage in budgeting process or its implementation (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 52). 
In addition, the Akim exerts significant power and influence in the administrative system. 
Sometimes people turn directly to him and his administration to address their problems 
instead of going to bodies of local self-governance (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 55). These 
councils are part of the local self-government structures and are therefore formally not under 
state structures such as the state administration, but in practice they are controlled or 
undermined by the latter nonetheless. As people often go directly to the Akim, the Kenesh’s 
function is often superfluous. 
The oblast level state administration is responsible for implementing policies from the 
president and central government in the raions.  Essentially, raion responsibilities correspond 
with oblast responsibilities, limited to their particular territories. The difference in 
responsibilities is that oblasts are to relocate funds down to raion level, as financial flows are 
organised top-down from one administrative level to the next. Raion level also has some 
specific responsibilities; to ensure social protection, maintain local infrastructure and to 
provide developmental, technical and legal assistance to Ayil Okhmotu and civil society 
organisations. Nevertheless, duplication of responsibilities has led to discussions among 
experts on eliminating one of the two levels (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 56, 57). Alymkulov and 
Kulatov (2010) note that 
 “In cases with different administrative-territorial levels of power, these are only effective if each level 
of government has their own powers that do not duplicate those of other levels- as sometimes occurs with the 
oblast and district levels. At the local level, an illogical hierarchy between the state government and local self-
government prevails, resulting in poorly delineated functions and dual subordination.” (Alymkulov and 
Kulatov 2010, 564.) 
This duplication is stopping the local governments in Kyrgyzstan from fulfilling their de jure 
functions and delegated powers (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2010, 572).Hence, this is politics of 
scale– higher levels of government affect local levels negatively in Kyrgyzstan, hindering 
them in doing their job. The top-down distribution of funds gives raion level immense control 
over activities at the local level. Tax inspection, sanitation regulation, land registration 
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(Gosregistr) and architectural authorities at raion level have great influence on economic 
development at local level. State structures continue to interfere in the work of Ayil Okhmotu 
(Grävingholt et al. 2006, 56, 59). Also, although resource allocations go directly from the 
central to the local level, it is still the oblast level that distributes the earmarked grants. There 
is a risk that resources might get lost in informal rent-seeking or corruption here. In addition, 
the local level approves and controls the implementation of social and economic development 
plans that have been developed at the respective raion and oblast levels (Grävingholt 2006). 
Hence, AO is also politically dependent on higher levels to a large degree. 
In addition, most tax collected locally goes to the central level and the Ayil Okhmotu has in 
practice no economic autonomy (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 47, 54). An improved system of 
local tax collection has not yet been implemented. Ayil Okhmotu only collects two types of 
taxes, for land and property. 14 of 16 types of taxes are collected locally now go back to the 
central government level, and thus give Ayil Okhmotu low incentives to accumulate more 
taxes (Ibraimova 2009, 86; Sybygalieva 2011, 149; Duishonbaev 2008). So, the responsibility 
for implementing policies has become de-concentrated, but there has been a low level of 
devolution of resources and political powers or autonomy. As Ibraimova explains, 
“ powers are delegated without appropriate funding; it is not possible for local self- governance bodies to 
plan their budget, as it is distributed by the central government; there is no political will to support the 
decentralisation process on the local state administration level” (Ibraimova 2009,86).  
Hence, although the AOs are supposed to be independent from other state structures to a large 
degree, they are not. This is an example of politics of scale, as the local level is economically 
and politically dependent on formal policies from, and formal and informal actions and 
practices happening at, higher levels. They are not autonomous, although they are meant to be 
to a large extent. 
5.1.2 Governance within the water sector 
Iskender Dzholdoshjaliev, head of Water Resources Management Department (WRMD) 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources Management and Processing Industry, 
mentions that there are very few resources in the country and at the national level of 
government. He also mentions that there are ‘all kinds of problems with the cadres in 
Kyrgyzstan’ (Dzholdoshjaliev , 10.06.11). These problems are connected to the lack of 
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technical knowledge and lack of norms on governance concerning for example how to 
manage and govern water resources in the country. Also, there are very few young cadres as 
the educated youth have gone abroad. Those who stay do not have the skills required because 
of lack of education possibilities. Payment is very low, undermining work ethics amongst 
cadres. Dzholdoshjaliev believes cadre challenges exist at all levels of government. Mostly, 
knowledge has not trickled down to lower levels in government projects on local water 
governance (McGee 2011). 
The oblast and raion levels are supposed to devolve money and resources onto the lower 
levels. At oblast levels, the decision to implement irrigation schemes lies with the Osh Oblast 
Agriculture Department. The chief of the department, “Olikbek”,  explains how the Kyrgyz 
republic has suffered after the Soviet dissolution, as money and technical plans for irrigations 
schemes used to come from Moscow. The abrupt separation from the Soviet Centre has been 
harsh. 20 difficult years have passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and not one 
year has the oblast administration had enough money to cover the irrigation funds necessary. 
“Olikbek” explains that budget and finance problems at the upper levels of government 
accumulate downwards. As the resources are not enough at national level, they cannot 
distribute resources downward in the system. The same governance problems exist at all 
governance levels. The department is now working on 18 different farming projects, including 
irrigation projects, but finances are just not enough to cover the many other necessary 
projects. There is very much a need for these projects now, as rehabilitation and 
modernisation in land use and agriculture is necessary. There needs to be a lot of spending on 
infrastructure, like pumps, as they are from Soviet times and are in need of change and repair. 
(“Olikbek”, 12.11.11). 
5.1.3 Donors in the governance system 
Mosello (2011) asserts that donors have created important know-how and skills, and that they 
do negotiate development projects with national authorities so that projects are in line with the 
national development plans. Donors are needed for development, says ‘Olikbek’, as they 
often set up a broad plan at national government level. They often arrange an agreement with 
a ministry or the equivalent, and then set up an executive agency at this level (“Olikbek”, 
19.11.2011). Thus, this has governance consequences, as donors are involved with decision-
making at higher levels. They push their agenda in cooperation with the government at higher 
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levels. Dzholdoshjaliev also mentions that there is a tremendous need for international 
projects. Mosello (2011) has objections to this, as she argues that the downside of donor 
projects is the dependency it creates. External actors ‘baby-sit’ the government, which needs 
to take responsibilities for development efforts such as water management (Mosello 2011, 
12,13). Otherwise, the government will never fully take this responsibility. In addition, Ayil 
Okhmotu use much time learning how to write project proposals for donors or other 
assignments to gain donor support (Grävingholt et al. 2006). This has consequences for 
governance reforms, as it provides for less time and resources for needed administrative 
learning among officials (Grävingholt et al. 2006). Thus, the governance consequences here 
are that the government will never be capable on its own. Dzholdoshjaliev acknowledges that 
donor projects are of varying quality, and that there are challenges with these projects. 
However, donor projects not only depend on the donor and the institutional setting and 
cooperation, but also on completely external factors, like regional and climatic differences. 
They work best, he says, in the South, where the land is fertile, and worse in the North and in 
the mountain areas. And, again, it really depends on the people and on how they work 
together (Dzholdoshjaliev, 10.06.2011).  
Although Dzholdoshjaliev points to possibly obvious and ‘unscientific’ issues when he speaks 
of how things depend on people, he really points to important contextual difficulties around 
water governance. Cleaver (2012), as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, argues that what is 
‘wicked’ about complex environmental and resource problems is precisely this; that they are 
so complex and therefore unlikely to be resolved by science and technology alone. This is 
because these complex problems cannot be separated from issues of values, equity and social 
justice. Analysis and solution often differ, and there is unlikely to be any agreement on 
solutions.  Hence, following Cleaver’s argument, donor support and science will not fix 
problems wholly, but they are there, adding to the institutional tools, which give both new 
possibilities and challenges. 
Hence, we see examples of politics of scale, where politics at different levels of government 
affect each other. Global policies on decentralisation have reconfigured a Soviet government 
system, and Kyrgyzstan now pushes local governance reforms. Although this entails an 
extensive degree of local autonomy, the local levels are in fact financially dependent on 
higher levels of government, and are in this way still in a hierarchical relationship with one 
another. Duplication in the government structure results in poor connections between higher 
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government levels and local government, resulting in inefficient policies. The fact that the 
elected councils are subsumed under executive powers at all levels means that people lose 
their representative power. Resource challenges at the top affect all the other levels. 
Additionally, out-migration and lack of education also affect all levels of government. Plans 
for development from the upper levels cannot be performed at the lower levels because of the 
trickling down effect of the lack of resources and knowledge as well as cadre problems.  
5.1.4 Decentralisation and local self-government 
Narusbaeva from NAMSU (see page 47), believes that decentralisation is going in the right 
direction. After the revolution in 2010 and the ousting of president Bakiev, new reforms were 
implemented by the new government. Previously, people would come to the parliament in 
Bishkek if they wanted something or had problems concerning money, land or water. Now, 
after the new reforms, these decisions are taken care of at local level. If the reforms turn out to 
be just as successful in the future, people will go to the local level with all their problems 
(Narusbaeva, 09.11.11). She expresses good hopes for the new reforms of the new 
government in terms of local self-governance. She believes independence will come if 
management is reformed on all levels. In her opinion, civil society is educated enough to 
drive development of local governance and resource management. 
“I hope our country will be independent, it depends on our reforms, our management, and management 
on each level. If we give more independence like local self-government we will [have] success. We have [a] new 
president, new government. Our parliament [is] trying to think of new reforms on Local Self-government. 
Yesterday [there] was [a] parliament hearing on independence, financially, of local self-government. There was a 
new working group [established] on this. Parliament supports our reforms, I hope the new president and 
government will support them too. My personal opinion is that our civil society and our society are very 
educated now, they are monitoring the activity of parliament. I think we will move in the right direction because 
of strong monitoring and control.” (Narusbaeva, 09.11.11) 
Shairbek Juraev, director at the American University in Central Asia in Bishkek, elaborates 
on the relationship between the head of AO, the decision-maker highest up in the local self-
government system, and the population subjugated to the AO. 
“Now, he [the head of Ayil Okhmotu]  is elected by council members. From what I hear, sometimes the 
AO buys off the council members. But still, he has to answer for his public. So, even though there is some 
corruption, this system on this level actually works. The best working decision organ is this Ayil Okhmotu level; 
the members need to bring the decisions from the council back to their villages. (…) villages often send elderly 
to the AO, they have more negotiation power, they are harder to say no to. These people [in the council] are 
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often directors or something like this. Raion and oblast are looked at with sceptisism because they are affiliated 
with wrong business, but the local level it is  more functioning. There are much more of these things [wrong 
business, corruption] at Akim or oblast [level], as they do business. They are just too far away.” (Juraev, 
12.11.11). 
Here, Juraev describes the villages ‘local coping mechanisms’, as Henry (2004) would put it. 
Through the geographical vicinity and networks the villagers have with this level, held up by 
traditions and institutions such as the role of elders, these are the villagers’ ‘local 
mechanisms’ for support and resources. Although, as I will discuss in later chapters, not all 
villagers are supported through this system.Still, Juraev believes that the local level is actually 
the only functioning political level when it comes to checks and balances by the people. 
Oblast and raion level is believed to be more corrupt by the population. 
“In early 2000s we had the first direct elections for village level. It came from the politics of 
decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan. This system has had its negative sides as well, the government seems to point to 
some negative factors, sometimes you have huge fights between village men. Women would support their 
husband’s candidate. But this should be a system that protects from power abuse by the state, and in the future it 
could be. And otherwise, it was really seen as what democracy really is. This is democracy now.“ (Juraev, 
12.11.11). 
At the same time, Dzholdoshjaliev from the WRMD under the Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
Resources Management and Processing Industry, holds that in the water governance sector, 
local government does not perform very well. He contends that WRMD helps local 
government with resources, technical equipment and knowledge, but it is really the WRMD 
that has all the responsibility for water governance issues. Here, he implicitly says that there 
is no real devolution of responsibility for water governance to lower levels. This is confusing, 
as it contrasts other government policies which I will discuss later. He does comply that there 
are differences from context to context and that some local governments function better than 
others (Dzholdoshjaliev, 10.06.2011).  
The director of local self-governance issues at MSDSP explains how governance structures at 
the local self-government level are exceptionally poverty-stricken (Saparova, 15.11.11). 
Hence, even though Juraev focuses on the functioning local mechanisms and checks and 
balances of these local structures, they are restrained in their functionality because of lack of 
resources. Even if they do get support from higher levels, it is not enough as all levels of 
government have few resources (Dzholdoshjaliev, 10.06.11, Saparova, 15.11.11). Local 
governments do not have resources to implement development schemes like irrigation 
themselves, although both they and other local resource associations are actually burdened 
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with this task through reforms that placed land and water under local self-governance
20
 
(Saparova 2011; Bichsel 2009, 65; Kreutzmann 2012). Here, Saparova points to the exclusion 
of poor villages from the networks of the non-poor. They do not have access to resources, and 
cannot mobilise, as they lack money and connections to people with information and formal 
or informal power, as mentioned by Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002). 
 There is at the same time a dependence on the higher levels that inhibits local governance 
from performing, due to low devolution of power, knowledge and resources (Sybygalieva 
2011; McGee 2011). Mountain villages are in particular very poor due to the arid climate 
unfit for agriculture, but also for their remoteness from the political and economic centre 
(Jansky and Pachova 2006). They are on government subsidies, [“dotation”, directly 
translated by the informant from the Russian expression dotatsyionnaya zavisimost’, which 
means subsidised dependence] meaning that they get 98% of their budget from the state 
government (Saparova, 15.11.11). In addition, local level income has been reduced the last 
years for many of the local self-governments (Sybygalieva 2011, 149). According to 
engineers working at my village case project, money for these projects are therefore always 
found by circulating money from where ever they can be found, from one fund, organ or 
ministry to another (Engineers and Kojomkulov, 25.11.11). Hence, the organisation of 
resources for development projects is quite ad hoc and unsustainable. The organisation of 
resources from the central level to the local is characterised by informal networking through 
formal channels – that is, through the governmental hierarchy. This creates more insecurity, 
and therefore continuous dependency issues, for the local level of governance.   
5.1.5 The executive local governance level - enabling and 
disabling participation 
The Ayil Okhmotu and its leader have both positive and negative traits when it comes to 
inclusion and transparency (Ibraimova 81,82). There has been registered a high motivation of 
work in some Ayil Okhmotus since the institutionalisation of electing them started in 2001. 
Many of them have good knowledge of their constituencies, and as they are elected they have 
a willingness to understand and to do the best for their population (ibid.). In her case study on 
villages in four Ayil Okhmotus, Ibraimova (2010, 83) measures the scope of support for the 
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 The law “On Patures” from 2009 is particularly relevant. I will come back to this law in the beginning of the 
next analysis chapter, chapter 6. 
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different local governance structures; the Ayil Okhmotu, the Ayil Kenesh, local traditional 
institutions and other private community organisations or territorial bodies of local self-
governance, like neighbourhood or street councils. She found that the executive 
administration of Ayil Okhmotus had the highest scores of support. The reasons for this were 
that this is a body that the villagers perceive as a provider of services. The Ayil Okhmotu is 
running their everyday lives in many ways as it organises village assemblies for decision 
making on issues such as for example tariff on cattle (Ibraimova 2010, 79,80). It helps them 
to fill out papers for village institutions, organises purchases of essential goods such as 
pesticides and fuel and helps villagers to fill out funding applications for international 
organisations. In this way, the Ayil Okhmotu is of great use for villagers as he connects them 
with resources that they are otherwise excluded from in their flat networks, and villagers 
participate in its operation (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002; Ibraimova 2010, 65, 66, 83).  
The Ayil Okhmotus do encourage participation in governance matters to some extent, as they 
include groups and associations in decision making. At the same time, some individuals and 
groups are excluded from these participative measures. The villagers are not always informed 
about the agenda of Kenesh sessions, even though this is under the Ayil Okhmotu’s 
obligation. Information is given selectively by displaying some information, whilst for 
example agendas of sessions or budget information are not on display. Some heads of Ayil 
Okhmotus have even misused their power position by corrupt practices and the mishandling 
of public funds (Ibraimova 2009, 84; Temirkulov 2004, 20). Groups excluded from 
participation have expressed dissatisfaction, women groups in some Ayil Okhmotus have for 
example complained because they wish to be more intensively included in decision-making 
(Ibraimova 2009, 85, 86). The situation for women, particularly some, in decision making 
makes up an important point in the next chapter that analyses participation in NGO-led 
development in the village Kun Elek. In addition to the exclusion of some groups, Ayil 
Okhmotus tend to involve some traditional village organisations, like the elders council - the 
aksakal council. Some village women are not satisfied with this, as aksakals rarely discuss 
women’s issues. They often direct women to elderly women for advice, but they are not part 
of the aksakal council. Thus, women are often not heard in decision making by the Ayil 
Okhmotu. Women activists are often instructed to arrange public cultural events, since 
women are in large part more concerned with these types of events. Thus, women are not 
given much space or motivation for public work or to “communicate their need to Ayil 
Okhmotu in an organised fashion” (Ibraimova 2009, 86). Thus, we see both possibilities and 
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limitations in the governance spaces where villagers are invited to participate by the Ayil 
Okhmotu and its leaders. In addition, women are particularly vulnerable to these limitations, 
as governance spaces are gendered in Kyrgyz society (Earle 2001; USAID/ CAR Gender 
Assesment 2010). 
5.1.6 Checks and balances on Ayil Okhmotu  
The head of the Ayil Okhmotu in Leninskyi Okrug, where Kun Elek is situated, explains how 
the Akim on raion level functions as sufficient checks and balances upon the head of Ayil 
Okhmotu. 
“Yes. He (the Akim) sends out one of his co-workers every month, to check on the Ayil Okhmotu. If he 
does not do his work, this co-worker tells the Akim and the Akim writes a letter to the respective Ayil Kenesh 
that your Ayil Okrug does not do its work, and that they have to look into it, so that they can solve their tasks. If 
he works well, he (the head of Ayil Okhmotu) gets an award from the Akim” (Niva, 30.11.11) 
This is supported by research from the German Development Institute. As Ayil Okhmotu is 
unofficially dependent on higher levels, he is also accountable to them. As one informant 
from Oblast level administration expressed, ‘But how can they truly not listen (to Akim and 
Oblast level administration) if tomorrow I can or cannot give them money?’ (Grävingholt 
2006, 87). That there is even a reward from the Akim to the best performing head of AO, 
shows that he is under semi-official observation from the Akim
21
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Niva’s wording expresses how the head of AO has perhaps more decision power than the 
whole AO itself. As he is head of both Ayil Okhmotu and Ayil Kenesh, he is the highest 
responsible actor or institution for the quality of work to address local issues. In practice, 
people often address their problems or resource needs directly to the head of Ayil Okhmotu, 
not the actual organs of Ayil Okhmotu (Ibraimova 2009, 79, 80). Although he is of great 
assistance to his villagers, there is a risk that there are patron-client mechanisms in this 
relationship which gives the head of AO great power and leverage over villagers. This gives 
him a dual role as an enabling leader and a disabling patron. As they are dependent on him for 
resources and information, for example information on how to obtain projects from INGOs, 
the head of AO can exercise strong control upon his constituents. The control is further 
legitimised by the indigenous institution of the leader for villages. Hence, this is a process of 
institutional bricolage, as meaning from earlier institutional traits are used in patron-client 
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relationships that have become more exploitative due to modern context. As the head of AO 
seems to be above many of the checks and balances installed, this further consolidates his 
powerful position. As explained, he is the head of both organs of the AO, but as I will 
describe further in the next paragraph, he exercises great leverage as he is often above the 
checks and balances of the Ayil Kenesh. 
5.1.7 The Ayil Kenesh. Dependence on the Ayil Okhmotu 
By law, and the very concept of decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan, the Ayil Kenesh is the main 
decision-making body in the local self-governance system, as it is the elected representatives 
of the people (Ibraimova 2009, 79,80). The Ayil Kenesh is like a local parliament for the 
several villages which are united under one administrative Ayil Okhmotu/ local self-
governance structure. They Ayil Kenesh and the Ayil Okhmotu are supposed to function as 
mutual checks and balances on each other. Representatives from the villages are elected to the 
Ayil Kenesh through secret ballot elections for a four years term. Anyone can nominate 
himself for the election. Sitting in the Ayil Kenesh does not require full-time involvement. 
Usually, the members keep their place of work, which often means that they continue to be 
involved in agriculture to make a living. The Ayil Kenesh meets four times a year, discussing 
matters put on an accumulated agenda. The Ayil Kenesh deputies usually make decisions on 
management of municipal property and development plans. They are to draft and approve 
strategies for development, issue basic legal normative documents for local communities and 
make decisions on major life sustenance-issues of local communities (Grävingholt 2006, 54). 
At the same time, they are monitored by Ayil Okhmotu and other state bodies to ensure 
compliance with existing Kyrgyz law (Ibraimova 2009, 62, 63, 80).  
Although the Ayil Kenesh is supposed to be independent, it is in fact highly dependent on 
Ayil Okhmotu. The local parliament is de facto subject to the local administration, the latter 
therefore being the true decision maker. As the Kenesh appears to the people not to have 
power, people, as mentioned, tend to go directly to the head of the Ayil Okhmotu. In addition, 
the staff at Ayil Okhmotu is better known to the people, as they are approached when people 
apply for municipal services. Some villagers have concluded that their Ayil Kenesh staff does 
not perform its assignments (Ibraimova 2009, 79, 80). As their status is low, and the positions 
are not paid, there is a self-fulfilling prophecy in the claim that the Kenesh staff does not do 
its job. They therefore find it hard to attract new skilled staff. In this way, there has been a 
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small degree of devolution of decision making and power to organs of people’s 
representatives. There is in fact no difference in practice between the executive body and the 
council in charge of checks and balances. There is now a local Kenesh system for which there 
is no real need, an institution stripped of real content and basically without political power 
(Ibraimova 2009,133). As Saparova, the local governance officer at MSDSP’s office in Osh, 
said to me about the Keneshs and the Ayil Okhmotu,  
“The problem is on the local representative board [council] because they are not paid, and there is no 
national program to invoke their capacity. So, representatives have not capacity to give consultation to the others 
[to the Ayil Okhmotu administration] because they are not specialists. Here, we often find business men or 
aksakali, so they are often not responsible people. They just say, ‘great, go a head!’ To whatever is suggested. 
But they should recognize their role, and they should be trusted.“ (Saparova, 15.11.11) 
 
Hence, in contrast to Niva’s firm belief in proper checks and balances between the 
administrative levels, the checks and balances function is missing between AO and Ayil 
Kenesh. Hence, people are to an extent not represented in local government organs, as Kenesh 
deputies and the head of AO is elected by the people, but the rest of AO bureaucrats are not. 
5.1.8 Jamaats and other bodies of public self-governance 
Jamaats are voluntary community associations that are made up by members of a part of a 
village or town – a street, a block or other territory. There can also be other territorially based 
associations; these can actually take on some of the functions of Ayil Okhmotu or Ayil 
Kenesh. They can also be allocated municipal territory, and local governments are obliged to 
get their consent on decisions regarding local resources or management of municipal property 
(Ibraimova 2009, 65). If Jamaat associations register at the Ayil Okhmotu, they can influence 
local self-governance, but contrasting with other territorially based associations they can only 
function as consultants of state and local self-governance bodies on local issues. However, 
they go through a considerably easier registration than the other territorially based 
organisations or other private organisations, like women’s groups, village development 
groups or resource associations. These must register at the Ministry of Justice. The positive 
aspects of registering are that you can apply for funds and support from international 
development organisations that work with officially registered groups of villagers exclusively 
(Ibraimova 2009, 66, 67). In this way, these groups, and more so the Jamaats, have the power 
to move across scales to connect with actors at global governance levels, bypassing elected 
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local assembly and regional and state levels of governance. Nevertheless, Jamaat in practice 
refers to very diverse types of organisation dependent on the particular village in discussion. 
Villagers might refer to them as business enterprises or self-help groups involved in land use 
and cattle breeding (ibid.). In Kun Elek, the Jamaat was mostly referred to as a way to 
organise the village in neighbourhoods. Each neighbourhood had its leader, a Jamaat Bashty, 
who cooperated with the Ayil Bashty and head of AO on local development issues. He 
addressed these authorities on behalf of his Jamaat if they needed resources, and counselled 
them on what was needed in his Jamaat (Jamila 2 and her husband, a Jamaat Bashty, 
25.11.11).  
Hence, although Jamaats can have an influence on governance, they are restricted in their role 
as counsellors. This can also mean that they are free from responsibility to do anything. One 
old Aksakal in Kun Elek told me; ‘The Jamaat Bashty doesn’t really do anything. It is the 
Ayil Bashty and the head of Ayil Okhmotu that really does anything’(Aksakal 25.11.11). 
Hence, the Jamaats also seem dependent on leaders – or patrons - further up in the local 
hierarchy. The AB and the head of AO seem to have a dual role, as both enabling leaders and 
disabling patrons.  
5.2 Formalising informal practices in 
governance structures.  
The Kyrgyz law on local self-government also includes local referenda, citizen meetings and 
other forums of direct democracy and traditional community practises (Alymkulov and 
Kulatov 2000, 532; Ibraimova 2009, 81). Informal practices such as kurultai, aksakals and 
ashar have been institutionalised and formalised to implement local village practices as part 
of democratic development. In addition, these practices are also attaining new content and 
being used for purposes different from their traditional ones (Temirkulov 2010, 97; Earle 
2005). They are traditional framings with reconfigured content and purpose (Baimyrzaeva 
2012, 119) – a process of institutional bricolage, in the words of Frances Cleaver (2012). 
The Kurultais are village assemblies taking place at least every two years, when it is found 




 century, or earlier. 
Throughout most of its history, the Kyrgyz led a nomadic lifestyle. Each tribe had a social 
structure consisting of the executive or leader (bi or bek) and kurultai – the collective council 
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or meeting of the elderly. The kurultai was to ensure some accountability between the people 
and the leader, and the leader should carry out the people’s will (Baimyrzaeva 2012, 119). In 
pre-revolutionary Central Asia, kurultai also functioned as large national assemblies, where 
people were informed about and called upon to discuss national matters. The institution of 
Kurultai waned during Soviet times (Temirkulov 2008). Today, its role as a collective 
assembly or meeting has been revived, but reconfigured. A kurultai can be demanded by all 
members of the village, and they are to encourage local participation in decision making and 
discussing major local issues, like changes in the community charter or establishing 
community property and its management. In 1999, a presidential decree on kurultais was 
passed in order to enhance their role, requiring the raion Akims and city mayors to send their 
drafts for social and economic development at the local level for approval by the kurultais. 
Two years later, the Akim or governor must report to a second kurultai on the progress of 
implementation. If the kurultai finds the progress to be unsatisfactory, it will advice the Ayil 
Okhmotu to give a no confidence vote in the Akim and submit it to the president. Otherwise, 
the Akim will complete his four years in power.   
Kurultais can also be initiated by government officials or even the president. In 2001 the 
government formalised kurultai even more by a new decree; kurultais were now to strengthen 
state structure, democracy and also to have more control over local communities. There have 
been 5 national kurultais since independence (Temirkulov 2010). They are intended to inform 
people on changes in the constitution or in politics, but also to discuss problems of the Kyrgyz 
republic and the Kyrgyz people (Gullette 2010, 160; Temirkulov 2008; 324,325).  
Critics say kurultais create tension between the old system and the new forms of governance. 
Kurultais may reduce the influence of the Ayil Okhmotu in Kyrgyz politics, and even impede 
representative democracy. Representative organs – the Ayil Kenesh- will have even less 
opportunity to influence the head of AO as kurultais to an extent take their role in the political 
system. On the one hand, these people’s meetings and protests are also a form of raising 
important issues and demands from the people to the government, and can therefore also 
promote democratic processes
22
. However, kurultais, often in the shape of protests, has 
become the main form of control and checks and balances on authorities, and therefore 
undermines the role of the representative organs- the Ayil Kenesh- to influence the 
administration and the head of Ayil Okhmotu (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2000, 533,534; Ruget 
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and Usmanalieva 2007). Furthermore, kurultais coupled with other traditional institutions 
have been used by Kyrgyz authorities to consolidate their position. For example, under 
president Akaev, oppositional forces were banned from taking part at the kurultais, and 
influential pro-governmental elders – aksakals- were used to form people’s opinion. At the 
same time, the political opposition also arranged their own kurultais and used aksakals to 
inform people’s opinion and, legitimize their actions and mobilise more followers 
(Temirkulov 2008, 325). Thus, people’s meetings can be manipulated from above through 
patron-client relationships and actually impede democratic development. These people’s 
meetings sometimes take the shape of public protests. Protests are a very prominent form of 
political activity among citizens in Kyrgyzstan, and they are also known to be manipulated by 
elites through patron-client relationships (Ruget and Usmanalieva 2007). Large protests can 
push through the will of some strong parties. These changes have not been through any 
democratic deliberations, like institutions where cases are voted on by people’s 
representatives. Because of this, these types of protests are seen as impeding the development 
of institutions that will lead to a functioning form of democratic deliberations. Party politics 
are to an extensive degree based on these kinds of protests, which creates constant stalemates 
and conflicts in parliament instead of deliberations and compromises (Gullette 2010; Ruget 
and Usmanalieva 2007). Thus, we see a scalar dimension to institutional bricolage.  The 
meaning inherent in institutions are continued, but also reconfigured, by people because of 
societal changes. The institutions of Kurultais are moved to the central level by powerful 
actors, creating mechanisms where actors move across scales. This is politics of scale which 
gives possibilities to local actors influencing higher levels of government, but people are also 
manipulated across scales, as aksakals are manipulated at state and regional levels. 
An Aksakal is an elder, directly translated it means “white bearded”. There are two meanings 
included in the word; not only does it mean elderly, but it connotes intellect, leadership and 
authority. Aksakals are the oldest generations of men in a community, but the expression is 
also used to denote knowledgeable men that might be younger. In 2002, the law “On local 
self-government and local state administration” was issued. It formalised the authority of the 
aksakals by creating a Council of Aksakals and a Court of Aksakals in local communities. 
Their court decisions are largely followed, and they have a large legal influence in villages. 
Aksakals have retained their role in informal politics as well. Aksakals are central in much of 
the organisation of community life. They use their authority, both formal and informal, to 
maintain social control in society, to mobilise the community members and to settle conflicts 
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involving the community. Even their mere presence can make an event respectable. To 
maintain social control, they use informal tools that are in widespread use in community life 
in Kyrgyzstan, also by others than aksakals (Bichsel 2009, 71; Temirkulov 2010). It is 
important to include the aksakals because of the respect they enjoy in the community. All the 
same, their role in the community is changing with historical and societal changes that are 
taking place today. The aksakals’ role today is restricted to some social fields. Within fields 
where modern knowledge is required they have less or only marginal authority (Bichsel 
2009).  
As aksakals become both informally and formally part of the governance system, we see 
governance reforms meeting traditional and informal practises, continuing yet reconfiguring 
these practises to fit modern society. Kurultais have also become part of formal governance 
structures, reviving institutional practises and meanings from pre-Soviet and Soviet times in 
modern framings. Both institutions have become open to use by a wide variety of people, 
having been continued and reconfigured to fit modern reform demands of decentralisation and 
participation. At the same time, different power-relations and new exclusionary network 
systems in society makes it easier for some to use, or abuse, these institutions. In this way, 
this is a process of institutional bricolage.  Traditional institutions are moulded by societal 
needs and new institutions, and the new institutions are again being affected by the old 
institutions. 
5.2.1 Traditional community solidarity and volunteer labour 
reconfigured for development efforts 
Tooganchilik is the traditional Kyrgyz idea of community solidarity, where every Kyrgyz has 
a duty to help others in the community. The practice of traditional solidarity gained popularity 
among the population after independence, as it provided social security through a guarantee of 
mutual aid (Temirkulov 2008, 7). Through this traditional idea of the community solidarity, 
people perform community ashar. Ashar is another informal institution or tradition in Central 
Asia which has been formalised and reconfigured with new content (Temirkulov 2008, 320; 
Earle 2005, 252). ‘ashar is a pre-Soviet form of collective voluntary work, in which groups of 
people were mobilised to provide assistance for family and neighbours’, (Earle 2005, 252). 
Thus, ashar is the actual community work that stems from the idea of community solidarity; 
tooganchilik. It is believed to have been first practised by nomadic people. According to 
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Thurman (quoted in Bichsel 2011, 73), ashar was frequently used to conscript labour for 
construction and maintenance of irrigation canals under the Kokand khanate prior to Russian 
colonialism. It survived during Soviet times, and Bichsel finds that ashar was still used at 
village level for maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and merged with the Soviet practice 
of subbotnik. Subbotnik was, and still is in post-Soviet countries, unpaid, communal work on 
Saturdays (Bichsel 2011, 75). Earle asserts that in the late Soviet period ashar mostly meant 
organised efforts to build a house with help from the extended family (Earle 2005, 
252).Unrelated neighbours and other villagers would also contribute. Normally, men who 
were fit to work would do physical labour, aksakals would give advice, and women would 
cook (Earle 2005). This form of ashar exists also today, but another form of a more formal 
use of ashar, similar to the pre-Soviet and early Soviet ashar, coexist alongside it (Earle 
2005). More and more often, state organs, NGOs and development agencies and organisations 
are using ashar for community work where people themselves are building common 
infrastructure (Earle 2005). Ashar is being employed to tackle the problem of contribution 
from villagers and involvement in the implementation of projects (Earle 2005, 251- 253). The 
respected aksakals are being used for mobilising people for ashar or at least they have an 
important role in decision making in the project (Earle 2005; Bichsel 2011, 76, 80). Here we 
see how an institution has been reconfigured in processes of institutional bricolage and 
changed with societal, structural changes and needs. Through institutional bricolage, 
collective participation has been what Henry (2004) calls an important local coping 
mechanism when societies have had to cope on their own through collective work. It has has 
enforcing effects, as it obligates people to do unpaid work. Under societal forms where power 
differences are wide, under for example Russian colonialism, there is, though, a risk that 
people will get exploited. In the next analytical chapter, I will discuss how the widespread use 
of ashar affects participation and governance by the people in development projects and 
resource governance. 
5.2.2 Social control functions in local governance  
Babajanian has studied 16 World Bank participatory development projects in Kyrgyzstan. His 
conclusion was that the social control functions excluded many vulnerable people from the 
projects and processes concerning the projects. Leaders, through their authority and village 
solidarity norms, forced villagers to pay for infrastructure projects when they really could not 
afford it. Thus, informants expressed some very negative views, and on how villagers in 
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North Kyrgyzstan were forced to become even poorer by paying for infrastructure 
(Babajanian 2011, 323). From this follows that vulnerable villagers do not have much to say 
in decision-making, but are forced to pay for development through the social control function 
of strong leaders. It should be mentioned, though, that these social control and solidarity 
practices have different meaning depending on the social dynamics and process in different 
places. Babajanian (2011, 323) found that village solidarity is more entrenched in the South 
than in the North. His research revealed that the population in the North was more reluctant to 
pay. This, he believes, is because in the more affluent Northern oblasts, capitalist exchange 
and individualism had replaced much of the traditional community solidarity, supportive 
networks and social control functions. This process has been exacerbated by the migration 
stream from the South, creating social alienation and division between the old and new 
inhabitants (Babajanian 2011).  
5.2.3 External aid agencies meeting old practices in resource 
governance  
International aid agencies and national or local NGOs alike deal with and position themselves 
among the Kyrgyz governance institutions at different administrative-political levels. NGOs 
and other actors of civil society constitute a part of the governance structure in Kyrgyzstan 
today. The civil society sector has flourished in comparison to some of the other Central 
Asian countries after the Soviet Union collapsed, as the country has a relatively open political 
environment in Central Asian terms (Earle 2005, 249). The development of NGOs has been 
promoted and shaped by Western donors’ views on the role of NGOs in society. 
Decentralisation efforts have opened up a space for donor-driven NGOs and aid agencies in 
community and rural development, invited by the first independent Kyrgyz government under 
president Akayev in 1991 (Adamson 2002; Earle 2005). These agencies and international 
NGOs became the Kyrgyz government’s new mentor, replacing Moscow’s role from the 
Soviet times (Baimyrzaeva 2005 OR 2012?, 31). 
Mosello (2011) fears that many donor projects will create governance problems, as many 
people’s needs and voices will not be heard. Projects will not be based on real needs by the 
people, as projects that win funding rather win due to leaders with skills and contacts and 
ideas that fit donor policies. People with strong leaders do not necessarily have the possibility 
to voice their needs, as there might be exclusionary mechanisms between villagers and leaders 
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or between villagers (Hickey and Mohan 2004).The competition for donor funding will 
therefore lead to inefficient and non-sustainable projects. In contrast, Baimyrzaeva believes 
that local NGOs have learned through this competition for donor funding to become more 
skilful (Baimyrzaeva 2012, 168). Nevertheless, NGOs working on projects involving local 
governance issues and actors meet severe challenges. This is explained by Saparova, the 
Manager of Local Governance at MSDSP in Osh (Saparova, 15.11.11). She works closely 
with local government organs, civil society and villagers to make these actors go into 
dialogue on development projects. MSDSP also try to help them to behave like checks and 
balances on each other to achieve democratic governance. She believes that there is an 
overlapping between workers in NGOs, AO and the local Kenesh sometimes, as people tend 
to work for all these different governance structures at the same time. She claims that people 
can wear ‘different hats for different occasions,’ and that this is not a problem. The problem 
lies in the personalisation of politics, she says, where you do not have any guarantee whether 
a bureaucrat working in local self-government is doing his work or not. Local government 
officials from the village administration often lack the competence to perform their tasks. 
“Politics at the Ayil Okhmotu level depends on personal factors, on whether or not they have the will, 
desire, and if they are active. Sometimes people here are very passive.” (Saparova, 15.11.11). 
 As aid agencies and large externally instigated NGOs operate in this complex political field, 
they are also implementing traditional institutional traits of Kyrgyz society in aid projects. 
Aid agencies and NGOs are promoting reconfigured or re-imagined pre-Soviet forms of 
community mobilisation. Donors involve aksakals and ashar as collective mobilisation for 
improving or implementing infrastructure (Earle 2005, 249). As local institutions and 
practices are shaped by local politics and power differences, this adds to the complex political 
field within which aid agencies and larger NGOs are operating.  
Informal institutions on the different political levels have often been misunderstood by 
international aid agencies (Bichsel 2011, 84). Bichsel compares two irrigation projects in two 
different villages in Southern Kyrgyzstan. One project was implemented by an aid agency, 
involving the establishment of a community based organisation (CBO), and another projects 
was instigated by the community itself without external aid interference. In the latter example, 
the community created an association, the Jangy Jer. The externally instigated project showed 
little understanding of the meaning of village institutions, although they tried to build on 
them, like using the aksakals’ role as older men with authority.  The aid agency had not 
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understood the social support basis of the aksakals. Aksakals that had authority was only 
those who earned support from the different families making up the village. In contrast, the 
project instigated solely by the community exerted a high degree of social control. These 
aksakals were middle-aged, and represented families and households of the village, which is 
the way representation function in many villages. Constituents of village boards or meetings 
are often not individuals, but families, as help and solidarity within families are very 
important for the survival of individuals in the village. Members of the Jangy Jer expressed 
that strong cohesion among villagers, coupled with honesty, accountability and the strong 
leadership performed by the Aksakal leaders was very important for the success of the 
project. The association had strong elements of social control, but this was not enforced 
through traditional norms of solidarity. The leaders used both coercion and enticement to 
control the population. For example, new land that now became irrigated was first given to 
villagers if they became members of the Jangy Jer association for only 2USD. Later, when 
the canal construction required more investment, families who wanted to keep their allocated 
plot were forced to pay 100 USD per family. The Jangy Jer’s early distribution of land 
secured it from being grabbed by other interested parties, including governmental and other 
power structures (Bichsel 2011,81,82). 
Bichsel concludes that aid agencies often lead to disempowerment of local institutions. By 
including participation of elders for instrumental and process-oriented purposes who are not 
supported by solidarity groups, they modify ‘the societal models these institutions are 
embedded in’ (Bichsel 2011, 85). Hence, as the INGO here altered the real village meaning of 
the Aksakal institution, associational power seized to exist. It was this associational power 
and local coping mechanisms that were needed for empowerment in the other example, where 
the community created their own association. This overlaps with what Cleaver (2012) 
explains about the meanings inherent in institutions. The indigenous association used social 
control functions in a new way, reconfiguring yet keeping this institution. This is an example 
of institutional bricolage, as institutions are reconfigured to meet modern societal challenges. 
With this associational power they moved across scales and fought off powerful actors at 
different scales. This process reminds us more of the political activism in Mitlin’s (2004) and 
Florisbelo and Guijt’s (2004) cases, where local activists were able to move across scales and 
affect higher level politics by linking local and global agendas. These examples are from 
Brazil and South-Africa and are set within different political and cultural systems. 
Nonetheless, this proves that connecting local activism to affect politics at higher levels of 
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government can be quite successful independently of cultural context. In the following 
chapter, I will analyse how an INGO works within and relates to decentralisation efforts, local 
self-government and participation when implementing a development project in my case-
study, the Kun Elek village. 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
Politics from the global to the local influence each other, and informal and formal power-and 
institutional practices create dependencies. The local level is dependent on the central level 
and international organisations for resources.   International policies of decentralisation affect 
all levels of government, and the politics of each scale in the end affects, but also merge, with 
the existing local power-and institutional practices. This has created both powerful local 
actors, and weak citizens, in the way that some citizens are heard and some are not as they are 
excluded from important informal networks of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. 
Politics on higher level merge with politics on lower level, that is, decentralisation policies 
meet informal institutions. At the same time, pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet institutions of 
governance meet in governance of resources today; this is institutional bricolage. Meanings 
from earlier institutions and forms of society are both continued and reconfigured. The 
different institutions create for a range of channels or possibilities for actors, this also has a 
scaled expression as they can move from different scales through the different institutional 
possibilities. As decentralisation policies meet informal institutions through informal power 
networks, some powerful actors are able to affect politics at higher level in an informal way. 
They can retract resources at higher levels, whereas those excluded from networks and 
without knowledge cannot. This is a good example of politics of scale, where politics and 




6 Village project in Kun Elek. The 
NGO between government, village, 
informal structures - and 
participation. 
In this chapter I will analyse how NGOs work in a complex political field, such as the one 
described in the last chapter, which is shaped by the meeting between state decentralisation 
and traditional institutions and practises. Through my case study, an integrated village 
irrigation project, I will discuss the roles of different actors, including the village people. I 
will elaborate on how this creates space for some participation at local level, but restrains 
some participation as well.  
I shall elaborate on what kind of space for participation and citizenship claiming MSDSP and 
local decision-making actors create in the village. I shed light on how power and knowledge 
are important issues in the development project in Kun Elek, and how these issues influence 
the degree and type of village participation. I will also discuss institutional bricolage in 
Kyrgyzstan, that is, how people can draw on different institutions and traditions to govern and 
manage their society and common resources in such strained environments as in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan. I aim to explore how institutional bricolage are connected to politics of scale - 
how politics at different scales, from the local villagers to the global policy level, are 
interconnected and how actors and power can potentially move across these scales through 
‘bricolaged’ institutions.  
6.1 The case study: Kun Elek village 
The Alai District in the Alai valley of Osh Oblast has 14 rural administrative communities – 
Ayil Okhmotus (AO). These are, as I have explained earlier, part of a local governance 
structure, and partly detached from the state political-administrative structure. Every AO 
consists of a number of villages with one being the administrative centre. Kun Elek is one of 
four villages in Leninskiy Aiyl Okhmotu, a village okrug
23
 in the barren mountains in the Alai 
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 The Ayil Okhmotu, when defined as a group of villages under one administrative unit and same jurisdiction, is 
overlapping with the term ‘okrug’ from Soviet times which holds the same meaning, see page 50. 
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valley. There are 1335 people living in Kun Elek, or 361 families (Suleimanova, manager 
Natural Resource Management MSDSP, 17.09.12). Because of lack of water and land and no 
other possibilities to get a job in Alai valley, youth are migrating to Russia, Kazakhstan or 
other cities in Kyrgyzstan to find work. Many who go to Russia or Kazakhstan come home to 
Kun Elek a couple of months during winter, as the market is slower in the cold periods in 
Russia (Interviews in village, 18-26.11.11; Suleimanova, 17.09.12).  
Kun Elek is, according to MSDSP staff, one of the poorest villages of the Leninskiy AO 
because of its relative shortage of farming and pasture land (Interviews MSDSP staff, Niva 
the head of AO). According to MSDSP statistics, though, 64% of the population in Kun Elek 
is rated poor, only a few per cent higher than the other three villages of Leninskiy okrug. At 
the same time, 41% of Kun Elek villagers, approximately 10 % more than in the other 
villages, earns less than approximately 12 USD monthly.
24
 The Leninskiy Ayil Okhmotu is 
among the poorest AOs in Osh, according to research on the geographical spread of poverty 
in the country (Kyrgyz Republic committee for national statistics, supported by the World 
Bank, 2005). Leninskiy AO has a poverty level among its population of 60 % or more. 
According to Niva and MSDSP staff, Leninskiy AO and Kun Elek are also poor due to lack of 
employment opportunities.  The Alai valley has a continental climate, with high seasonal 
variation in weather and temperature. It is also a very arid valley, because of the non-fertile 
mountainous soil which makes it a difficult place for agriculture when compared to other 
regions in the country (Jansky Pachova 2006). Climate changes have led to the melting of 
glaciers, which in the long run will lead to more arid climate in the valley. As the population 
in Alai valley is dependent upon their agricultural activities and livestock herding, water is 
crucial. Food insecurities have been alleviated by humanitarian and development aid and 
money transfer from seasonal and permanent migrants from the region. At the same time, the 
struggle for survival over the last twenty years has severely degraded the mountainous 
ecosystems and their resources. Mountain villages are located far from central areas and 
excluded by their mountainous location. The discontinuation of state employment and social 
benefits has led to further exclusion, social degradation, poverty and out-migration.  
Thus, decoupling of Soviet agriculture and export system, together with scarce resource 
production and harsh living conditions in mountain villages up to 3,500 meters, exacerbates 
the poverty. This affects these mountain societies’ capabilities of coping with the increasing 
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natural disasters and everyday hardships they are experiencing (Jansky and Pachova 2006, 
104, 105). 
6.2 The INGOs’ position and role in a complex 
political field. Between Western policies and local 
politics. 
In the beginning of the decentralisation reforms, development agencies like AKF and their 
daughter organisation MSDSP supported village associations to take care of community 
development. These associations for management of diverse village resources have, in AKF’s 
view, developed in an unsustainable direction (Saparova, 15.11.11). In 2009, the state 
government implemented a law ‘On Pastures’. This transferred all farm land management to 
local committees and associations (Kreutzmann 2012, 136). Water associations had started 
developing already in the 1990s, mostly by international donor agencies (Sehring 2009, 69). 
The government delegated all issues to the local governance authorities. Communities started 
associations, committees and administrative boards parallel to local government. These were 
independent from government in all development spheres, like water, land, irrigations or 
farming. But the leaders from these community groups were not paid, they were more like 
volunteers. Saparova says that how they work now, directly with local governments, is much 
more sustainable. “(…) this new structure, this is government structure, and sustainable, and 
involving people.” (Saparova, 15.11.11) 
Saparova explains how MSDSP has changed its development efforts from village associations 
to working with local governments or NGOs in the areas where they work in Osh, in Alai and 
Chong Alai raions. The less active village associations were simply handed over to the AO, 
and merged into these already existing structures that might be more capable. 
“Within 5 years there were established 63 village associations, like water associations. What to do with 
them? Some were very passive, some active, because all mountain areas used to get support from [the] 
government during Soviet times. So they got addicted to that. But now they were supposed to work, when they 
are not used to it. So, we, or the district officers, suggested something that we transferred to Shahid [director of 
MSDSP in Bishkek] and divided village associations in three [groups] – very active, not active and the middle 
one [medium active]. The passive ones were asked to transfer all projects, potatoes, education, goat breeding, 




At the same time, active village associations that were able to deliver good services became 
NGOs.  
“The active were asked if they could get registered at the Ministry of Justice, just to become a local 
NGO. The middle ones, we had a meeting with them and asked if they would keep developing activities or if 
they could deliver [these] over to msdsp. Now, we have 32 or 38 that were ready to register as NGOs. Before, 
they got all support from MSDSP, they did not do anything themselves, but now they needed to register at the 
Ministry of Justice to get support. They need to arrange a village fund.  So now, many of these became very 
good NGOs”. (Saparova, 15.11.11). 
Dzholdoshjaliev, from WRMD under the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources 
Management and Processing Industry, explains that they actually still support water user 
associations. WRMD has the supervisory responsibility of these. However, he admits that 
they are successful in a very varying degree; it completely depends on the individuals making 
up the WUAs. This conflates with Narusbaeva’s thoughts on how governance issues are very 
personalised in Kyrgyzstan. Also, there seems to be some non-coordination between state and 
INGO efforts on WUAs. Mosello (2011) points to the danger of uncoordinated efforts of aid 
agencies, as resources could be used at other more pressing agendas.  
Hence, external aid agencies are contributing their guiding rules not only on higher, but also 
lower levels of governance. Through MSDSP’s policies towards local self-governance, either 
NGOs or official governance structures deliver services and implement development 
measures in localities in Alai region. MSDSP was an instigator in changing the social 
organised forms of associations into NGOs, and thus is heavily involved in local decision-
making. The governance functions of the associations paralleled those of local village 
administrations, which according to Saparova at MSDSP (15.11.11) made both of the 
institutions to perform badly. The associations were often overlapping with Ayil Okhmotu, so 
they were basically the same as the Ayil Okhmotu (Sehring 2009, 73). Also, as Saparova 
mentioned above, associations lack incentives to perform as their work is unpaid. This 
indicates uncoordinated efforts between the central state and AKF/MSDSP. However, it 
might indicate that those who function live on, and others are transferred to other units of 
governance. In this way, different local units for resource governance might just be 
contextually suited institutional arrangements.  
Now, through support from MSDSP, Ayil Okhmotu has regained its strong position, although 
MSDSP believes that local NGOs are flexible in this system. To have both AO and other units 
of governance to govern resources might be a necessary flexible system fitted for its context. 
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At the same time, as pointed out by Bichsel (2009, 74) and Cleaver (2001); the manner in 
which  international NGOs implement projects typically strengthen local power relationships. 
The donors and INGOs are dependent on the village elite in the AO to carry out the project 
within their time frame. The AO is necessary to involve as it has power to get decisions 
through and implementation done.  Having them involved in development implementation is 
a type of local participation and an important coping mechanism. On the other hand, 
vulnerable groups are not likely to be represented in this decision making. 
6.3 INGOs and development agencies play an 
enabling and a disabling role at the same time 
Saparova, the manager of local governance at MSDSP, explains how MSDSP functions as a 
necessarily disciplining institution when it comes to making sure that the projects are 
accurately planned by the communities. MSDSP ensures that the money needed for a project 
is kept at a minimum. Sometimes they inspire communities to implement projects and cut 
costs themselves. 
“There was one project where the villagers asked for street lighting. But when they gave their proposal 
to us they had made wrong calculations. We could not believe it would be so expensive. So, they did a 
recalculation and did it cheaper themselves, without any support. We thought it was a great idea, especially 
because an assessment in the community proved they wanted it themselves, this was in Kara Kulja, but the same 
case happened in Naryn and Osh oblast as well.” (Saparova, 15.11.11). 
Narusbaeva, from the state agency for local self-government, asserts that donors seem to 
focus on some issues and regions they have found to be most important, whereas other 
important issues are left behind. 
“It is a problem that most local self-government projects are on budget and finance issues. No one does 
municipal issues, legislation. I am trying to talk to different donors about new programs for these directions, 
AKF  and OSCE - but they are just working with the Southern Kyrgyz regions, nobody works with the Northern 
regions”. (Narusbaeva, 09.11.11). 
Baimyrzaeva (2012) agrees with this, saying that this leads to the targeting of only some 
actors and areas, leaving others behind. In this respect, foreign aid might lead to uneven or 
scattered geographical development. 
Nevertheless, Narusbaeva also believes that donor activity has had overall positive influence 
on development in Kyrgyzstan. What she believes to be problematic are certain time 
constraints and the fact that donor support is not long-term. 
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“It is a problem that donors are here for one or two years, then all work is to stop because donors 
completed the project. We have each year new donor meetings to make them further develop the projects. If a 
new project should start they [donors and aid agencies] should start from, continue from, results from prior 
projects. With MSDSP, with Chinara [Saparova], we work with five raions on different aspects of local self-
government. This year they closed local self-government component, and I am afraid they will not continue to 
work in this area.” (Narusbaeva, 09.11.11).  
Shairbek Juraev is the director of the American University of Central Asia. He is an expert on 
international actors and the influence of international policies in Kyrgyzstan. Juraev explains 
how there are hazards for aid to exacerbate corruption in Kyrgyzstan, but this is very much on 
a case-to-case basis.  
“There is this fashion that there are hazards [for aid to exacerbate corruption]. Foreign aid basically 
compensated the state’s ability to deliver various errands. On the one hand, that’s kind of bad, but it is hard to 
make a general statement on this. Most donor projects I think do a very good job. They create discussion, and a 
certain discourse.” (Shairbek Juraev, 12.11.11). 
In this way we see how international aid agencies or INGOs have had both an enabling and 
disabling effect on Kyrgyzstan. There seems to be differences of opinions between the AKF 
staff on the regional level, the representative for Kyrgyz State Agency for local self-
governance and the Kyrgyz scholar. The AKF staff sees its role as mostly positive and 
disciplining in a good way. The state representative sees that there are some time-and priority 
challenges with donors, although the overall influence of external aid has been positive. The 
scholar, Juraev, views aid as complex and enabling, but at the same time it does have some 
negative aspects. He also points out how effects are difficult to generalize. Thus, the complex 
process gives unintended effects which make many development efforts both enabling and 
disabling at the same time. 
6.3.1 Knowledge transfers from the INGO  
Juraev points to the importance of aid money in the hard nineties, when Kyrgyzstan was in 
the building stages of becoming an independent state. At the same time, he further elaborates 
on the problems related to time-frames and lack of local knowledge in the agenda-setting 
stage of project planning. 
“IOs and INGOs have been crucial to build up Kyrgyzstan in the early 90s. [There have been] lots of 
NGOs and exchanges.But the problem is that [the] agenda is set not in Kyrgyzstan but somewhere else. The 
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agenda changes all the time - first it’s climate, next year - not even next year but next proposal – it’s gender, 
freedom of press or something completely different.“ (Juraev, 12.11.11). 
 “Because of the nature of international organisations, they do not have - you don’t expect from them - 
such deep context knowledge. They are there for a bit, and then they go somewhere else [to another country]. 
They are professional. Those that are in Bishkek probably don’t understand the villages.“ (Juraev, 12.11.11). 
Hence, the changing of the agenda would seem to make it more difficult to transfer 
knowledge in a sustainable way. As Mosse (2001) sees it, there is a danger that knowledge 
will stay with the benefactor. In one way, the knowledge from NGOs is thought to be more 
important than the local knowledge when the agenda is set somewhere else by people that are 
not in the Kyrgyz setting, but at main offices in Geneva or Haag. Juraev even claims that 
these international organisations are ‘professional’, which indicates how the professional 
supersedes the local in importance. This reflects Botes’ and Renburg’s (2000) views, as they 
criticise development agencies for imposing external knowledge, and for implementing 
agendas and decisions already made by the international development agencies. In this way, 
in much participative measures the local population is not really participating in decision-
making stages at all. In the Kyrgyz instance, according to Juraev, agenda-setting is already 
made and it is made in an external setting.  
At the same time, much knowledge transfer is viewed as important and positive by AKF 
workers. Saparova, from the department of local governance at MSDSP, sees the importance 
of the spread of these methods to other regions of the country but also outside Kyrgyzstan.  
“This approach shows very good results, and it is important to expand to other mountain areas, and in 
other sub-districts of the same districts [where they have already been implemented]. In this [district] we have 
[projects] in five AOs, but there are altogether 75. So, a big issue is that AKF supports year by year, and AKF 
wants to get resources from other donors. So that’s why we asked Norwegian government. Another challenge is 
the capacity of staff. Even I didn’t know how to do my job before I got an education, a job and then experience. 
“ (Saparova 15.11.11). 
Hence, in her view, the problem lies with the lack of donors, resources and training of staff, 
not the methods of MSDSP. Although, she sees the knowledge transfer from MSDSP to the 
communities as positive, she sees some constraints in the knowledge sharing effect that 
development agencies have. The knowledge-sharing could be more bottom-up. 
“Since [the] beginning we have this training of trainers, you asked about shared knowledge? We 
conduct training of trainers before [the] projects. I gather all my district staff here in Osh, hire a professional 
trainer, they conduct training for my staff. My staff gets this knowledge, they go in the district and give this 
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knowledge to the AO. Now, sharing knowledge is kind of top down, when sharing knowledge should be bottom 
up. Lessons learned, case studies, documenting activities - we do not have capacity for this. We know how to 
implement projects, taken from the top and delivered to the local, but disseminate the message from the local 
community to the donors is… ah… this year we practice developing case studies for the donors. The street 
lighting was a case study for the donors. And probably we need to increase our staff capacity for the document 
fixing, and cases, and deliver these to the donor, the AKF and MSDSP, to tell about success and challenges.” 
(Saparova, 15.11.11) 
As Mosse’s (2001) argues, ‘what is taken as ‘local knowledge’ is constructed in the context of 
planning and reflects the social relationships that planning systems entail,’ (Mosse 2001, 17, 
26). Where donors and NGOs are dependent on little resources and timely delivery, the local 
knowledge aspect might be lost in practice. Participation from villagers, as a means to extract 
local knowledge to achieve locally adapted development, is reduced to the more passive 
beneficiary. This is, in White’s (1995) words, a kind of instrumental participation, or 
information transfer, in contrast to participation as real representation and voice in 
implementation of projects. It is also not empowering, at least not directly. Their participation 
has not transformed their consciousness about their own situation and how they can claim 
their political rights. 
 At the same time, Kun Elek villagers strategise with the resources at hand and the knowledge 
they have gained about the strategies of NGOs. In the same situation in Mosse’s research in 
India, villagers strategise to maximize short-term benefits from wages and subsidies (ibid.). 
Some version of this seems to be happening in Kun Elek too, in an inventive way. The 
villagers in Kun Elek seem to have a large focus on the aspects of keeping youth by creating 
jobs and halting out-migration. AKF also implements youth development, halting out-
migration and job creation in the irrigation projects, although irrigation is slightly more in 
focus. In contrast, as one young man in the village said, “We need water, but most of all we 
need developed youth and work (Religious young man, 23.11.11). The local leaders also 
emphasised the importance of halting migration and creating jobs for youth (The librarian and 
’executive leader’ of the project, 23.11.11; Head of AO, 30.11.11). Kun Elek seems to have 
accomplished the project they wanted, using the knowledge and institutional resources 
available in an institutional bricolage process (Cleaver 2012). As AKF get their irrigation and 
youth development project, the village gets theirs. The policies of external agencies might not 
be influenced by local knowledge, or lessons learned locally, to a large degree. Gender 
equality, climate adaptation and freedom of press might be difficult to implement sustainably, 
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or sustainably transfer knowledge on how to perform, if these policies change all the time. 
Nevertheless, villages learn how to cope and use these new institutional possibilities in a 
rather inventive way. INGO knowledge is both disabling and enabling, or inspiring, for 
participation and for communities. 
6.4 Village norms and mechanisms: Local 
leaders and their network, knowledge, social 
control and checks and balances.  
Niva, the head of Leninskij Ayil Okmotu, was one of the lead instigators of the project. Much 
because of his acquired experience and skills, Kun Elek won a project through an AKF 
competition for grants. As mentioned, he knew about Kun Elek’s water problems. After 
gaining some new information on irrigation schemes and the help available from AKF, he 
wrote a project proposal together with villagers at a village meeting (Niva, 30.11.11). In 
addition, Niva also managed to get hold of extra resources when there was a lack of money in 
the closing phase of the project. He obtained these resources through contacts in the capital, 
Bishkek, and through the Oblast governor. There is a fund called “structuration fund”, from 
which Niva was distributed resources by the government in Bishkek. These resources were 
handed over through the governor of Osh oblast (MSDSP Engineers, 26.11.11). Niva 
personally went to Bishkek two times to ask for donations (Niva, 30.11.11).  
Niva is powerful in the way that he can decide which village under his okrug that he will help 
arrange a project for. He has experience with writing project proposals, and he has the right 
contacts. He has a broad network and contacts in Bishkek, he has access to information and he 
holds good knowledge of the raion and of how to do political work in the raion. Niva 
possesses these skills as he was born here and has worked in different positions in the raion 
bureaucracy. In this way, he was a key person for ensuring the project for the village. As he 
says, 
“ In my opinion it is not hard to get money or help from the national political level, because the one 
who works, the one who thinks, he will always find a way. It is not difficult for me, because I know the raion, I 
have worked in the raion and I know my business. I know how to find money, because I am myself an 
economist. I worked for a long time as head account at predsedatelj kolkhosa [chairman of the collective farm]
25
. 
                                                 
25
 Collective farms existed in Soviet times. Now, they have been privatised, and most of them have been divided 
into smaller farms (Bichsel 2009). 
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I know the path and what to do – first I write the project, then they need to agree on raion and oblast centre level 
of powers, they support and respect me”. (Interview “Niva” 30.11.2011).  
If the population comes to the Ayil Okhmotu for help, but the Ayil Okhmotu must seek extra 
resources from the state for development projects, this level is still not de facto independent. 
There is a certain decision-making freedom, but without real devolution of power they are 
dependent on resources from above. Local government is in fact restricted in performing 
development for their constituents because of this lack of real devolution. In Kun Elek, the 
irrigation project depended to a great deal on Niva’s contacts. As he explains; 
“If I myself cannot solve these problems or questions, I talk with the raion, oblast or Bishkek (level). I 
have acquaintances. How can I help? People come with questions for money, or they want material help and I do 
what I can” (Niva 30.11.2011). 
Niva’s views shows that he can accumulate more knowledge and power based on his already 
existing knowledge and power. He knows how and through whom to operate, and gains 
resources and more power by doing this. The fact that Niva clearly views himself as an 
important and powerful person implies the importance of status, position and networking are 
in Kyrgyzstan. He can create opportunities for his villagers, and thus he power he holds will 
‘circulate in society’ and reach the villagers that can take advantage of this power (Masaki 
2007). At the same time, those excluded from supportive networks, with less knowledge and 
power will have a harder time gaining more of these attributes in this kind of system. Other 
excluded villages with less connected leaders will have difficulties creating these 
opportunities. Also, these exclusionary traits exist within communities as well, which I will 
return to later. 
Niva also validates the elected Ayil Bashty, the head of a village under his okrug, or validates 
the removal of a dysfunctional Ayil Bashty. He needs to be present at these events, and can 
veto these decisions if he wants to. According to Niva, the village leader in Kun Elek was 
elected at a village meeting where around 300 or 400 were gathered. As this first elected 
village leader was incapable of performing his duties, Niva was called to validate the new 
elected leader, whom a few aksakals had chosen under a village meeting (Niva 30.11.2011; 
Old Lady, 22.11.11 ).  
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The leader of each village, the Ayil Bashty, addresses the Ayil Okhmotu for instructions.  
Niva explained how village leaders come to him with problems or processes going on in their 
villages, and how he delegates responsibility to them; 
“Every Monday they come here and discuss what they have done the last week, and I give them tasks 
for the coming week. If they cannot come, we talk over the phone about what they shall do, what problems they 
have and how I can solve their problems.“ (Niva, 30.11.11).  
The Kun Elek Ayil Bashty found being a leader to be a difficult job and a great responsibility. 
It is difficult to work with the Ayil Okhmotu and the head of AO, as the salary for being the 
village leader is small and he sometimes quarrels with the Ayil Okhmotu. Sometimes, people 
do tricks to get extra resources, or they do things differently than how he has told people to do 
them (Ayil Bashty 26.11.2011). Ulan, the Kun Elek Ayil Bashty, explain how he was elected 
because of the trust he had already gained from the aksakals; ‘I used to be Jamaat Bashty, 
they knew I did a good job and trusted me. That is why they wanted me as Ayil Bashty.’ (Ayil 
Bashty, 26.11.2011).  
Hence, the head of AO has some power over election of the village leader, but his role is more 
consultative. As the village leader, who was first elected by the people, turned out to be 
unsuited, local coping mechanisms came through; if elders chose a leader, the people would 
trust their authority to find a good AB. 
Dardak is the village librarian. He takes care of the library and he was in fact renovating it 
during my research. In addition, Dardak has run several projects, and he has learnt how to 
write project proposals. He has also arranged the workers brigades for this project, gathering 
youth from around Osh city and from Kun Elek. Niva calls him ‘kind of an executive in the 
project, when we wrote the project plan, so I know him. I initiated a commission so that he 
does everything by the correct building norms’ (Niva, 30.11.2011). Niva also explains the 
necessity of these leaders; 
“I love and support these people. If they (the village) do not have these people, my deputies can help. 
But people understand what needs to be done, and understand the need for a leader that earns their confidence.” 
(Niva, 30.11.11). 
As there surfaced unexpected obstacles in the way of project implementation, there was need 
for extra resources and money. One obstacle was in connection with the building of a new 
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road, which was part of the project. The new road was to connect Kun Elek to the market, so 
that necessary equipment and pipes could be transported to the village. The villagers can now 
appropriate different kinds of resources (money, credit, food) easier as they are connected to 
wider markets. The problem is when the snow melts from the mountains during spring; large 
chunks of stone fall and block the road. This was fixed by a wealthy businessman with 
connections to the village. He bought a bulldozer, and cleans the road every spring 
(Suleimanova, 16.11.11; Technician, 16.11.11). 
Niva claims that Ulan is the ‘fixer’ and the decision-maker on village-level regarding the 
project. Dardak, the librarian, seems to have more influence on the practical implementation 
of the project. Niva said that “but Ayil Bashty takes care of everything; the school, the library, 
competitions – and he also answers to me, what he shall do” (Niva, 30.11.2011). 
Consequently, there is a web of leadership that is important for village development at the 
level of local self-government in Kun Elek. It consists of the head of AO and the village 
leader and other local instigating actors. This is coherent with O’Neill Borbieva’s (2010) 
research on the development industry in Kyrgyzstan. Her research covered 6 out of 7 oblasts 
in Kyrgyzstan, and she argues that all over the country there were always charismatic and 
industrious local or village individuals needed to translate projects for villagers, and make the 
project work. In Kun Elek, these men were key persons for getting the project through. 
Hence, getting a development project is largely based on whether the villages’ AO or head of 
AO, alongside other key actors, are well connected through networks to other governance 
levels. It also depends on whether they hold information and knowledge or not. This suggests 
that development is largely dependent on personal factors, networking and local coping 
mechanisms in the wording of Henry (2004). These key actors are, as Cleaver calls them, 
bricoleurs, who shape and use institutions as they have better access to them through their 
roles as leaders and through their knowledge and network. In addition, this again points to the 
important factor of knowledge, which is needed to already be in place for actors and 
communities to be able to obtain donor support. In this way, knowledge and informal 
networks – that is, the networks between higher political levels, the head of AO and other 
local actors - are the powerbase of these communities. As projects are based on a competition, 
where the best project proposal wins a project, there are many other villages that did not get a 
project. Other leaders in other villages might lack the necessary knowledge and contact 
network. Hence, externally led development uses methods that lead to development for some, 
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but might lose others in need that the state might be better suited to help. This argument 
parallels the good governance critics (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Gaventa 2004) who warn us 
that the good governance agenda is to a considerable part shaped by new public management 
practices derived from a neoliberal logic that are unsuitable for development processes. That 
is, competition practices are a double-edged sword; they are needed to give donors some kind 
of guarantee that the projects they support are good and will be successful. At the same time, 
those less able to write proposals, but who might need projects, are left excluded.  
The head of AO is elected by the people, and the head of the village appears, in Kun Elek 
anyways, sometimes to be elected by the people and sometimes by trusted aksakals. I will 
now look at the villagers’ participation in village meetings, or councils, and meetings about 
development projects held in the village. I will discuss how knowledge about participation in 
different spaces for decision-making has an effect on each other. Therefore, I look at village 
participation in such a general manner.  
6.5 Village participation. What kind of 
participation, and who participates in what? 
6.5.1 Ashar – participation as labour and resources 
The actual canal which was planned in the project was built by unemployed youth, both from 
the village and from smaller cities around Osh city. The team of young workers is called 
brigady by MSDSP staff (Suleimanova, 16.11.11). They were supervised by technicians and 
engineers from MSDSP in Osh. These workers were informed by Dardak, who had 
connections that he used to find the young men from around the Osh area. The workers have a 
real contract, and will be paid after the project is finished (Young workers, 19.11.11). In 
addition, the Kun Elek villagers who were able to work were told by the Ayil Bashty and the 
practical leader Dardak to join in volunteer labour, ashar, which has been elaborated on in 
earlier chapters. This was decided, or confirmed, by the head of AB. The villagers dug parts 
of the canal that they did not need supervising from the engineers to dig. The population dug a 
part of the canal in proportion to the property they had; if they had a large property they had 
to dig a length equivalent to this large property.  If a young man and his family were 
distributed a new land plot, the family dug a part proportionate to this plot. Often, men dug 
and women served food, as women do not contribute in this type of hard labour. Also, those 
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who could give a contribution in money were told to do so, whilst those who did not have the 
means merely contributed in handy work and food gifts (Suleimanova, 16.11.11, Technician, 
16.11.11; Niva 30.11.11). 
This differs from what some villagers told me. Some old women, having no animals and no 
sons, and whose daughters had left the village, told me they had to pay for the project. Their 
life situation suggests that they are poor in the village, as those without animals and help from 
their family are considered poor (Four middle-aged and old women at house warming toi, 
18.11.11). This might be an example of patron exploitation of the poor and of those excluded 
from supportive networks. In addition, there is a risk here that participation is only 
instrumental and reduced to labour or contribution of resources. In the next paragraph I will 
analyse whether or not empowering participation is also involved. 
6.5.2 Participation in decision making or participation as 
information? 
It seems like most men in Kun Elek between the approximate ages of 20 and 50 years 
participate in village meetings; this includes the meeting about the water irrigation project. At 
village meetings, they vote for candidates for Ayil Okhmoto, the head of Ayil Okhmoto, the 
village leader, or they discuss development plans for the village. Many of my informants 
explained that the head of AO, the Ayil Bashty and Dardak had explained to them the 
importance of water under the irrigation project meeting. After the meeting, they felt that they 
had understood the importance of irrigated water for the future of the village, for better 
agriculture products and to create jobs for the migrating unemployed (Young man building 
house, 27.11.11; 4 Young men, 28.11.11;).  
Sometimes at Kun Elek village meetings, the aksakals – old men and/or a group of respected 
and knowledgeable men, choose candidates for Ayil Okhmoto or the village leader post, and 
the villagers who are attending the meeting simply confirm their choice (Jamila 1, 19.11.11). 
According to one older woman of the village, the villagers often have more faith in a village 
leader candidate’s abilities and power if he has been elected by the aksakals than if he is 
simply chosen through other mechanisms. 
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“The last Ayil Bashty was supposed to give me and my family land, but he did not. Because he did not 
do good work, he had to go. This time, the aksakals elected the Ayil Bashty, and not everyone, like last time” 
(Friend of Dabulazhe, 24.11.11).  
Although aksakals can give legitimacy in some spheres, they do not have the same authority 
in others. In spheres or situations where new technology is used, they are not involved. (2 
aksakals in taxi, 26.11.11).  In Kun Elek, it seemed that some aksakals were important for 
employing the right village leader, but many, as one elder told me, were simply pensioners 
sitting at home much of the time (Aksakal, 25.11.11).  
Hence, most men participate in the village meetings, including the meeting concerning the 
irrigation project. In these meetings, leader figures are explaining the project and its necessity 
to the villagers. The villagers are not so much joining in decision making and discussions, but 
are getting information from their trusted leaders. These leaders are sometimes only chosen 
by a few trusted men – aksakals - and the villagers confirm their choice. In one way, villagers 
do have some influence, so there is representative participation in process. Villagers 
participate in decision making as they oust the leaders that they are displeased with. Leaders 
who do not do their job or are not knowledgeable enough to create possibilities for their 
villagers will not perform in a satisfactory way and might be removed as leaders. In this way, 
villagers perform a function of checks and balances upon their leaders, who otherwise has 
strong decision making power and exercises strong social control due to their knowledge and 
skills. But this is not really transformative participation, as villagers really do not have so 
much to say in development efforts, but are in larger part informed. Knowledge and political 
power stay with the implementers and the leaders. As O’Neill Borbieva (2010) contends, 
there is a necessity for local actors to translate projects to villagers. However, is needed is 
possibly a deeper structural development, not projects that encourage citizen participation 
without linking this to political or structural changes. There is no claiming of citizenship 
rights, that is, villagers are not encouraged to claim resources for development of irrigation 
from government structures based on their rights as citizens.  
6.5.3 Women in the village. Women falling outside of 
participation –  but not all women  
Many women in Kun Elek were not involved in local governance issues. Many did not go to 
village meetings concerning the development of the village, and they did not vote for the 
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village leader or deputies to local self-governance organs. One woman explained how she was 
not informed of the election of a new village leader; 
“It was supposed to be election for Ayil Bashty. And suddenly, he was elected, without us knowing it! 
He was chosen by 7 aksakals” (Jamila1, 19.11.11).  
However, there seems to be quite a large difference between women. Richa (2008,1) finds 
that older women who grew up in Soviet times not only have a different attitude towards 
participation in public matters, but also have an assigned responsibility for village 
participation on the count of their age. This is supported by Babajanian (2011), who found 
that women that participated in village meetings often had posts in the local school, clinic or 
in the local administration. The majority of these belonged to a cohort of Soviet activists, who 
had either worked at the collective or state farms or been active in local party committees. In 
Kun Elek, I also found differences between women who had experience with participation 
and activity from their own family or environments, like their job, and those who did not. 
Some women who come from a ‘participative’ family, where husband and wife are more 
equal, are often participating if they have no small children. For example, the mother of the 
village leader and the wife of a Jamaat
26
 leader participated in village meetings. She even 
voted for deputies to the Ayil Kenesh, the village administration representatives, which no 
other woman I interviewed seemed to have done (mother of village leader - the Ayil Bashty, 
26.11.11). The wife of the neighbourhood leader, Jamila, also had very active children at 
school, she said. In addition, Jamila worked as a nurse. According to Elmira, another 
interviewee, this was also crucial for women’s involvement with development in the village.  
“Those women who have jobs, they get around and they get to see what is going on. They are 
participating in all kinds of meetings” (Elmira, 19.11.11). 
This seems to fit with what was said by a female teacher at the Kun Elek School. Teachers are 
often considered as authoritative and important in villages in Kyrgyzstan (O’Neill Borbieva 
2010).  This teacher participated not only in village meetings, including the irrigation 
meeting, but also in all other meetings arranged by AKF/MSDSP. She was in fact the only 
teacher at the school who wasinvolved in a project on trainings for teachers, where teachers 
receive support, training and different magazines and reading materials for the children.  





“Many women have children, and do not have time. Or, they are just not interested. I am interested. Not 
only with how our children are doing, but on what is going on outside, around, in Osh or Bishkek” (Teacher, 
29.11.11). 
In comparison to middle-aged women, many young women do not participate in village 
affairs. There are many reasons for this, they told me. Richa (2008) argues that participation is 
not young Kyrgyz women’s responsibility in the village setting. I found that women with 
children in Kun Elek do not have time, which is not surprising as women bear the main 
responsibility for their children in most societies today (Mayoux 2006). Also, women who are 
married, especially the younger ones, are expected to be more at home. Some young women 
think that if an older woman from their family participates, there is someone there 
representing the family. As the daughter-in-law of Jamila, an older woman in the village, who 
told me;  
” I do not participate, because my mother-in-law does. If there is anything important, she will repeat 
what was going on at the meetings.” (Daughter-in-law, 20.11.11). 
At the same time, the wife of Dardak, a powerful man with a large network in the raion and 
much agency to make different development efforts, did not participate in public meetings. As 
her husband had all the connections, she did not need to do much; 
” I do not care about politics. I do not participate in groups or meetings, I have a husband who makes 
money and knows everyone in the village, so I don’t need to. I don’t know which women are poor or rich 
because my husband has the overview on that. I have grown used to life at home, I don’t care about politics.”  
(Dardaks wife, 19.11.11).  
Thus, women without husbands are also more vulnerable, as they have to take care of the 
children and work alone without a husband, who would most likely be much more involved 
with village affairs than his wife. Under a group interview at a house warming toi, one woman 
whom the others characterised as poor was present. They felt sorry for her, almost pitied her. 
They explained how her husband had died, and that she was raising her small children by 
herself. Her children were young, and could not migrate to Russia and send back remittances, 
like these women’s children did. In addition, she lived far away, and this added to her 
exclusion from village affairs (Interview with five women at house warming, 18.11.11). This 
coincides with Babajanian’s research on World Bank projects in 16 villages. He found that 
women could be represented by their husbands, but if they had no husband there was strong 
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possibility that their voices would not be heard, and they would fall under heavy social 
control pressure (Babajanian 2011). 
Thus, many of the Kun Elek women believe that only one person in the family needs to be 
participating in village affairs. As long as the family is represented, there is no need for every 
individual to be present. According to Bichsel (2009, 83), families and not individuals make 
up the units of a Kyrgyz village. Those who are most excluded, like young, married women or 
older women with no husband and few children, or those without children migrating to Russia 
or Kazakhstan, stay excluded without their voices being heard. Exclusion from supportive 
networks is yet another exclusionary mechanism. Social and power relations such as class, 
age and lifestyles among women in Kun Elek often decide whether they participate in village 
affairs and meetings or not. In addition, there are differences in how these different women 
view the scope of woman participation in village matters. Many women who do not 
participate, like the interviewees quoted above, express that ‘meetings are for men’. As 
another young woman said to me, “in general, women do not participate. I know a few who 
does, those that are very outspoken, and do not have a husband.” (Young woman1, 24.11.11). 
In contrast, the women that participated uttered that many women did participate, that it was 
normal for women to participate (Mother of village leader/Ayil Bashty, 26.11.11). Some 
expressed that they found it easy to express their meaning in village meetings, it was 
important and necessary and in general a good thing (Jamila 1 and Jamila 2, 19.11.11).  
Some women in Kun Elek were also isolated from having their voice heard in local 
governance organs because of more specific village institutions and traditions. Some of the 
work the women do is to organise tois - parties- for the appropriate events that demand a party 
in the village – for example a house-warming or a marriage. Especially house-warmings are 
frequent, as there is a building boom in the village. In fact, much of Kyrgyzstan is 
experiencing a building boom as the money they earn abroad is often used to build a new 
house. So, new possibilities in terms of money have accelerated old institutions of both 
building and celebrating new houses. A group of women arranging a toi told me that there is a 
lot of work arranging it (Jamila 1, Jamila 2, Young toi Woman 1, Young toi woman 2, 
19.11.11). One woman exclaimed;  
“I am not at meetings, it is toi season! I am never at meetings when there is a toi to organise!” (Young 
toi Woman 1, 19.11.11).  
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One woman was unable to go to any participative meetings or gathering because of traditional 
behavioural norms in the village. Her brother had died, and she had to excuse herself from 
any social events for a year (Old lady, 28.11.11). Here, I found support in Babajanian’s 
(2011) research, whose female informant explained that she did not participate in village 
meetings because her husband had died. Hence, these institutions and traditions confine 
women to spaces at home and exclude them from spaces of politics and influence. Hence, 
women’s subordinate status in the private or the home space might be transferred to other 
spaces as spaces influence each other (Mohanty 2011; Cleaver 2001; Cleaver 2012). This 
corresponds with the opinion of some of the Kun Elek women themselves, as they expressed 
that gatherings outside of home are men’s business, and women only gather at home. The 
women at the health station in Kun Elek think that women are spending too much time in 
their homes, and that it is very good for their development to get out of this sphere and join 
training sessions (2 Women Health Clinic, 26.11.11). 
 In the village, women and men share some work loads such as farming, but there were 
certain gendered spheres of work and interests that to some extent reflected what kind of 
development efforts villages wanted. Cornwall (2011, 207, 208) points out how women 
sometimes are given or claim space, but that they voice needs that might be connected with 
fulfilling their duties as wives and mothers. This is a dilemma in feminist development work, 
where women ask for specific support for such things like handicraft, which might not be 
empowering to women, but might reinforce their inequality. Many women in Kun Elek did 
want support for these kinds of activities, for example to be able to make traditional tois that 
are expensive. They need to make traditional carpets and food, and fabric and yarn is very 
expensive. A lot of money is being spent on tois (Jamila 1, Jamila 2, Young toi Woman 1, 
Young toi woman 2, 19.11.11).The traditional tois are, as mentioned, the women’s sphere. 
Preparing for these, women gather to chat and gossip while they make traditional carpets and 
food. Although these are things that women enjoy, and tois give women some space for 
themselves away from harder labour, tois are also in some ways keeping women fulfilling the 
tasks as wives and mothers. In addition, tois drain the communities of money (Reeves 2012). 
As Kun Elek is already poor and women are not gaining or claiming space to make changes 
for their position, this reflects Cornwall’s (2011) above-mentioned dilemma. 
A lot more work which was only conducted by women, was connected to everyday chores in 
the home and involving children. These activities were for example cooking, washing, 
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fetching water and taking care of children. Some women feel that they have the same 
workload as their husbands, in addition to having the responsibility for kids and cleaning. The 
women I interviewed were more preoccupied with development efforts that would liberate 
them from some of their homely duties. Many women wanted a kindergarten, or a shop or a 
bazaar where they could work (Elmira, 19.11.11.; Jamila 1, 22.11.11.; Old lady, 22.11.11.; 
Women’s group making blankets for house warming, 19.11.2011). This would make their 
lives easier. These women were of different ages, but many had experienced the Soviet era 
and might have memories of a time were women worked more outside of the home. No 
matter why, the fact that many women wanted a bazaar or a shop where they could work 
implies that they want to come out of their homes, be active and take care of income 
generating activities. One might say that voices of the women had not been heard as these 
projects had not been realised, but an irrigation project, largely voted for by men of a certain 
age, is being implemented. It seems like what many women need in their everyday lives are 
other things than water. On one hand, access to water within closer vicinity will lift some of 
the labour burden for some women. At the same time, however, the more structural 
challenges remain, that is, women are not being liberated from their homely sphere as 
opportunities like work outside of home and kindergartens are not prioritised. It seems like 
women do not claim their rights as citizens, as spaces for decision-making are to a large 
extent closed to them. 
On the other hand, most women seemed to have participated in other participative 
arrangements than village meetings. MSDSP have implemented many projects on women’s 
and children’s health as well as courses for young mothers in Kun Elek. Women seem to 
especially value the opportunity to meet other women at these meetings, and to observe the 
MSDSP women leader in the project, who was even from another country. Many women 
remember one woman from AKF, or MSDSP, that was helping to install install water taps 
around the village. They say she did a very good job.’ When there are women having courses 
or meetings, and they come and invite us, we participate’ (Jamila 2, 22.11.11). Other women 
agreed to this statement, and explained that they also would have participated in activities led 
by women (Young woman 1, 24.11.11; Emret’s friend, 22.11.11; Elmira, 19.11.11; Jamila 1, 
22.11.11). Jamila 1 was middle aged and participated in village meetings in general. But also, 
young girls who were not involved in public life otherwise were excited about the health 
meetings arranged by AKF; 
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”I have not voted for either Ayil Okhmotu, Kenesh [deputies] or Ayil Bashty. I know that some women, 
without a husband that is, are involved in these meetings. But, I have participated in other AKF meetings, for 
young mothers. It was very important for me to join, to learn, and I liked it. Unfortunately, it only lasted for an 
hour as the AKF woman had to go on to other villages” (Jamila 1’s daughter-in-law, 25.11.11). 
Further, it seems like the youngest married women did not even participate in these meetings. 
They seem to be home most of the time. Emreet, a 16 year old girl, was married to a boy 
when she was 14, when the boy was about five years older. She had been kidnapped, but was 
not too dramatic about this fact, as kidnappings in the Kyrgyz society can be conducted in a 
range of different ways and with different purposes in mind by the actors involved (USAID/ 
CAR Gender Assesment 2010; Gulette 2010). However, as she was from another village she 
did not know anyone except for her husband. She was therefore home all the time, had not 
heard about the project or participated in any meetings at all (Emreet, 22.11.11). This 
contrasted with the life of a friend of hers, a 16 year old girl who was not married. She had 
heard about the water project and had participated many times in health projects, through 
school. She was excited about these projects, as she felt she was learning something and 
meeting other young women from other places. 
“I thought it was really good, I was even at a meeting, and on a training [session]. I have even met women 
from other raions, which was really interesting.“ (Emret’s friend, 22.11.11).  
6.5.4 Spaces for women - transformative spaces or empty 
spaces?  
The example above of the women and children meetings arranged by MSDSP seems to match 
Mohanty’s (2004, 31) research on women’s participation in India. She explains how spaces 
created by aid agencies will give training and development of a certain consciousness for 
women and give them opportunity to engage in other spaces later. She argues that ‘Even the 
most unpromising of institutions may open up possibilities for learning the skills and the arts 
of governance, which people can use in other spaces’ (Mohanty 2004, 26). The Kyrgyz 
village norms and burdens for some women make it difficult for them to join in village 
meetings, and the only space they have outside home in Kun Elek to discuss women needs 
and experiences are these health meetings. This invited space has been shaped by the inviters 
to fit women’s needs and village norms. Here, they get a possibility to gain influences from 
outside and become conscious about their situation in the village.  
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On the other hand, Mohanty warns us that these spaces might also restrict possibilities for 
participation and democracy at the local level, as they still keep women in non-political and 
unthreatening spaces. In this way, such spaces must not be conflated either with democracy or 
with participation (Mohanty 2004, 27). In Mohanty’s case of ‘empty spaces’ for women in 
local forest management in India, there is no intension to get women from local forest 
committees engaged in village councils, where most decision making takes place. In fact, no 
women in this case, although participating in the forest committees, were involved in village 
council meetings (Mohanty 2004). There are no NGOs or external agencies working in the 
village, which make women accept whichever spaces the state makes. So, even though it is 
important not to bypass the state when INGOs work in villages, it is also sometimes necessary 
to have the presence of an INGO or NGO to balance the state in some cases. Here, we see a 
difference from Kun Elek. Some Kun Elek women are engaged in village meetings, and 
explain that they feel they can express their meaning (Jamila 1, Jamila 2, 19.11.11; Mother of 
Ayil Bashty, 26.11.11). There might be a better balance of INGO and state presence that 
creates possibilities for influencing other spaces than the ones created by NGOs. Thus, these 
apolitical spaces in Kun Elek might influence the political spaces, and in a way they serve as 
political spaces too. Spaces are made outside of the home, where women can learn about their 
own situation and how to act in public spaces. AKF/MSDSP can thus push women’s 
empowerment in these spaces, or, women might start taking action without being pushed. 
Through their own experiences in the spaces opened by the AKF/MSDSP, women might start 
claiming real influence in the political spaces.  Nevertheless, health and child meetings are 
non-threatening spaces, and are devoid of political, transformative or empowering meaning. 
Women are excluded in the home, and based on this household identity this exclusion is 
transferred to other spaces at higher levels, from the local to the regional, and arguably, the 
national. Here, meanings and power from one level move across scales and influence other 
levels, as described by Herod and Wright (2002). Here, scale meets institutional bricolage in a 
negative way, as stereotypes and exclusion of women are transferred from one institution - the 
home - to others – the decision-making institutions (Cleaver 2012: 128, 132).  
6.5.5 Participation of other vulnerable groups.  
Economic inequality, in Kun Elek materialised in no cattle and less land or no arable land, 
cuts across as an obstacle within groups like women and youth. As mentioned, the 
economically poor will be further excluded from supportive informal networks (Kuehnast and 
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Dudwick 2002). People without cattle and less land have a difficult time in the village, as they 
are considered to be the poorest in the village. As already mentioned, if they in addition are 
women, have few children or their husband has died, or if they are old, they seem likely to 
have very little power or possibility to impact village matters (Dabolazhe, 24.11.11).  
Suleimanova, manager for Natural Resource Management at MSDSP, explain how villagers 
are co-financing the projects that MSDSP is supporting, and how difficult this can be; 
 “20 % of the total cost they have to pay themselves. If costs are too high, they simply cannot do it. This 
depends on amount of households; if it is a small village it is difficult. If it is 500 or 700 households, it's more 
simple.” (Suleimanova, 16.11.11).  
Suleimanova also explains how dependent young people are on land and irrigation if they are 
to stay in the villages, and in the country: 
“It is difficult for villagers who are young - they might have a very small plot or no land at all. Some 
villages are just [inhabited by] youth, sometimes there is no land for them so they have to move. This happens 
not often of course. Very seldom. What often happens is that they do not have irrigation water, and they start to 
move out because they do not see how they can live on there. Like what happened in the Kara Kulja village. 
They had no money to repair their canal. Without it [the canal], nothing is growing for animals to eat, so there is 
not even water for animals. If there were no such troubles to irrigate land, there would not be such strong out-
migration. Even when we have repaired some of the canals, they do not want to come back because they have 
now arranged better paid jobs than [what they can earn in] the village.” (Suleimanova, 16.11.11). 
As Dardak, the head of AO and many of the villagers tell me, the migration of people of 
working age due to lack of jobs is the real problem and focus of the irrigation project. New 
land, with improvement in soil nutrition with a new irrigation system, will expand farming 
possibilities. Young families will be able to grow more nutritious food for themselves, and 
they can expand from subsistence farming to selling their vegetables at markets. These 
economic opportunities will help halting the migration of youth who are needed for the 
village’s survival. As irrigation also will be installed in the lower part of the village, already 
populated, it will improve their lives as well as halt their seasonal migration (Niva, 30.11.11). 
As the migrants I have been talked to are seasonal migrants and come home every year, they 
have their homes in the village. Many of these young inhabitants of Kun Elek agree that they 
would stay if more and better land, together with economic opportunities in farming, was 
available in Kun Elek. One migrant exclaims ‘Of course we would stay, what do you think? 
We are from here, this is our home’ (Friend of head of village, 19.11.11). Some young men 
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seem to think that participation in village meetings are only for older men. As all the youngest 
sons are to remain at their parents’ home to take care of their parents, they have perhaps a 
somewhat different role in the village than older sons or older men. Maybe this is why they 
are not participating. Even though they will probably stay in the village later, they are still not 
participating in any village meetings (Zamir, Friend, Friend’s brother, Worker Boy, 28.11.11; 
Viktor, 29.11.11).  
Several young men in the village, many of them working on the project, wanted a sports or 
culture centre to be set up, or the possibility to do something entertaining in the village 
(Young workers 22.11.11; Other young workers/men 25.11.11). As mentioned, many women 
of different ages also wanted other development efforts that could make their everyday lives 
better. Hence, women and young people of both genders have wishes for their well-being that 
are not being implemented. Also, it is clear that young people need more than water to stay in 
Kun Elek. As Suleimanova mentioned above, they might stay in the capital as income 
opportunities are better. These men’s wishes for cultural activities are covered there. 
Although many young people would like to stay in the village, it is needed to include youth in 
decision-making spaces so that they can join in an integrated plan to keep youth in the village. 
As it is now, young people are not claiming their rights as active citizens, as no space for this 
is made for or by young people in the village. As many of the villagers from these groups do 
not participate in any village meetings, and therefore have had less off a chance to have had 
an influence on decisions regarding the project, will these groups benefit from the project? 
6.5.6 Who benefits? Differences in benefits from the project 
for different groups 
Many women with whom I spoke mentioned that they had not participated in meetings, but 
they had contributed money for the irrigation project. In fact, all women and men in the 
village were to donate money or food, except for the workers (Lady without cattle, 30.11.11; 
Lady with seven children, 28.11.11). The wife of Dardak, the connected librarian who 
managed a lot of the labour and organising for the irrigation project, was working at home, 
providing all the workers food and a place to stay. This was a lot of full-time work, and she 
was paid approximately 200 USD a month for this (Wife of Dardak, 19.11.11). It contrasted 
to the others who had to pay, as she was already married into a powerful household. Also, 200 
USD is quite a sum of money a month for a villager, when many employed workers in Osh 
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earn around 48 USD a month. Compared to this, one older, poor woman with no cattle, whose 
children had moved away, told us that she had paid for the irrigation project although she 
would not benefit from it. She was living in the upper part of the village, where there was 
already water and no pipes were to be laid (Dabolazhe 24.11.11). So, meanwhile the wife of a 
powerful man in the village gains both resources and water (she is living in the lower part of 
the village, which will receive irrigation), a more excluded woman living outside the soon to 
be irrigated areas is forced to pay and does not really benefit from the project. It seems that in 
some instances the powerful benefits from this project, and the excluded does not.  
The new land that is to be irrigated had already been distributed to young, married families. 
This had been decided by the Ayil Okhmotu, and the village leader had distributed to the 
young married families who wanted a plot of land (Olimbek, 24.11.11). This secures land for 
the future vulnerable generation and the future hope of Kun Elek. At the same time, single 
young women and men are also vulnerable, and do not benefit from the project. In addition, 
the water for irrigation is meant to go to one plot first, then to the next and so on. The last 
household in the chain will have to wait a long time for water, and might have problems with 
upstream households using too much water. These kinds of problems have been observed in 
projects of an almost identical nature other places in Southern Kyrgyzstan, causing conflicts 
(Earle 2005).  In Kun Elek, land has been distributed, but it has not yet been decided which 
plots of land go to which families. So, there are some vulnerable people who benefits, and 
some, including more excluded people, who do not. Is this fair, and does this benefit the 
village, including excluded or vulnerable individuals?  
6.5.7 Leaders and authority persons – legitimate or illegitimate 
power?  
As already mentioned, three men with authority have had a significant meaning in and 
influence on the appropriation of the project. The head of Ayil Okhmotu, Niva, was crucial to 
the project. He had the right connections, the right knowledge. He knows the language of the 
aid discourse, and he knows how to write a proper project proposal. In this way, he ensured 
that Kun Elek won a competition for resources from the AKF (Niva, 30.11.11). He himself 
obtained the knowledge about irrigation projects from AKF. Also, he has the respect and 
authority to have village leaders and other villagers listen to him. So, he gathered the village 
and made a proposal so they won the project. One old lady with 7 children and no cattle said; 
94 
 
“The AO does a lot of work, he does all kinds of things. He gives us Gumpomosch [humanitarian 
aid/support], and he gathers people if there is something that needs to be fixed.” (Women with 7 children, 
28.11.11).  
At the same time, there are different opinions of the work Niva does for the village. “AO 
can’t help. Some even puts money in their pockets” (Jamila1, 19.11.11). Many old men found 
that village leaders in general were doing a good job. On the other hand, some of them 
disagreed, and said it was a big variation among leaders who really participated in decisions 
regarding the village. The present village leader was doing a good job for now (Aksakals, 
18.11.11). Many of the women also disagree. Some said that Ulan up until now had done a 
good job; some claimed he does not really help them in any important way (Women 
interviews, 18-28.11.11). However, he and Dardak have been among the drivers of the 
project, getting people to come to a village meeting where the project was voted on. Here, 
together with Niva, they also gave information about everything regarding the project, the 
need for irrigation for the village and the need for community work (Niva, 30.11.11).   
6.5.8 Community solidarity and social control 
The mechanisms of solidarity and social control - that is, leaders who can gather people for 
collective work, inform, create consent and collect money, have been crucial to the 
development project. Without the money that was collected through the authority of the 
leaders, the project could not have been implemented. These leaders and the villagers are in a 
patron-client relationship, as leaders connect villagers to resources they are otherwise 
excluded from. As the state is of little support for the villagers of Kun Elek, mainly staying 
far away and  not having much role in practice in the MSDSP-led project, these local support 
mechanisms are the only ones available. It is a bricolage process where the mechanisms 
available, traditional social control an coping mechanisms, are used in a modern development 
setting were knowledgeable actors play by the rules that have been set up by aid agencies to 
gain wanted development. 
As some vulnerable individuals and aksakals in Kun Elek expressed a disbelief in authority 
persons and that government structures would help them, they nonetheless supported the 
irrigation project to a large part (Lady without cattle, 30.11.11; Dabolazhe 24.11.11; Aksakals 
18.11.11). Most of my interviewees, including excluded women, expressed that water was 
their first priority because it would give young people work in the village (interviews 
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22.11.11, 23.11.11, 28.11.11). Water and jobs for young people were prioritised before other 
development measures on their wish list, and would perhaps lead to more improvements for 
their individual lives. As the head of village, the head of AO and Dardak had explained them 
their the opportunities through one member of the family, the irrigation was something that all 
villagers also very much saw the importance and usefulness of. Also, they did not protest very 
much that they had to pay for a project that might not even benefit them. One woman said; 
“I think it is ok to pay, because they told me that you have to pay if you want to have water. I think it is 
safe to pay, I do not think the head of AO is swindling us.” (Neighbour of Dabolazhe, 30.11.11). Another 
woman expressed their urgent need for water; 
“First we need jobs. For the youth, for example for my daughter in law. But before that, we need water. 
We cannot live without water!” (Old woman 2, 23.11.11).   
In this way, they expressed solidarity with the village and the community. My interviewees 
did not respond as negatively as in Babajanian’s research on participative approaches and 
villager’s contribution. This might be explained by the fact that my case-study took place in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan only, and here community solidarity is strong. Babajanian argues that 
more excluded respondents from poor Northern villages were especially negative towards 
paying. As migration from the South and exposure to modern capitalist social norms has 
affected Northern villages more than in the South, this has lowered village solidarity norms 
and supportive networks here. This, he stresses, is why they did not want to pay (Babajanian 
2012). At the same time, although Kun Elek villagers were positive to the project, the need 
for water to create youth employment might have been imprinted in them by people with 
authority. As villagers depend on knowledgeable leaders to connect them with resources, like 
INGO’s projects, they are in a vulnerable patron-client relationship where they will perhaps 
be indebted to their patron, or be under his strong control. For example, vulnerable villagers 
that did not benefit from the project were obliged to pay. This might make them further 
economically and socially excluded, as lack of money will exclude them from those informal 
networks that create social mobility, according to Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002).  
Nonetheless, most people did not express negative feelings about paying for the project. From 
this follows that leaders might have legitimate power to demand villagers to follow social 
norms. The fact that leaders demand villagers to pay, even though they are not directly 
benefitting from it, might be in their interest if they are sincerely preoccupied with the future 
of the village and their community. Also, it is one of the few mechanisms available to create 
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development for excluded villagers. Very many of my interviewees articulated a strong 
‘familial’ bond to the village, that ‘the whole village is related’, and that they share one 
forefather (Interviews 18-28.11.11). So, the need for irrigation does somehow overshadow the 
space for vulnerable groups, as their voices and needs are not heard. Both leaders and in many 
cases the villagers put the needs of the village first. Henry (2004) claims that this is 
citizenship based on community affiliation. Rights based and space claiming agendas are too 
naïve when they wish to tie villagers and the state together to make the state responsive. 
Social control and strong leaders are local coping mechanisms that are crucial for villages’ 
survival. This contrasts with Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Gaventa (2004), focusing on how 
little is done with the unbalanced power differences, both within the village and between 
villages and structures at different levels. This makes real change difficult to obtain, as people 
themselves need to push for their voices to be heard. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
Both institutional traits of the MSDSP and the local institutions play a continuously dual role 
for villagers. They are both enabling and disabling, and encounter one another and intertwine 
as new democratic spaces of local self-governance are based on local control and solidarity 
mechanisms. AKF’s projects are needed, as the state does not have resources to create 
irrigation services and arrange water governance reforms for its people. At the same time, 
AKF’s knowledge creates dependency for aid, and is not so much based on what villagers 
know. Nevertheless, AKF has given villages and their population new institutional tools. 
They use the AKF institutional traits, knowledge and power inventively to create 
opportunities for themselves. This is an expression of institutional bricolage, and also an 
example of how power and knowledge circulate in society (Masaki 2007). 
The success of the irrigation project in Kun Elek has been dependent on local leaders with 
networks and connections to higher levels of government. The village solidarity and control 
mechanisms have also been crucial to the realisation of the project. At the same time, some 
excluded groups are very vulnerable when these mechanisms are at play, and do often not 
benefit. These are women, young people, those that have few resources or are in general 
outside of informational and supportive networks. As the local self-government does not 
include all groups in spaces of political decision-making, the excluded risk staying excluded, 




Here follows a conclusion from both chapters, where I present my main findings on good 
governance, decentralisation and participation in Kyrgyzstan. I return to the research 
questions, and analyse and discuss them in the light of the theoretical departures that I have 
earlier presented and of the empirical findings.  How have institutional decentralisation and 
participation influenced different actors’ and institutions’ roles in governance processes? 
How has this affected development in Kyrgyzstan?  
 The outcome of good governance reforms and decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan is shaped by 
the encounter and interconnectedness of governance reforms and traditional institutional 
practices. Politics on global level merge with politics on lower level, that is, decentralisation 
policies meet informal institutions. The practical outcome is the local self-government 
structure. Institutional traits such as elder’s councils, village councils, forms of community 
solidarity and social control have either formally or informally become part of these local 
self-governance structures. Some small organisations, like the neighbourhood associations 
Jamaats, are now able to affect their local government in an easier way than others. They can 
easily apply for funds from international development organisations (Ibraimova 2009).Thus, 
pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet institutions of governance meet in governance of resources 
today; this is institutional bricolage. Meanings from earlier institutions and forms of society 
are both continued and reconfigured. In this way, we see a scaled expression of Cleaver’s 
(2012) institutional bricolage. Meanings from older institutions are reconfigured, and their 
meanings move across scales by actors. At the same time, some associations are left out, like 
women’s groups or other private associations who cannot afford and do not have time to 
register. Another quite different example are the kurultais - village assemblies or meetings – 
that have been reconfigured and can now be performed at state level. At the same time, this 
old but reconfigured institution is an obstacle for other democratic institutions, like 
parliamentary deliberations and making compromise, or other channels of affecting 
governments. The kurultais have become instruments for power abuse by the powerful.  
Foreign aid institutions are a large part of governance processes, as they have decided much 
of the decentralisation agenda. Through the AKF, the villagers have been able to work across 
different scales. They have been given additional institutional tools in a constrained 
environment, characterised by lack of resources and supportive institutions or government 
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structures. In the Kyrgyz governance system today, local, knowledgeable leaders or authority 
figures, within or with network connections to the Ayil Okhmotu, are important. Actors, that 
is, the leaders, have worked across different scales through networking when it comes to the 
state and levels within the borders of Kyrgyzstan, and through knowledge and ‘donor- talk’ 
when it comes to working with AKF. So, this is a typical example of scalar politics. Actors 
can move across scales, but the fact that power politics at these scales might usurp money or 
resources, and that those without power and donor knowledge are left out, will lead to the fact 
that some will stay excluded. 
Thus, decentralisation and participation measures have produced local arenas that create both 
possibilities and limitations for people’s participation. These are what Gaventa (2004) calls 
invited spaces or arenas. Decentralisation efforts have been implemented largely by the 
government, Western aid agencies and local and international NGOs to include people in 
governance issues, but these are still initiated, and to an extent controlled, by elites and not by 
the people themselves. They are not claimed spaces (Gaventa 2004), they were not formed 
from below and were not efforts from the people to claim their rights as citizens. The different 
institutions create for a range of channels or possibilities for actors, this also has a scaled 
expression as they can move from different scales through the different institutional 
possibilities. As decentralisation policies meet informal institutions through informal power 
networks, some powerful actors are able to affect politics at higher level in an informal way. 
They can retract resources at higher levels, whereas those without network and knowledge 
cannot.Thus, although powerful and connected actors can move across scales, decentralisation 
efforts by the government and development agencies have made the local level of politics is 
the only level that poor villagers can influence. Some, though, are excluded from influencing 
this level. In this way, decentralisation has not led to an increase of accountability from the 
central state to the people. 
What is the role of an INGO and other actors involved in a participative project at the local 
level? How are villagers participating in village development projects where issues of 
governance and participation are involved? Case-study: An integrated and participative 
irrigation project in Kun Elek, supported and implemented by MSDSP/AKF. 
The MSDSP has had a powerful role in social organisation and governance in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan, as they have created and changed the ways that Kyrgyz people organise and 
execute local governance. These changes have been enabling in the way that the executive 
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council at the local level has gained power and can now implement many development 
activities through forms of social control and village solidarity. Other forms of associations 
have failed in implementing development as they have not inhabited the power of social 
control and legitimacy the way local self-government structures have. But the changes have at 
the same time been disabling for excluded groups and individuals, who have to a large degree 
been further excluded. Those that are poorest need to pay for development projects as they are 
forced by local norms and social control mechanisms, which excludes them further from 
supportive networks as they need money to access these. 
The MSDSP also has a weak position in relation to the actual function of local self-
governance organs. It has been challenging to influence these bureaucrats’ level of skills and 
independence, as the national level is not implementing functioning plans for their 
development. In addition, resources often remain at higher levels, so the local governance 
structures remain poor. As the bureaucrats are often unskilled, many are not doing their job. 
Also, the executive council is superior to the representative council through informal 
networking and mechanisms. We see a merge of informal and formal structures through 
institutional bricolage as new formal democratic spaces are filled with informal mechanisms. 
Also, these are processes of politics of scale, where politics and power at different levels 
affect each other. There is a lack of devolution of power in the sense that people are not 
empowered through their representatives in local self-governance organs. Aid agencies like 
AKF can help local self-governments to become more transparent and skilled. At the same 
time, by doing this the central state does not take enough responsibility to make local 
governance better.  
The villagers that are most vulnerable, like women and young people, are not empowered. 
These groups only participate in practical implementation and payment for the development 
project, and do not participate in decision-making in the village. As spaces influence one 
another, and meanings are transferred from one space to another, women’s participation in 
children and health meetings is at least a step towards empowerment. Women in Kun Elek are 
at home a lot, as their chores as subsistence farmers and wives and mothers are all located 
close to home. MSDSP has created a space for women outside of the home as they arrange 
women’s and children’s health meetings.  In these meetings they get to discuss things that are 
important to their lives and futures. This might affect the homely space, and in the end also 
political spaces. As for now, it seems as if the homely space is not affecting women’s space in 
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politics. The women and children’s meetings and village meetings are now both spaces of the 
type that Gaventa (2004) calls empty. The powerful are still making and shaping decisions. 
Although the INGO-created spaces do have potential to become invited or even 
transformative spaces they are now non-threatening and devoid of political, transformative or 
empowering meaning. Women are excluded in the home, and based on this household identity 
this exclusion is transferred to other spaces at higher levels, from the local to the regional, and 
arguably, the national. Thus, the allegory of scaling can be used here as a suitable description 
of women’s empowerment and participation in Kyrgyzstan, much in tune with Herod and 
Wright’s (2002) and Cleaver’s way of thinking. Here, scale meets institutional bricolage. 
Meanings, power-differences and stereotyped imaginations from one institution influence 
others. This is spatially expressed by meanings and stereotyped imaginations moving from the 
scale of the household to a higher decision-making level. 
At the same time, the very same functions that exclude the most vulnerable are vital to a 
village’s survival. To have leaders that organise development, through control functions and 
solidarity mechanisms, is part of the reality for village life, as Henry (2004) contends. He 
rejects citizenship to claims on the state, as this does not fit with the reality in many villages 
or indigenous settings. Excluded villagers’ poverty and exclusion from state and powerful 
clan networks are not only due to the central state’s lack of political will, but also the real lack 
of resources. Institutions like village solidarity and strict obligations demanded by connected 
village leaders, somewhat controlled by the villagers, are necessary for the village’s survival, 
and it might be naïve to believe otherwise. In addition, through a positive institutional 
bricolage process, AKF/MSDSP creates more institutional choice for villages and enables 
development to happen. So, knowledge from externals are used in what Henry (2004) 
describes as ‘social coping mechanisms’. Paradoxically, AKF/MSDSP’s work also, at the 
same time, maintains dependency on aid and exclusion of vulnerable or excluded groups. 
Hence, knowledge and power circulating in society, but stemming from powerful local 
leaders or INGOs and their powerful policies, are both enabling and disabling at the same 
time. 
I think it would be fruitful to undertake further research on the dual role of local mechanisms; 
how coping processes and exclusionary mechanisms are combined and changed in complex 
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Dzholdoshjaliev, Iskender. Head of Water Resources Management Department under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources Management and Processing Industry. At his office, 
Bishkek. 10.06.11. 
2 Engineers from MSDSP. Outside, all along canal site, Kun Elek. 26.11.2011. 
Kojomkulov, Baatyrbek. Manager of Infrastructure Department at MSDSP, Osh City. At 
MSDSP office, Osh City. 25.11.2011. 
Narusbaeva, Ulara. State Secretary of the National Agency for Local Self-Government. At her 
office, Bishkek. 09.11.2011. 
“Olikbek”. The chief of Osh Oblast Agriculture Department. At his office, Osh City, 
12.112011. 
Saparova, ‘Chinara’ Chynarkan. Manager of Local Governance Department at MSDSP, Osh 
City. At MSDSP  office, Osh City. 15.11.2011. Also by email 07.02. 2013. 
Suleimanova, Jyldyz. Manager of Natural Resource Management at MSDSP, Osh City. At her 
office, Osh City. 16.11.2011. Also by email 17.09.2012. 
Village interviews 
15-20 aksakals Old or middle-aged knowledgeable men.  At an informal aaksakals meeting at 
a house warming toi, Kun Elek. 18.11.2011. 
Aksakal. Old man. At his house, Kun Elek. 25.11.2011. 
2 aksakals. Old men. In Taxi from Gulche to Kun Elek. 26.11.2011.  
Ayil Bashty/ ‘Ulan’. Village chief. In Kun Elek village. 18.11.2011, 26.11.2011. 
Dabulazhe.  Old woman. At her own house, Kun Elek. 24.1.2011. 
Dardak, the Librarian. Outside, in Kun Elek. 23.11.2011. 
Daugther-in-law of Jamila 1. Group interview in the house of Jamila 1, Kun Elek, 20.11.2011. 
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Elmira. Young woman with no job, mother. At her own house, Kun Elek. 19.11.2011. 
Emret. Young woman. At her and Zamir’s house, Kun Elek. 22.11.2011. 
Friend of Dabulazhe. At Dabulazhe’s house, Kun Elek. 24.11.2011. 
Friend of head of village. At his grandmother Jamila 1’s house, Kun Elek. 19.11.2011. 
Jamaat Bashty. Neighbourhood leader. Kun Elek, at his house, interview with wife, 
23.11.2011. 
Jamila 1, old lady. At her house, Kun Elek. 22.11.2011. 
Jamila 2, nurse, wife of Jamaat Bashty- neighbourhood leader. At her own house 
23.11.2011.Juraev, Shairbek. Director, American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. On 
the university premises, Bishkek. 12.11.2011. 
Lady without cattle. At her house, Kun Elek. 30.11.2011 
Lady with seven children. At her house, Kun Elek. 28.11.2011 Mother of Ayil Bashty. In the 
house of Ayil Bashty, Kun Elek. 26.11.2011. 
 ‘Niva’, head of Leninskyi Ayil Okhmotu. At his office in Lenin village, Leninskyi okrug, 
Alai valley, Osh oblast. 30.11.2011. 
5 old and middle-aged ladies at house-warming toi. Lower part of Kun Elek. 18.11.2011.  
Old Lady. In taxi from Gulche to Kun Elek. 22.11.2011. 
Old woman 2. At her house, Kun Elek. 23.11.2011 
Olimbek, taxi driver. At his house, Kun Elek. 24.11.2011 
Religious young man. Outside his house, Kun Elek. 23.11.2011. 
Teacher. Woman. At the school in Kun Elek. 29.11.2011. 
Wife of Dardarin/Dardak. Dardak’s house, 19.11.2011. 
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Workers. Brigady, workers team. Kun Elek, outside by pump, 17.11.2011, at Dardak’s house, 
19.11.2011. 
Young man building house. Outside his house, Kun Elek. 27.11. 2011 
4 Young men; Zamir, Zamir’s friend, Younger brother of Zamir’s friend, Worker. Friend of 
Zamir’s house, Kun Elek. 28.11.2011. 
Young Workers. At canal site, Kun Elek. 22.11.2011. 
Viktor. young man/boy, son of Olimbek. 18 years old. Outside, Kun Elek. 29.11.11 
2 Women in Helath Clinic. At the health clininc, Kun Elek, 26.11.11. 
4 Women at group interview: Jamila 1, Jamila 2, Young toi Woman 1, Young toi woman 2, 
women’s group making blankets for house-warming toi, myself and interpreter included in 
blanket making. At new house, Kun Elek, 19.11.2011. 
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